预见知识与自由意志——一个随附性理论方案

发布时间：2019-02-24 12:27

【摘要】：神学宿命论论证旨在表明神圣预见知识与人类自由意志不相容,但由于上帝预见知识的跨时间随附性,他可以在平行、对等的反事实形而上学意义上持有一个有别于实际预见知识的信念,神学宿命论论证不再可靠。随后,在形而上学维度,依据经验真理或知识随附于事件,将事实知识区别于模态知识;在认识论维度,澄清形而上学必然与认知确定之间的概念混淆,指出认知确定并不蕴含形而上学必然;在语义学维度,不使用可能世界语义学工具考察"必然"的另一种解读,以论证与人类自由相一致的一个条件句版本宿命论,这一版本的宿命论可以保证神圣预见知识之下的人类自由。此外,通过论证否证上帝预见信念的证据在任何可能世界都找不到,捍卫了尽管人类可以行使做出其他行动的自由,但上帝的预见知识是不可错的。
[Abstract]:Theological fatalism is intended to show that knowledge of divine foresight is incompatible with human free will, but because of the intertemporal attachment of knowledge of God's foresight, he can be paralleled. Equal counterfactual metaphysics holds a belief different from actual foresight and theological fatalism is no longer reliable. Then, in the metaphysical dimension, according to the empirical truth or knowledge attached to the event, the fact knowledge is distinguished from the modal knowledge; In the epistemological dimension, it clarifies the confusion between metaphysical necessity and cognitive certainty, and points out that cognitive certainty does not contain metaphysical necessity. In the semantic dimension, we do not use the tools of possible world semantics to examine another interpretation of "necessity" in order to demonstrate the fatalism of a conditional sentence version consistent with human freedom. This version of fatalism guarantees human freedom under divine foresight. Moreover, proof of God's belief in foresight cannot be found in any possible world, defending that although man may exercise the freedom to do other things, God's knowledge of foresight cannot be mistaken.
【作者单位】：南京大学哲学系;
【基金】：江苏省社科基金一般项目“模态认识论研究”(16ZXB005)阶段性成果
【分类号】：B025.9

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