论介入主义对排斥问题的解决方案
发布时间：2018-07-23 16:43
【摘要】：自2003年伍德沃德提出系统的介入主义因果理论以来,许多非还原物理主义者企图运用该理论解决金在权的排斥问题,为心灵因果性辩护。然而,鲍姆加特纳质疑道,心物随附性和介入主义因果理论的前提相冲突,此冲突恰恰否定心灵因果性。伍德沃德作出回应,指出麦克没有区分因果依赖和非因果依赖关系(包含随附关系),并针对后者提出了新的因果定义,从而维护心灵因果性。作者针对该回应,阐明伍德沃德的新方案不适用于随附性,解决排斥问题还需另寻他法。
[Abstract]:Since Woodward put forward the systematic theory of interventional causality in 2003, many non-reductive physicists have tried to solve the exclusion of Jin Zaiquan and defend the causality of mind by using this theory. However, Baumgartner questioned the conflict between the attachment of the mind and the premise of the interventionist causality theory, which negates the mental causality. Woodward responded by pointing out that Mike did not distinguish between causality and non-causality (including attachment), and proposed a new definition of causality for the latter, thus preserving mental causality. In view of this response, the author clarifies that Woodward's new scheme is not applicable to the appurtenance, and another alternative method is needed to solve the problem of exclusion.
【作者单位】： 北京大学哲学系;
【分类号】：B712.59
，
本文编号：2140013
[Abstract]:Since Woodward put forward the systematic theory of interventional causality in 2003, many non-reductive physicists have tried to solve the exclusion of Jin Zaiquan and defend the causality of mind by using this theory. However, Baumgartner questioned the conflict between the attachment of the mind and the premise of the interventionist causality theory, which negates the mental causality. Woodward responded by pointing out that Mike did not distinguish between causality and non-causality (including attachment), and proposed a new definition of causality for the latter, thus preserving mental causality. In view of this response, the author clarifies that Woodward's new scheme is not applicable to the appurtenance, and another alternative method is needed to solve the problem of exclusion.
【作者单位】： 北京大学哲学系;
【分类号】：B712.59
，
本文编号：2140013
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