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论塞尔的集体意向性

发布时间:2018-05-30 09:45

  本文选题:塞尔 + 集体意向性 ; 参考:《山东大学》2014年硕士论文


【摘要】:意向性问题是当代行动哲学和心灵哲学研究的重要议题。作为意向性问题研究的主要代表,塞尔对意向性的研究开始于他对言语行为理论的讨论。随后,塞尔把意向性引入到对言语行为理论的研究中,认为意向性是以言行事的基础。按照塞尔的观点,虽然个体意向性是意向性研究的重要方面,但他仍然把研究的重心转向了集体意向性。本文通过讨论塞尔的集体意向性的相关论题、结构、社会本体论以及规范性等角度对集体意向性进行研究,试图理清集体意向性的丰富内涵。 在关于集体行动的讨论中,意向性的概念是十分重要的。塞尔认为,个体意向性是真实存在的,个体具有各自的心灵,而在这一点上集体是不同于个体的,那么集体意向性的存在是怎样的呢?个体意向性与集体意向性之间的关系问题就成为十分重要的问题。关于这些问题,塞尔主要通过以下论题来解释:首先,塞尔通过比较集体意向与个体意向的差异来证明集体意向性是真实存在的,集体意向性存在于个体的心灵当中;其次,我们在理解集体意向性时还存在一个前提,即集体意向性不能被还原为个体意向性;第三,集体意向性预设了作为合作候选者的他者感。塞尔通过目的与手段的因果性关系和目的与方式的构成性关系这两个方面来论述了集体意向性的内在结构。此外,在社会本体论的讨论中,塞尔通过前语言意向性与意向性的语言形式之间的差别、集体意向性与制度性事实的关系以及承诺和道义论等方面来讨论集体意向性是如何形成的。 关于塞尔的集体意向性理论存在着吉尔伯特等人的质疑。在吉尔伯特看来,集体合作行为必然涉及到规范性,而塞尔的集体意向性理论没有体现出规范性。笔者认为,塞尔虽然没有在集体意向性中明确提出规范性这一概念,但是塞尔的集体意向性中仍然包含着规范性的思想;并且,吉尔伯特也没有说明规范性是否是由人们的内部意向状态产生的。 塞尔的集体意向性理论是我们讨论集体行动和社会行为的基础。尤其在社会实体的建构方面,如果没有集体意向性的存在,社会实体的建构就不可能得到实现。至于塞尔集体意向性理论中存在的争议,比如集体意向性是否可以还原,集体意向性是否存在规范性等争论,从某种意义上说明了塞尔的集体意向性理论还并不十分完善,我们需要对集体意向性做进一步的研究。
[Abstract]:Intentionality is an important issue in contemporary philosophy of action and philosophy of mind. As the main representative of the study of intentionality, Searle's study of intentionality began with his discussion of speech act theory. Then, Searle introduced intentionality into the study of speech act theory, and thought that intentionality was the basis of words and deeds. According to Searle, although individual intentionality is an important aspect of intentionality research, he still focuses on collective intentionality. This paper attempts to clarify the rich connotation of collective intentionality by discussing the related topics, structure, social ontology and standardization of Searle's collective intentionality. In the discussion of collective action, the concept of intentionality is very important. According to Searle, individual intentionality is real, individual has its own mind, and at this point the collective is different from individual, so what is the existence of collective intentionality? The relationship between individual intentionality and collective intentionality becomes a very important issue. These questions are explained by Searle mainly through the following topics: first, by comparing the differences between collective intention and individual intention, Searle proves that collective intentionality is real, collective intentionality exists in individual mind; secondly, When we understand collective intentionality, there is a premise that collective intentionality can not be reduced to individual intentionality; third, collective intentionality presupposes a sense of otherness as a candidate for cooperation. Searle discusses the internal structure of collective intentionality through the causality of ends and means and the constitutive relationship between ends and ways. In addition, in the discussion of social ontology, Searle makes use of the differences between prelinguistic intentionality and intentional linguistic forms. The relationship between collective intentionality and institutional facts as well as commitment and deontic theory are discussed to discuss how collective intentionality is formed. The theory of collective intentionality of Searle has been questioned by Gilbert et al. In Gilbert's view, collective cooperative behavior must involve norms, but Searle's theory of collective intentionality does not embody normality. The author thinks that although Searle did not explicitly put forward the concept of norm in the collective intentionality, it still contains the normative thought in his collective intentionality. Gilbert also did not say whether the norm is caused by people's internal state of intention. Searle's theory of collective intentionality is the basis of our discussion of collective action and social behavior. Especially in the construction of social entity, if there is no collective intention, the construction of social entity can not be realized. As for the controversy existing in Searle's theory of collective intentionality, such as whether collective intentionality can be reduced, whether collective intentionality is normative or not, it shows in a sense that Searle's theory of collective intentionality is not very perfect. We need to do further research on collective intentionality.
【学位授予单位】:山东大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:B565.59

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