仁学理想视阈下先秦儒家义与利的价值张力

发布时间：2018-10-18 15:11

【摘要】：先秦儒家对义与利的取舍态度与选择倾向成为其仁学价值的重要指向。先秦时期,辨析各自具体语境下义利范畴"公"或"私"的性质成为先秦儒家提出仁学价值及其相关价值依据的理论前提。公与私分别由各自非道德性质向具有道义性价值褒贬的范畴演化。在先秦儒家,义与利的选择性张力并非表示两者之间构成截然对立的矛盾,而是表现在价值定位的轻重或次序之别。利的价值在于主体获取生产或生活资料以存养小体,为主体的道德活动提供外在基础,义作为主体追求的价值目标并不是远离现实经验的抽象理念,道德活动的开展必须以主体基本感性需要的满足为前提。然而,功利性手段与道义性目的在本质上不同,二者不具备同等价值,利的手段只能达到利的目标,永远无法实现义的价值。
[Abstract]:The attitude and tendency to choose and choose between righteousness and benefit of Confucianism in pre-Qin period became the important direction of its value of benevolence. In the pre-Qin period, distinguishing and analyzing the nature of "public" or "private" of the category of righteousness and benefit in their respective specific context became the theoretical premise for the Confucian to put forward the value of benevolence and its related value basis. Public and private have evolved from their non-moral nature to the category with moral value. In the pre-Qin Confucianism, the selective tension of righteousness and benefit does not mean that the contradiction between them constitutes a diametrical contradiction, but is manifested in the difference of value orientation or order. The value of profit lies in that the subject acquires the production or the means of life to keep the body and provides the external basis for the subject's moral activities. As the value goal pursued by the subject, the meaning is not an abstract idea far away from the practical experience. The development of moral activities must be based on the satisfaction of the basic perceptual needs of the subject. However, utilitarian means and moral ends are different in nature, they do not have the same value, the means of profit can only achieve the goal of profit, and can never achieve the value of justice.
【作者单位】：河北大学政法学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目“儒道汇融大生命视域下的《周易》哲学研究”(14BZX056) 河北省委讲师团科研课题“儒家道德对社会主义核心价值观涵养作用研究”(201727) 河北省社会科学发展研究课题“儒家道德融入社会主义核心价值观研究”(201703010108)
【分类号】：B222

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