企业特许经营合约设计与监督问题研究

发布时间：2018-02-03 04:39

本文关键词： 特许经营合约设计广告效应需求不确定回购监督　出处：《湖南工业大学》2009年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：本文通过运用产业组织理论、博弈论和委托代理理论,研究了广告效应相同(受许者同质)和广告效应不同(受许者异质)情况下的特许经营合约设计、需求不确定下的回购契约的设计及特许者如何有效地对受许者搭便车行为进行监督等问题。首先,针对特许经营中的广告效应,分别讨论了广告效应相同(同质)和广告效应不同(异质)时的特许合约设计。分析结果表明:在一定条件下,特许者可通过设计最优的特许合约促使特许者与受许者都提供承诺的广告及服务水平,从而使整个特许经营系统实现最大化利益。与受许者同质的情形相比,特许者制定的使用费率和广告费率的取值范围不仅受自己成本效率及受许者成本效率的影响和价格敏感系数的影响,在受许者异质时,还受其所受广告影响的差异程度的影响,因而特许者在制定这两项费率时要综合考虑各方面的影响因素。然后,针对需求不确定下特许经营中特许者实施完全回购与无回购策略的情形,比较分析两种情形下的批发价格、销售策略、期望收益等。分析结果表明:在无回购情形下,在高需求时,受许者的销售策略是制定销售价格将其所有的订购量销售出去;而在低需求时,受许者的销售策略受需求的随机波动大小的影响。在完全回购情形下,受许者在高需求和低需求时的销售策略都是制定销售价格以实现其利润最大化的销量。特许者在无回购策略下的期望收益大于完全回购,而完全回购策略下的产品销售价格波动幅度低于无回购策略。再后,针对一个特许者和两个位于同一市场中的受许者构成的特许经营体系,分析受许者的搭便车行为与特许者的监督问题。分析结果表明:当特许者不进行监督时,如果两个受许者提供的服务质量水平具有较大的正外部性,则当受许者提供服务质量的成本位于一定的区间时,且特许经营体系持续时间较短时,受许者将存在搭便车行为,从而导致双方都不提供服务质量。但当特许经营体系持续时间较长时,如果未来收益对受许者来说较重要,则受许者可采用触发策略阻止搭便车行为的发生。如果特许经营体系持续时间较短,或者特许经营体系持续时间虽然较长,但未来收益贴现率较小,则为了阻止搭便车行为,可能需要特许者对受许者的搭便车行为进行监督。
[Abstract]:Through the use of industry organization theory, game theory and principal-agent theory, this paper studies the franchise contract design under the same advertising effect (the same quality of the licensee) and the different advertising effect (heterogeneity of the licensee). The design of repurchase contract under uncertain demand and how the franchisor can effectively supervise the free rider behavior of the franchisee. Firstly, aiming at the advertising effect in franchise, we discuss the design of concession contract with the same advertising effect (homogeneity) and different advertising effect (heterogeneity) respectively. The results show that: under certain conditions. The franchisor can make the franchisor and the franchisee provide the promised advertising and service level by designing the optimal concession contract, so as to maximize the benefits of the whole franchise system and compare with the situation where the franchisee is of the same quality. The range of the use rate and advertising rate determined by franchisor is not only affected by its own cost efficiency and the cost efficiency of the licensee and the price sensitivity coefficient, but also by the heterogeneity of the licensee. It is also affected by the degree of difference in the influence of the advertisement, so the franchisor should consider all factors when setting the two rates. Then, in view of the situation that the franchisor implements the complete repurchase strategy and the non-repurchase strategy under the uncertain demand, the wholesale price and the sales strategy under the two situations are compared and analyzed. The results show that in the case of no repurchase and high demand, the licensee's sales strategy is to set the sales price to sell all the orders; In the case of low demand, the sales strategy of the licensee is affected by the random fluctuation of the demand, in the case of complete repurchase. The sales strategy of the franchisee in the case of high demand and low demand is to set the sales price to maximize its profit. The franchisor's expected income in the absence of the repurchase strategy is greater than that of the complete repurchase. The price fluctuation of products under complete repurchase strategy is lower than that without repurchase strategy. Then, a franchise system for one franchisor and two licensees in the same market. The results show that when the franchisor does not carry out supervision, if the quality of service provided by the two licensees has a greater positive externality. When the cost of providing quality of service is in a certain range and the duration of the franchise system is relatively short, the franchisee will have a free-rider behavior. As a result, neither party provides quality of service. But when the franchise system lasts longer, if the future benefits are more important to the licensee. If the duration of the franchise system is shorter, or the franchise system duration is longer, but the discount rate of future income is smaller. In order to prevent hitchhiker, franchisor may need to supervise the rider's hitchhiker.
【学位授予单位】：湖南工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2009
【分类号】：F721.7

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