《纯粹理性批判》第三个二律背反研究

发布时间：2018-05-09 15:59

本文选题：康德 + 二律背反　；参考：《山东师范大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：在《纯粹理性批判》第三个二律背反中,康德通过一对貌似相互反对的正论与反论,提出了自由与自然决定论的两难问题。这个难题部分基于康德在先验分析论中取得的成果:自然规律的普遍性;部分基于道德对自由的要求。正是在解决这一问题的过程中,康德在《纯粹理性批判》中第一次系统讨论了自由的含义。论文共分为三个部分,第一部分回顾了第三个二律背反的正论、反论及其各自的证明,以康德的目的为线索,分析正论与反论的得失,通过尽量细致严格的分析,尽可能严谨清楚地归纳出第三个二律背反究竟揭示了怎样的困难,并以此为出发点,疏理了可能解决这一难题的理路。第二部分详细阐释了康德对第三个二律背反的解决。康德的基本思路是:既然自然规律的普遍性与自由的可能性都不能放弃,那就通过显象与物自身的区分,在两个领域分别安置二者,并由此设立了两种因果性。这里的困难是,两种相互独立的因果性,何以总是能得出同样的显象结果。通过对理性的因果性的作用方式的分析,我们最终得出结论:理性在显象世界中造成人的任性,而后者作为一种经验性性质,参与自然规律的因果决定。两种因果性的这种联结方式,有其理论得失,其缺陷在于:康德的自由概念不含有在显象世界中任意选择的能力。第三部分基于对上述缺陷的不满意,寻找康德的解决方式中造成这一结果的要害。发现关键在于康德对自然规律的严格普遍性的坚持。在第三个二律背反之前,康德已经在先验分析论中证明了自然规律的严格普遍性,因此我重新考察了康德的证明过程,主要是考察了第二类比。发现,康德在第二类比中的论证存在缺陷。这就指出了一条可能的出路:在一个并未完全被自然规律支配的时间序列(显象世界)中,允许理性在被自然规律视为随机性的地方进行任意的干预。
[Abstract]:In the third "critique of Pure reason", Kant puts forward the dilemma between freedom and natural determinism through a pair of opposite positivism and antithesis. This problem is based partly on Kant's achievements in transcendental analysis: the universality of natural laws, and partly on the moral requirements for freedom. It is in the process of solving this problem that Kant systematically discusses the meaning of freedom for the first time in critique of Pure reason. The thesis is divided into three parts. In the first part, the author reviews the third positive theory of the second law reciting, discusses their respective proofs, analyzes the gains and losses of the positive theory and the inverse theory by taking Kant's purpose as a clue, and analyzes the gains and losses of the positive theory and the inverse theory as carefully and strictly as possible. This paper sums up exactly what kind of difficulty the third second law recitation reveals, and takes it as a starting point to dredge the possible solution to this problem. The second part explains Kant's solution to the third law in detail. Kant's basic idea is that since the universality of natural law and the possibility of freedom can not be given up, the two kinds of causality can be set up through the distinction between the appearance and the object itself, respectively in the two fields. The difficulty here is why the two independent causalities always produce the same apparent results. Through the analysis of the causality of reason, we conclude that reason causes human willfulness in the visual world, and the latter, as an empirical property, takes part in the causal decision of natural laws. Two kinds of causality of this kind of connection have their theoretical gains and losses, its defect lies in: Kant's concept of freedom does not contain the ability to choose freely in the visual world. The third part is based on dissatisfied with the above defects, looking for the key to this result in Kant's solution. The key to discovery lies in Kant's adherence to the strict universality of the laws of nature. Kant had proved the strict universality of natural law in the theory of transcendental analysis before the third second law recited. So I reexamined Kant's proof process, mainly the second kind of ratio. It is found that Kant's argument in the second category is flawed. This indicates a possible way out: in a time series (visual world) that is not completely dominated by the laws of nature, reason is allowed to intervene arbitrarily where it is regarded as randomness by the laws of nature.
【学位授予单位】：山东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：B516.31

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