朱熹与“四端亦有不中节”问题——兼论恻隐之心、情境与两种伦理学的分野
发布时间：2018-11-26 08:07
【摘要】：自孟子以来,四端纯善就是不言而喻的。但是,晚年朱子挑战了这种观点,从而提出了"四端亦有不中节"的问题。在孟子的著名例子的基础之上,笔者构造了一个新案例,该案例的核心就是把儿童替换为一个恶贯满盈的成年人,并假设目击者中有的人知道这个事实,有的人不知道这个事实。于是,本文就以恻隐之心为例,辅以是否具有某种知识的条件,以及是否中节的道德判断,对认知主义与非认知主义两种伦理学的分野,予以了初步的分析。从而认为朱熹的道德哲学是认知主义的,具有敏于情境的特点;而孟子的道德哲学则是非认知主义的,具有钝于情境的特点。
[Abstract]:Since Mencius, the four ends of pure goodness is self-evident. However, in his later years, Zhu Zi challenged this view and raised the issue of "four ends are not in line with each other". On the basis of Mencius' famous example, the author constructs a new case, the core of which is to replace the child with a vicious adult, and assume that some of the witnesses know this fact. Some people don't know this fact. Therefore, this paper makes a preliminary analysis of the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive ethics by taking compassion as an example, supplemented by whether there is a certain condition of knowledge and whether moral judgment is in the middle. It is concluded that Zhu Xi's moral philosophy is cognitive and sensitive to the situation, while Mencius' moral philosophy is non-cognitive and obtuse from the situation.
【作者单位】： 厦门大学哲学系;
【基金】：教育部哲学社会科学研究后期资助项目“东亚朱子学中的人心道心问题”(编号16JHQ017) 福建省社会科学规划项目“东亚朱子学中的人心道心问题研究”(编号FJ2016A026) 国家社科基金重大项目“东亚朱子学的承传与创新研究”(编号13&ZD062)的阶段成果
【分类号】：B244.7
本文编号：2357900
[Abstract]:Since Mencius, the four ends of pure goodness is self-evident. However, in his later years, Zhu Zi challenged this view and raised the issue of "four ends are not in line with each other". On the basis of Mencius' famous example, the author constructs a new case, the core of which is to replace the child with a vicious adult, and assume that some of the witnesses know this fact. Some people don't know this fact. Therefore, this paper makes a preliminary analysis of the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive ethics by taking compassion as an example, supplemented by whether there is a certain condition of knowledge and whether moral judgment is in the middle. It is concluded that Zhu Xi's moral philosophy is cognitive and sensitive to the situation, while Mencius' moral philosophy is non-cognitive and obtuse from the situation.
【作者单位】： 厦门大学哲学系;
【基金】：教育部哲学社会科学研究后期资助项目“东亚朱子学中的人心道心问题”(编号16JHQ017) 福建省社会科学规划项目“东亚朱子学中的人心道心问题研究”(编号FJ2016A026) 国家社科基金重大项目“东亚朱子学的承传与创新研究”(编号13&ZD062)的阶段成果
【分类号】：B244.7
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