当前位置:主页 > 社科论文 > 哲学论文 >

胡塞尔的范畴代现理论

发布时间:2018-11-03 09:03
【摘要】:本文以胡塞尔《逻辑研究》中的范畴代现理论为研究课题,主要考察了范畴代现提出的理论背景,理论内容及其在实施中所遭遇到的理论困境,并且进一步分析了之所以导致这一困境的根源:胡塞尔在《逻辑研究》时期局限于立义内容-立义的实显性的意向分析模式。在这样一种分析模式之下,所能寻找到的直观被给予之物只能是带有实显性特征的已被构造之物,因而范畴的代现性内容无法获得明确的说明,而此后胡塞尔通过内时间意识中"滞留"概念的发现实现了对内感知和立义内容-立义模式的突破,这样一种转向则可以看作是其对此局限性的一种克服和对现象学理解的进一步深入。正文部分分为三章。第一章主要介绍范畴代现提出的理论背景。范畴代现是在客体化行为的意向分析发现和范畴直观的理论前提下提出的,它是在范畴直观的基础上从代现的角度对范畴直观的进一步说明,意在分析范畴直观中的构成情况。第二章主要就范畴代现的理论内容进行考察,其中主要解决两大争议性问题:范畴代现性内容的有与无以及如果有,它到底是什么的问题。而对这两个问题的解决牵涉到对内感知和范畴抽象这两个概念的理解,本章特别是对内感知概念的歧义性进行了阐释。第三章主要是阐明范畴代现这一理论在《逻辑研究》的现象学理解背景下所面临的理论困境以及对这一困境的突破,在《逻辑研究》时期,由于胡塞尔局限于立义内容-立义的意向分析模式,因此其所能达到的只能是在内感知中被给予的实项内在被给予性领域,因此更深和更为基础的纯粹现象领域则被错失。但是在1904/05年左右胡塞尔在内时间意识现象学的研究中通过对滞留概念的发现揭示出一种新的不同于立义内容-立义的构造模式,这是对立义内容-立义的实显性意向分析模式的有限度的拒斥和其应用范围的限定,由此深入到了原始的被动的自身被给予性领域,范畴代现也在更深层次上通过被动综合获得进一步说明。
[Abstract]:In this paper, the category agent theory in Husserl's Logic Research is taken as the research topic, and the theoretical background, the theoretical content and the theoretical dilemma encountered in the implementation of category generation are mainly investigated. And it further analyzes the causes of this dilemma: Husserl's "logical study" period is limited to the meaning of the content-the real-explicit intention analysis model. In such an analytical model, what can be found to be visually given can only be something that has been constructed with the characteristics of reality and dominance, so that the representational content of the category cannot be clearly explained. Since then, Husserl has realized the breakthrough of the internal perception and the content of the meaning-the model of Li Yi through the discovery of the concept of "retention" in the internal time consciousness. Such a turn can be seen as a way to overcome this limitation and to further understand phenomenology. The text is divided into three chapters. The first chapter mainly introduces the theoretical background of category. Category subdivision is put forward on the premise of intention analysis of objectified behavior and categorization intuitionism. It is a further explanation of categorical intuition from the perspective of category intuitionism on the basis of categorical intuitionism. It is intended to analyze the constitution of categorization intuitionism. The second chapter focuses on the theoretical content of category generation, which mainly solves two controversial issues: the existence or absence of category generation content and, if so, what it is. The solution of these two problems involves the understanding of the concepts of internal perception and category abstraction, especially the ambiguity of the concept of internal perception. The third chapter is mainly to clarify the theory of category generation under the background of phenomenological understanding of "Logic Research", and the breakthrough of this dilemma, in the period of "Logic Research". Because Husserl is confined to the intention analysis mode of meaning content and meaning, what it can achieve is only the given real item given in the inner perception, and therefore the deeper and more basic pure phenomenon field is missed. But in the study of Husserl's phenomenology of internal time consciousness in 1904 / 05 or so, through the discovery of the concept of retention, it reveals a new tectonic model different from the content of the meaning of Li Yi. This is a limited rejection of the model of contractionary content-real explicit intention analysis of meaning, and the limitation of its scope of application, thus penetrating into the original field of passive self-giving. Category generation is also further explained through passive synthesis at a deeper level.
【学位授予单位】:南京大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:B516.52

【参考文献】

相关期刊论文 前4条

1 马迎辉;;范畴、现象学还原与被给予性[J];南京社会科学;2014年09期

2 马迎辉;;范畴代现与实显性问题[J];江苏社会科学;2012年02期

3 马迎辉;;滞留的双重意向性与直观原则[J];江苏行政学院学报;2010年06期

4 陈志远;;胡塞尔范畴代现的理论失败之谜[J];哲学动态;2010年02期



本文编号:2307324

资料下载
论文发表

本文链接:https://www.wllwen.com/zhexuezongjiaolunwen/2307324.html


Copyright(c)文论论文网All Rights Reserved | 网站地图 |

版权申明:资料由用户53d4f***提供,本站仅收录摘要或目录,作者需要删除请E-mail邮箱bigeng88@qq.com