意识研究的第一人称方法论探究
发布时间：2018-09-05 12:09
【摘要】：意识的觉知感是人最亲熟、最不可怀疑的实在,但这种实在是主体性的。主体性使得对意识的认识和研究不可避免地要采取和包含第一人称的视角。然而,与科学史上得到充分发展并受到极度尊崇的对象化的或客观化的(objectified)第三人称研究方法相比,意识的第一人称研究只在最近20-30年间,藉由意识科学的建立,才缓慢地在科学界取得了合法性。本文正是以意识科学这20-30年的发展为背景,力图系统地考察意识的第一人称方法论的诸方面。首先,在第一章,本文论述了为什么必须对意识的第一人称方法进行考察。由于意识体验的主体性,意识科学从一开始就遇到了一个障碍,即"难问题"。"难问题"所带来的第一和第三人称视角之间的"解释鸿沟",使得意识科学,即使抛开意识的存在论问题(即心-身问题)不论,也仍然面临着一个方法论问题。事实上,在意识科学试图确立意识体验的相关可观察的物理事实(这些事实可能是神经的,也可能是量子的)之前,我们首先要对意识体验是什么(即体验的类型、结构和内容)有一个清晰、恰当的描述。通常,科学方法要求对物理事件的实验、观察、描述和分析需要达到主体和交互主体(inter-subject)的可重复验证;现在当要实验、观察、描述和分析的对象变为意识体验本身时,我们需要依靠主体对自身意识体验的自我揭示(self-disclose)和报告。如果说观察物理事件被认为是第三人称的,那么这种体验的自我揭示和报告就是第一人称的。研究意识状态的好的心理学、现象学和认知科学都需要依赖好的第一人称方法。因此,意识科学研究的一个基本环节就是对第一人称方法论做系统的辩护和论证。本文余下章节的论述思路循如下四个方面展开:(1)第一人称方法的意识理论基础。既然第一人称方法的内容是关于意识体验的自我揭示和报告,因此一个需要回答的问题是意识体验何以能够自我揭示和报告,换言之,意识体验的自我揭示和报告的基础是什么?在第二章中,为从理论上回应这一问题,我们考察了诸如"反思"、"注意"、"无意识"、"自身觉知"等诸多意识结构的相关理论。我们认为,意识的单一水平的"自身觉知"特性,从意识结构上给出了意识体验自我揭示的基础。在这方面,佛教传统的心智理论和"自证分"、"自证现量"、"瑜伽现量"等理论也为我们提供了丰富的理论资源。(2)第一人称方法的种类及其相应问题。第一人称方法有哪些种类?如何开展第一人称方法?第一人称方法实践中存在哪些困难?在第三章中,我们主要考察了心理学内省、现象学还原与悬搁、佛教禅定训练和第二人称访谈技巧这些第一人称方法,并试图明晰这些方法的具体操作程序,以及探讨实践操作中的困难。例如,瓦雷拉用"变得觉知"的模型描述了"悬搁"的操作程序;我们也试图尝试了明晰佛教禅修实践最一般的范式——"止"、"观"的操作模型。(3)第一人称方法下产生的第一人称报告的效度问题。作为一种科学的方法,我们需要为第一人称报告的有效性方面做出辩护;以及如何评价第一人称方法的科学效度,即它的有效性、稳定性和准确性?在第四章中,首先我们辩护了第一人称报告的有效性。现象学的"生活世界"与后现代从社会、文化的视角对认知的理解,已经打破了"唯我论"对意识研究的禁锢一一我们的心智本质上就是主体间性在先的。其次,库恩之后,一种绝对中立的观察已不复存在,知识的有效性从一种"无主体"的客观性转换为了一种"陈述行为一致性"的有效性。加之体验类和体验报告具有可重复性和可公共通达性,第一人称报告的有效性能够得以"正名"。在第一人称数据的效度方面,我们则需要提供更多促进第一人称报告准确表达的手段,例如研究者需要拥有一个熟谙第一人称方法操作程序及其体验的第二人称视角,设计良好的相关问题列表,减小实验偏差,以及实现体验报告的"主体间-神经-现象学"相互验证等。(4)第一人称方法的应用与研究的现状、展望。在第五章中,我们展示了根据第一人称方法,利用第一人称专门知识,在禅修的神经科学研究、神经现象学研究等方面,如何更好地实现了对体验的神经对应物的研究。在第六章中,我们简要对比和评估了各种第一人称方法,并概述了这个领域研究的现状和未来趋势。意识科学的第一人称方法论研究的兴起是在一个跨学科(哲学与科学)和跨传统(东方与西方)的背景下展开的,尽管我们在本文中尽力建构一个全面的框架,但仍然有许多细节研究有待补充。意识科学的第一人称方法论的未来研究空间是广阔的。
[Abstract]:Consciousness is the most intimate and unquestionable reality, but it is subjectivity. Subjectivity inevitably leads to the adoption and inclusion of a first-person perspective in the understanding and study of consciousness. However, it is objectified or objectified, which has been fully developed and highly respected in the history of science. Compared with the method of person study, the first person study of consciousness has only slowly gained its legitimacy in the scientific circles in the last 20-30 years. This paper is based on the development of consciousness science in the past 20-30 years, trying to systematically examine various aspects of the first person methodology of consciousness. Because of the subjectivity of consciousness experience, consciousness science encounters an obstacle from the very beginning, that is, the "difficult problem". The "explanatory gap" between the first and third person perspectives brought about by the "difficult problem" makes consciousness science, even if the ontological problem of consciousness (i.e. mind-body) is put aside. In fact, before conscious science attempts to establish observable physical facts about conscious experience, which may be neurological or quantum, we must first have a clear and appropriate understanding of what conscious experience is (i.e. the type, structure and content of experience). Normally, scientific methods require that experiments, observations, descriptions, and analyses of physical events be re-validated by the subject and the inter-subject; now, when the object of experiment, observation, description and analysis becomes the conscious experience itself, we need to rely on the subject's self-disclosure of the conscious experience. If observing physical events is considered to be a third person, the self-disclosure and reporting of such experiences is the first person. Good psychology, phenomenology, and cognitive science of the state of consciousness all rely on good first-person methods. Methodologies are systematically defended and demonstrated. The ideas discussed in the remaining chapters of this paper are as follows: (1) the theoretical basis of consciousness in the first person method. In other words, what is the basis for self-disclosure and reporting of conscious experience? In Chapter 2, in order to theoretically respond to this question, we examine a number of relevant theories about the structure of consciousness, such as "reflection", "attention", "unconsciousness" and "self-awareness". We believe that the "self-awareness" characteristic of a single level of consciousness is structurally related to the structure of consciousness. In this respect, the traditional Buddhist theories of mind and self-identification, self-identification, and Yoga also provide us with abundant theoretical resources. (2) The types of first-person methods and their corresponding problems. In Chapter 3, we examine the first-person methods of introspection, phenomenological reduction and suspension, Buddhist meditation training and second-person interview techniques, and try to clarify the specific operating procedures of these methods, as well as explore the difficulties in practical operation. For example, Valera uses "change" The model of perception describes the operating procedure of "suspension"; we also attempt to clarify the operating model of "stop" and "view", the most common paradigm of Buddhist meditation practice. (3) The validity of the first-person report arising from the first-person approach. As a scientific approach, we need to address the validity of the first-person report. In Chapter Four, we first defend the validity of the first-person report. Phenomenological "life world" and postmodern understanding of cognition from a social and cultural perspective have broken the "solipsism" of consciousness research. Secondly, after Kuhn, an absolutely neutral observation ceases to exist, and the validity of knowledge is transformed from the objectivity of a "non-subject" to the validity of a "consistency of declarative behavior". Moreover, experience and experience reports are repeatable and publicly available. In terms of the validity of the first-person data, we need to provide more means to promote the accurate expression of the first-person report. For example, researchers need to have a second-person perspective familiar with the first-person method operation procedures and their experience, and well-designed related issues. In the fifth chapter, we show the application and research status of the first-person method, using the first-person expertise in the study of meditative neuroscience and neurophenomenology. In Chapter 6, we briefly compare and evaluate various first-person methods, and outline the current situation and future trends in this field. The rise of the first-person methodology in consciousness science is in an interdisciplinary (philosophical and scientific) and intertraditional (oriental). In the context of the West, although we try to construct a comprehensive framework in this paper, there are still many details to be added. The future research space of the first-person methodology of consciousness science is vast.
【学位授予单位】：浙江大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：B016.9
，
本文编号：2224222
[Abstract]:Consciousness is the most intimate and unquestionable reality, but it is subjectivity. Subjectivity inevitably leads to the adoption and inclusion of a first-person perspective in the understanding and study of consciousness. However, it is objectified or objectified, which has been fully developed and highly respected in the history of science. Compared with the method of person study, the first person study of consciousness has only slowly gained its legitimacy in the scientific circles in the last 20-30 years. This paper is based on the development of consciousness science in the past 20-30 years, trying to systematically examine various aspects of the first person methodology of consciousness. Because of the subjectivity of consciousness experience, consciousness science encounters an obstacle from the very beginning, that is, the "difficult problem". The "explanatory gap" between the first and third person perspectives brought about by the "difficult problem" makes consciousness science, even if the ontological problem of consciousness (i.e. mind-body) is put aside. In fact, before conscious science attempts to establish observable physical facts about conscious experience, which may be neurological or quantum, we must first have a clear and appropriate understanding of what conscious experience is (i.e. the type, structure and content of experience). Normally, scientific methods require that experiments, observations, descriptions, and analyses of physical events be re-validated by the subject and the inter-subject; now, when the object of experiment, observation, description and analysis becomes the conscious experience itself, we need to rely on the subject's self-disclosure of the conscious experience. If observing physical events is considered to be a third person, the self-disclosure and reporting of such experiences is the first person. Good psychology, phenomenology, and cognitive science of the state of consciousness all rely on good first-person methods. Methodologies are systematically defended and demonstrated. The ideas discussed in the remaining chapters of this paper are as follows: (1) the theoretical basis of consciousness in the first person method. In other words, what is the basis for self-disclosure and reporting of conscious experience? In Chapter 2, in order to theoretically respond to this question, we examine a number of relevant theories about the structure of consciousness, such as "reflection", "attention", "unconsciousness" and "self-awareness". We believe that the "self-awareness" characteristic of a single level of consciousness is structurally related to the structure of consciousness. In this respect, the traditional Buddhist theories of mind and self-identification, self-identification, and Yoga also provide us with abundant theoretical resources. (2) The types of first-person methods and their corresponding problems. In Chapter 3, we examine the first-person methods of introspection, phenomenological reduction and suspension, Buddhist meditation training and second-person interview techniques, and try to clarify the specific operating procedures of these methods, as well as explore the difficulties in practical operation. For example, Valera uses "change" The model of perception describes the operating procedure of "suspension"; we also attempt to clarify the operating model of "stop" and "view", the most common paradigm of Buddhist meditation practice. (3) The validity of the first-person report arising from the first-person approach. As a scientific approach, we need to address the validity of the first-person report. In Chapter Four, we first defend the validity of the first-person report. Phenomenological "life world" and postmodern understanding of cognition from a social and cultural perspective have broken the "solipsism" of consciousness research. Secondly, after Kuhn, an absolutely neutral observation ceases to exist, and the validity of knowledge is transformed from the objectivity of a "non-subject" to the validity of a "consistency of declarative behavior". Moreover, experience and experience reports are repeatable and publicly available. In terms of the validity of the first-person data, we need to provide more means to promote the accurate expression of the first-person report. For example, researchers need to have a second-person perspective familiar with the first-person method operation procedures and their experience, and well-designed related issues. In the fifth chapter, we show the application and research status of the first-person method, using the first-person expertise in the study of meditative neuroscience and neurophenomenology. In Chapter 6, we briefly compare and evaluate various first-person methods, and outline the current situation and future trends in this field. The rise of the first-person methodology in consciousness science is in an interdisciplinary (philosophical and scientific) and intertraditional (oriental). In the context of the West, although we try to construct a comprehensive framework in this paper, there are still many details to be added. The future research space of the first-person methodology of consciousness science is vast.
【学位授予单位】：浙江大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：B016.9
，
本文编号：2224222
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