可能世界形而上学中的时空多样性及其后果

发布时间：2018-06-03 12:30

本文选题：可能世界 + 时空　；参考：《科学技术哲学研究》2017年06期

【摘要】：可能世界中的时空问题既是形而上学问题,又与几何学和物理学紧密相关。莱布尼茨认为空间是事物并存的序列,时间是事物后继的序列,它们是唯一匹配而共存的,不同的可能世界具有不同的时间和空间。刘易斯认为,时间和空间是某种使得世界内在地成为一个整体的关系系统,如果其他可能世界中的这种内在关系不是我们意义上的"时间和空间",那也是类似于时间和空间的内在关系系统,所以刘易斯允许不同的可能世界具有不同的时间和空间。莱布尼茨和刘易斯都"允许"不同的可能世界具有不同的时间和空间,这种"多样时空观"与牛顿以及克拉克的绝对时空观相冲突,它意味着几何学真理和相关物理学真理在形而上学意义上是偶然的。
[Abstract]:It is possible that space-time problems in the world are not only metaphysical problems, but also closely related to geometry and physics. Leibniz holds that space is a sequence of things coexisting, time is a sequence of things that follow, they are only matched and coexist, and different possible worlds have different time and space. Lewis believes that time and space are some kind of relational system that makes the world intrinsically a whole. If this internal relationship in other possible worlds is not our sense of "time and space", it is also a system of internal relations similar to time and space, so Lewis allows different possible worlds to have different time and space. Leibniz and Lewis both "allow" different possible worlds to have different time and space, and this "diverse view of time and space" conflicts with Newton's and Clark's absolute views of space-time. It means that geometric truth and related physical truth are accidental in metaphysical sense.
【作者单位】：南京大学哲学系;西北政法大学哲学与社会发展学院;
【分类号】：B016.9

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