萨特早期的“他人”理论探析
发布时间：2018-11-02 16:47
【摘要】：本文所论述的重点是萨特早期的“他人”理论。“他人”理论直到二十世纪才深深的扎入到哲学的根基之中,就像托尼逊在他著名的《他者》一书中所说的一样,他人问题是二十世纪第一哲学主题。同时,“他人”问题是萨特哲学中独具匠心解决的一个问题,之所以说萨特对他人问题的解决是独具匠心的,是因为与传统哲学在认识论上认识他人不同,萨特是在存在的遭遇中遇见他人,他人的存在是因为我看见了他。他人和我一样都是作为主体的存在并且在他人的注视下,我的“自为的存在”异化为我的“为他的存在”,我的超越性又使我超越注视成为注视的主体去注视他人,我和他人之间存在着相互对象化和被对象化的关系。这样,在对象化和被对象化的过程中,我和他人之间的关系不是和谐共生的,而是一种冲突和对立。本文从《存在与虚无》入手,深刻剖析萨特的他人存在的理论背景和基础,我和他人的具体关系并分析了萨特早期他人理论的局限性。本文一共分为五个章节:第一章论述了萨特他人理论的理论背景,主要包括实在论和唯心论者对他人问题的唯我论障碍、胡塞尔的交互主体性问题、黑格尔的意识理论以及海德格尔的共在理论。萨特是在批判和继承前人的关于他人问题的理论的基础上,来阐释自己的他人理论。第二章论述了萨特他人理论的本体论基础:首先萨特改造了笛卡尔的“我思”提出了“反思前的我思”,并把“反思前的我思”作为其哲学的出发点。其次,阐述了萨特的“我思”即意识,萨特把意识看作一种纯粹的虚无,并把这种抽象的意识看作存在的源泉。除此之外,还赋予了意识否定性和超越性的特征;最后通过意识的超越性和不完满性区分了“自在的存在”和“自为的存在”。第三章论述了萨特他人理论的主体部分,表明了我与他人的关系是一种冲突和对立的关系,而不是和谐共生的关系。我与他人这种冲突的关系是通过“注视”而得到的,萨特甚至把我和他人这种冲突的关系比作是“地狱”。第四章论述了我和他人的具体关系。萨特把我和他人两种具体的关系描述成两种具体的态度,一是爱情、语言和受虐色情狂;二是冷漠、情欲、憎恨和性虐待狂。第五章论述了萨特早期他人理论的局限性。即使萨特想尽办法用存在本体论的视角来代替传统理性认知的视角去构建他的他人理论,但是还是受到来传统哲学的主客二分或意识与实在二分的二分法的影响。
[Abstract]:This paper focuses on Sartre's early "others" theory. It was not until the twentieth century that the theory of "others" was deeply rooted in philosophy. As Tonison put it in his famous book the other, the question of others was the first philosophical theme of the twentieth century. At the same time, the problem of "others" is a problem solved by originality in Sartre's philosophy. The reason why Sartre is unique in solving other people's problems is that he is different from traditional philosophy in understanding others in epistemology. Sartre met others in the suffering of existence, and they existed because I saw him. Others, like me, exist as subjects and, under the gaze of others, my "self-made existence" dissimilates to mine "for his existence", and my transcendence makes me look beyond gaze as a subject of gaze to look at others. There is a mutual objectification and objectification between me and others. In this way, in the process of objectification and objectification, the relationship between me and others is not harmonious symbiosis, but a conflict and opposition. Starting with being and nothingness, this paper deeply analyzes the theoretical background and foundation of Sartre's existence of others, the specific relationship between me and others, and analyzes the limitations of Sartre's early theory of others. This thesis is divided into five chapters: the first chapter discusses the theoretical background of Sartre's theory of others, including the barriers of realism and idealism to others' solipsism, Husserl's intersubjectivity. Hegel's theory of consciousness and Heidegger's theory of co-existence. Sartre interprets his own theory of others on the basis of criticizing and inheriting the previous theories about others. The second chapter discusses the ontological basis of Sartre's theory of others: firstly, Sartre reconstructs Descartes's "I think" and puts forward "I thought before reflection", and regards "I thought before reflection" as the starting point of his philosophy. Secondly, it expounds Sartre's "my thought" that is consciousness. Sartre regards consciousness as a kind of pure nothingness and this abstract consciousness as the source of existence. In addition, it gives consciousness negativity and transcendence, and finally distinguishes between "free existence" and "self-existence" through the transcendence and imperfection of consciousness. The third chapter discusses the main part of Sartre's theory of others, which shows that the relationship between me and others is a conflict and opposites, not a harmonious symbiotic relationship. My conflict with others was achieved by watching, and Sartre even likened my conflict to hell. The fourth chapter discusses the specific relationship between me and others. Sartre describes my relationship with others as two specific attitudes, one of love, language and masochism, the other of apathy, lust, hatred, and sexual sadism. The fifth chapter discusses the limitations of Sartre's early other theory. Even though Sartre tried his best to construct his theory of others from the perspective of ontology instead of traditional rational cognition, it was still influenced by the dichotomy of subject and object or the dichotomy between consciousness and reality in traditional philosophy.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：B565.53
本文编号：2306380
[Abstract]:This paper focuses on Sartre's early "others" theory. It was not until the twentieth century that the theory of "others" was deeply rooted in philosophy. As Tonison put it in his famous book the other, the question of others was the first philosophical theme of the twentieth century. At the same time, the problem of "others" is a problem solved by originality in Sartre's philosophy. The reason why Sartre is unique in solving other people's problems is that he is different from traditional philosophy in understanding others in epistemology. Sartre met others in the suffering of existence, and they existed because I saw him. Others, like me, exist as subjects and, under the gaze of others, my "self-made existence" dissimilates to mine "for his existence", and my transcendence makes me look beyond gaze as a subject of gaze to look at others. There is a mutual objectification and objectification between me and others. In this way, in the process of objectification and objectification, the relationship between me and others is not harmonious symbiosis, but a conflict and opposition. Starting with being and nothingness, this paper deeply analyzes the theoretical background and foundation of Sartre's existence of others, the specific relationship between me and others, and analyzes the limitations of Sartre's early theory of others. This thesis is divided into five chapters: the first chapter discusses the theoretical background of Sartre's theory of others, including the barriers of realism and idealism to others' solipsism, Husserl's intersubjectivity. Hegel's theory of consciousness and Heidegger's theory of co-existence. Sartre interprets his own theory of others on the basis of criticizing and inheriting the previous theories about others. The second chapter discusses the ontological basis of Sartre's theory of others: firstly, Sartre reconstructs Descartes's "I think" and puts forward "I thought before reflection", and regards "I thought before reflection" as the starting point of his philosophy. Secondly, it expounds Sartre's "my thought" that is consciousness. Sartre regards consciousness as a kind of pure nothingness and this abstract consciousness as the source of existence. In addition, it gives consciousness negativity and transcendence, and finally distinguishes between "free existence" and "self-existence" through the transcendence and imperfection of consciousness. The third chapter discusses the main part of Sartre's theory of others, which shows that the relationship between me and others is a conflict and opposites, not a harmonious symbiotic relationship. My conflict with others was achieved by watching, and Sartre even likened my conflict to hell. The fourth chapter discusses the specific relationship between me and others. Sartre describes my relationship with others as two specific attitudes, one of love, language and masochism, the other of apathy, lust, hatred, and sexual sadism. The fifth chapter discusses the limitations of Sartre's early other theory. Even though Sartre tried his best to construct his theory of others from the perspective of ontology instead of traditional rational cognition, it was still influenced by the dichotomy of subject and object or the dichotomy between consciousness and reality in traditional philosophy.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：B565.53
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