康德法权学说的规范性价值：一种融贯论解读

发布时间：2018-06-21 01:41

本文选题：自由 + 法权　；参考：《山东大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：探寻康德法权学说的规范性价值,关键在于明晰康德法权学说的证成路径,主要表现为厘清法权学说与康德先行确立的道德哲学的关系。在法权原则和道德原则的关系问题上,康德本人的论述中存在一定的模糊性,国内外学者围绕此问题的解释论辩大致分为两种立场:派生论和分离论。派生论者认为,康德的法权学说以道德学说为基础,法权原则源于道德原则(表现为绝对命令),两者具有共同的规范性前提。强的立场认为,绝对命令不仅蕴含着法权原则,而且法权原则预设了道德原则。弱的立场认为,法权原则虽然不能直接源于绝对命令,但却源于道德原则的基本价值;分离论者则认为,法权学说作为独立的体系,可以经由实践理性所确立,法权原则并不能够源于道德原则。强的立场认为,法权原则不仅独立于道德原则,而且也不用预设道德原则。弱的立场认为,法权原则预设了道德原则,但道德原则却推不出法权原则。本文在汲取学界相关研究成果的基础上,通过细致解读康德法权学说的论证脉络,呈现并确证"自由"作为根本价值的乃是康德法权学说的规范性来源,以此表明康德的法权学说具有融贯的体系。在此基本线索的指引下,导论梳理了康德法权学说的诸多争论,提出本文解读将遵循康德文本的逻辑顺序:"自由—法则—义务"。第一章,以"自由"的概念为切入点,以此表明只有经由纯粹实践理性确立道德法则才能获得"真正的自由",而这个自由的体系包含内在的德性学说和外在的法权学说。第二章,法权普遍原则表征着"自由"的根本价值,其能够源于绝对命令的"人性公式",并且绝对命令能够为强制的合法性提供辩护。第三章,法权义务分为内在法权、私人法权和公共法权,联结其中推论的"实践理性的法权公设"不仅契合于"人性公式"的基本理念,而且也与"自由"的根本价值相一致。第四章,康德法权学说以道德合理性为基础,分离论的反对意见不仅忽视了自由在康德法权学说中的统摄作用,而且也偏离了康德实践哲学的根本意图。本文最终得出结论:康德法权学说的规范性价值在于"自由"的根本理念,法权普遍原则源于"人性目的"公式,法权义务也确证了"人性目的"公式的价值理念。尽管康德的法权论义务和德性义务论在立论基础、动机要素和强制方式等方面存在差异,但两者的基础都是奠基于自由价值理念并且表征了人性目的论的价值旨趣,两者的方式都是经由纯粹实践理性进而确立普遍性法则,两者的目的都是通过普遍法则"限制自由而获得自由",进而确保每个人享有平等的自由价值。
[Abstract]:To explore the normative value of Kant's doctrine of right of law, the key lies in clarifying the path of proof of Kant's doctrine of right of law, which is mainly manifested in clarifying the relationship between the doctrine of right of law and the moral philosophy established by Kant in advance. On the relationship between the principle of legal right and the principle of morality, Kant has some vagueness in his exposition, and the explanations and arguments of scholars at home and abroad on this issue can be divided into two positions: derivation theory and separation theory. Derivative theorists believe that Kant's doctrine of right of law is based on moral doctrine, and the principle of legal right originates from moral principle (expressed as absolute command), both of which have the same normative premise. The strong position is that absolute order not only contains the principle of legal right, but also presupposes moral principle. The weak position holds that the principle of legal right, although not derived directly from absolute command, is derived from the basic value of moral principle, while the separatist view is that the doctrine of legal right, as an independent system, can be established by practical rationality. The principle of legal power cannot be derived from moral principles. The strong position is that the principle of legal right is not only independent of moral principles, but also does not need to presuppose moral principles. The weak position holds that the principle of legal right presupposes moral principle, but moral principle cannot infer the principle of right of law. On the basis of drawing on the relevant research results of academic circles, this paper, through careful interpretation of Kant's doctrine of right of law, presents and confirms that "freedom" is the normative source of Kant's doctrine of right of law as its fundamental value. This shows that Kant's doctrine of right of law has a coherent system. Under the guidance of this basic clue, the introduction combs many arguments about Kant's doctrine of right of law, and points out that the interpretation of this paper will follow the logical order of Kant's text: "Freedom-Rule-obligation". In the first chapter, the concept of "freedom" is taken as the starting point, which shows that "real freedom" can only be obtained through the establishment of moral law through pure practical reason, and the system of freedom includes the internal moral doctrine and the external doctrine of legal power. The second chapter, the universal principle of legal power symbolizes the fundamental value of "freedom", which can be derived from the "human nature formula" of absolute order, and it can provide a defense for the legality of compulsion. In the third chapter, the legal rights and obligations are divided into the inherent right, the private right and the public right. The corollary "the postulate of the legal right of practice rationality" not only accords with the basic idea of "human nature formula", but also accords with the fundamental value of "freedom". In the fourth chapter, Kant's doctrine of right of law is based on moral rationality. The dissenting opinion of separation theory not only ignores the dominating role of freedom in Kant's doctrine of right of law, but also deviates from the fundamental intention of Kant's philosophy of practice. Finally, this paper draws a conclusion that the normative value of Kant's doctrine of right of law lies in the fundamental idea of "freedom", the universal principle of right of law originates from the formula of "purpose of human nature", and the duty of right of law confirms the concept of value of formula of "purpose of humanity". Although there are differences between Kant's theory of legal right and duty of virtue in the aspects of theoretical basis, motivational elements and compulsory ways, both of them are based on the concept of free value and represent the value purport of the teleological theory of human nature. Both ways are to establish universal law through pure practical reason, and both aim is to "restrict freedom and obtain freedom" through universal law, so as to ensure that everyone has equal value of freedom.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：B516.31

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