心之存在的证明——罗蒂后现代心灵观批判

发布时间：2018-04-13 10:12

本文选题：心 + 内在生活　；参考：《河北学刊》2017年05期

【摘要】：摧毁人们对于"心"的信任,是罗蒂哲学的任务之一,然而这一任务是否真的完成了却值得怀疑。仔细考察可以发现,他对心的种种解构,并不能消除心的存在。社会实践、相互作用不仅不能消除心,反而预设了心的存在,没有心的社会实践是不可思议的,相互作用的逻辑前提是相互作用项,也就是心。罗蒂等的说法只看到了相互作用的一个方面,即其整体性的维度,而忘记了这个整体又是向个体的内在性敞开的,如果消除了内在性,整体性、外部环境便无立足之地。心理活动和现象的连续性、稳定性表明了心的存在和独立性,心不能被归之于任何生理、神经或物理活动,而具有独立自存性。坚持心与身的区别,未必一定导致二元论。从整体论视角理解心是没有错的,但不能以整体代替局部,承认所有局部(心就是局部之一)的才是整体。以这样的整体论来看,心灵不可被归并为整体或任何其他部分。罗蒂所摧毁的不是心,而是关于心的看法。所以,关键问题应当是我们对于心的认识,而不是有没有心。
[Abstract]:Ren Wuzhi, the philosophy of Rorty, destroyed the trust in the heart, but it is doubtful whether this task has really been accomplished.Careful examination shows that his deconstruction of the mind does not eliminate its existence.Social practice, interaction not only can not eliminate the heart, but presupposes the existence of the heart. The social practice without the heart is incredible. The logical premise of the interaction is the interaction term, that is, the heart.Rorty and others only see one aspect of the interaction, that is, the dimension of its integrity, and forget that the whole is open to the internal nature of the individual. If the internality and wholeness are eliminated, the external environment will have no place.The continuity and stability of psychological activities and phenomena indicate the existence and independence of the heart, which can not be attributed to any physiological, neural or physical activity, but independent self-existence.Insisting on the difference between mind and body may not necessarily lead to dualism.It is not wrong to understand the heart from the perspective of holism, but it is not possible to substitute the whole for the part, and to admit that all the parts (the heart is one of the parts) are the whole.In such holism, the mind cannot be merged into a whole or any other part.What Rorty destroyed was not the heart, but the view of the heart.Therefore, the key issue should be our understanding of the heart, not the heart.
【作者单位】：北京师范大学价值与文化研究中心暨哲学学院;
【分类号】：B089

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