性善:本善与向善——孟子性善论的两种诠释进路及其当代省察

发布时间：2018-01-26 05:51

本文关键词： 孟子性善本善向善恻隐之心本源情感　出处：《学术界》2017年07期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：孟子性善论的本善论诠释与向善论诠释之间存在着深刻的差异性。前者是在本体论视域下言说孟子的性善论,而后者立论的根基则是"事实"与"价值"的二分。本善论诠释的理论缺陷在于其形而上的先验化诉求所导致的对生活世界中的本源性实存经验的褫夺及其对人的本真能在的遮蔽;而向善论诠释则由于过分注重经验性的内容一方面无法给予道德失败以合理说明,另一方面则是斩断了孟子性善论所蕴含的"亲—民—物"之间的存在论意义上的连续性。"恻隐之心"作为本源情感是对天地万物一体共在的本真领会。孟子性善论的真实意涵既非论证人之为人的先验善性,亦非指明生命的事实是经验性的向善过程,而是在本源情感与本真领会的基础之上提供一种指引性的哲学,进而开启一种不断超越自身旧有主体性的"性善"之路。
[Abstract]:There is a profound difference between Mencius' interpretation of nature and goodness, the former is to say Mencius' theory of goodness from the perspective of ontology. The latter is based on "fact" and "value". The theoretical defect of the interpretation of this theory of goodness lies in its metaphysical transcendental appeal, which leads to the deprivation of the original existential experience in the living world and the obscuring of the real ability of man; On the one hand, the interpretation of the theory of good cannot give reasonable explanation to moral failure due to the excessive attention to the empirical content. On the other hand, the continuity of the existential meaning of Mencius' theory of sexual goodness is cut off. As the source of emotion, it is the true understanding of the unity of heaven and earth. The true meaning of Mencius' theory of sexual goodness is not to demonstrate the transcendental goodness of human beings. Nor is the fact of life an experiential process of goodness, but a guiding philosophy based on the understanding of the original feelings and the truth. Then open a kind of constantly surpassing their old subjectivity of the road of "good nature".
【作者单位】：复旦大学哲学学院;山东大学儒学高等研究院;
【分类号】：B222.5
【正文快照】： 2.山东大学儒学高等研究院,山东济南250100)孟子的性善论虽然对中国哲学乃至整个中国文化产生了巨大的影响,但其自提出之时便引起巨大的争议与批评。自先秦至宋代之前一千多年的历史进程中,孟子的性善论从未获得广泛的认可。[1]然而,由于宋明理学家着眼于儒学本体论的建构以及

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