德沃金权利论研究

发布时间：2018-04-27 08:57

本文选题：德沃金 + 权利论　；参考：《吉林大学》2011年硕士论文

【摘要】：为什么是权利理论?为什么是德沃金?为什么是笔者? 对于为何要研究权利理论的回答是：权利理论是中国转型社会中法理学转型的重要契机。对于为什么要研究德沃金的权利论,而不是研究其他学者的权利理论的回答是：中国学者对于德沃金权利论的研究,相对于中国学者对其他西方权利理论的研究,开展得更早,研究规模更大,德沃金的权利论在事实上对中国法理论从义务本位向权利本位转型发挥了重要作用。那么就出现了第三个问题,既然中国学者对于德沃金的权利论已经比较早就展开了规模比较大的研究,那么笔者为什么还要研究德沃金权利论?笔者认为原因在于本文有两个创新之处：其一,本文注重理论的预设与理论的结论之区分,而现有的国内二手研究文献中很多都忽视了这一重要区分,而忽视这一区分,可能会导致误读；其二,本文全文注重画结构图与逻辑图来辅助理解与研究,作为一种写作方式上的创新,这种方式能够更为简洁、清晰地体现需要用语言进行繁琐叙述且不易被理解的抽象理论。以上就是笔者为何要写德沃金权利论这个被国内学人研究已久的论题。德沃金的权利论缘起于二十世纪五、六十年代,美国的整个社会思想领域出现混乱,西方社会传统的自由主义态度受到保守主义者和激进主义者的攻击。保守主义者把社会行为的放任归咎于自由主义,认为自由主义给予个人以过多的自由,造成色情泛滥、性解放、堕胎、吸毒等社会道德的败坏。激进主义者则批评自由主义不重视财富的再分配与消灭贫穷。这场社会思想混乱导致了美国社会出现信仰危机,延续数个世纪的西方传统价值受到怀疑和出现动摇。德沃金以其法律与政治哲学思想,回应这种冲击。德沃金认为：法律的不确定反映了一个传统的政治态度的不确定,即传统的自由主义政治态度的不确定导致了法律的不确定。德沃金上世纪六、七十年代写作一些列论文的目的就是定义和捍卫一种法律的自由主义理论。德沃金的一系列论文尖锐批判了另一种被广泛认为是一种自由主义的法理论——法实证主义。一种法律的一般理论是由描述性面向和规范性面向两个部分组成的。德沃金从批判法实证主义的描述性面向,即作为法实证主义架构的中心性和组织性的命题：规则命题、系谱命题、裁量命题、法律义务的来源命题入手,构建了其早期法理论的描述性面向——原则论。而为了批判法实证主义的规范性面向——功利主义,德沃金发展了其早期法理论的规范性面向——权利论。本文即是对德沃金权利论从其理论之预设到其理论之具体展开的追根溯源式研究。包括导论和结论,本文共分为五个部分。第一部分为导论,介绍了权利论产生的时空背景,以及本文的研究动机、问题意识、研究方法与本文结构安排。第二部分讨论权利论之性质。一种一般法理论的描述性部分根植于语言哲学,并且通过语言哲学而运用逻辑学和形而上学；规范性部分根植于政治哲学和道德哲学,而政治哲学和道德哲学则转而依赖于关于人类本性的哲学理论与关于道德的客观性的哲学理论。作为一种一般性法理论的规范性部分,德沃金的权利论是一种政治理论。政治理论需要符合政治责任原则。政治责任原则所要求的是同样的情况同样对待,即清晰的前后一致。所以,如同任何一种政治理论一样,权利论也有前后一致的要求。至于是哪一方面的前后一致,就要看该理论的预设。第三部讨论德沃金权利论之预设。德沃金对法实证主义之规范性批判的方法是找出法实证主义理论之预设。德沃金权利论的预设来自于对于罗尔斯正义理论之论证特点的接受,并且在接受的基础上进行了进一步的分析和延伸,探寻罗尔斯未言之的其论证特点背后更深层次的预设。德沃金从反思性平衡、社会契约、原初状态这三个罗尔斯正义理论的论证特点延伸得出,罗尔斯正义理论最根本的预设是建构模式下的“平等的关心与尊重”的权利,这是罗尔斯正义理论中最为基础的价值,德沃金将其接受,作为权利论的预设。第四部分以以上三个部分的论证为基础,描述德沃金权利论之展开。德沃金从三个方向：权利的概念分析、法律的原则体系、法官的个人信念与社会的政治道德上展开其权利论之论证。第一,在权利的概念分析方向上：德沃金是从两个方向来解释“权利”的：政治论证的使用的角度、社会中的利益和负担的分配的特点。第二,在法律的原则体系面向上,德沃金建立了在单独的每一个权威层级上,为各个先例所提供证立的原则必须为这一权威层级上的为其他先例提供证立的原则前后一致,而对于任何一个原则来说,在每个权威层级上的这个原则,都要与更高权威层级上的这个原则前后一致,如此建构了一张法律原则的无缝之网。第三,在法官的个人道德和社会的政治道德面向上,德沃金强调其审判理论根本就没有提供法官在其自己的政治信念和法官认为的社会的政治信念之间选择的问题,相反,社会道德是法律和社会制度所以之为先决的政治道德,而法官必须依赖其自己的判断来决定社会道德包含有哪些原则,社会道德不是社会成员彼此竞争的主张之总和,而是依其各自主张的每一种竞争的主张。第五部分为结论。德沃金与法实证主义的论战始于对法官的司法自由裁量权是否存在的争论,本文用原则论和权利论两幅论证逻辑图展现了德沃金前期法理论批判法实证主义之自由裁量权的两种论证逻辑路径,并且指出了这种论证逻辑的改变的原因,在于德沃金在提出原则论之后,受到了罗尔斯1971年出版的《正义论》的影响,接受了罗尔斯的预设,并对其预设进行了延伸,进而进一步发展出其权利论。从原则论到权利论,德沃金一以贯之,建构了“无缝之网”的法律的原则体系。权利论虽然描述的是美国法体系的一个解释,但是对中国现实亦具有非常大的借鉴意义。德沃金的权利论产生于美国社会迅速变革、以功利主义思想为规范性面向的法理论占统治地位的时期,作为一个有社会责任感和历史使命感的知识分子,德沃金强调那个时代被占统治地位的法理论所一定程度忽视的个人权利。中国大陆这三十余年来也正在历经着巨大的变革,经济高速发展,人民的个人权利有所扩大,政府已经在一定程度上已经意识到法律不仅仅是统治阶级的工具,法律也要更大程度的保护个人权利,权利神圣。而作为一个人,作为一个公民,拥有什么权利以及为什么拥有权利,德沃金给出了一种解释,值得中国社会研究与借鉴。
[Abstract]:Why is the theory of rights? Why is Dworkin? Why is it the author?
The answer to why the theory of right is to be studied is that the theory of rights is an important opportunity for the transformation of jurisprudence in China's transitional society. The answer to why Dworkin's theory of rights is to be studied, rather than the study of other scholars' rights theory, is: the Chinese scholars' Study on the theory of Dworkin's rights is relative to the other western countries. The research on the theory of square rights has been carried out earlier and the research scale is larger. In fact, Dworkin's theory of rights plays an important role in the transformation of Chinese law theory from duty standard to right standard. Then there are third problems. Since Chinese scholars have already carried out a relatively large scale of Research on Dworkin's theory of rights. Why do I have to study the theory of Dworkin's rights? The author thinks that the reason is that there are two innovations in this article: first, this article pays attention to the distinction between theoretical presupposition and theoretical conclusion, and many of the existing domestic second-hand literature ignores this important distinction, but neglecting this distinction may lead to misreading; secondly, The full text of this article focuses on drawing structure and logic to assist in understanding and research. As an innovation in a writing style, this method can be more concise and clearly embodies the abstract theory that needs to be tedious and uneasily understood in language. This is why the author has been writing Dworkin's theory of rights for a long time. An argument.
Dworkin's theory of rights originated from the five and 60s twentieth Century, in 60s, the whole social ideological field of the United States was confused. The liberal attitude of the western society was attacked by the Conservatives and radicalists. The Conservatives blamed liberalism on the release of social behavior, and the liberalism gave the individual too much self. It causes the deterioration of social morality such as pornography, sexual liberation, abortion, and drug abuse. The Radicalist criticised liberalism for not paying attention to the redistribution of wealth and the eradication of poverty. This social ideological confusion led to the emergence of a belief crisis in American society, which lasted for several centuries to the suspicion and wavering of western traditional values. Dworkin took its law. Dworkin believes that the uncertainty of the law reflects the uncertainty of a traditional political attitude, that is, the uncertainty of the traditional liberal political attitude leads to the uncertainty of the law. The purpose of writing a number of papers in the six and 70s of the last century was to define and defend a law of Dworkin. The liberal theory of law. A series of Dworkin's papers sharply criticize another kind of legal theory, which is widely regarded as a liberalism - legal positivism. A general theory of law consists of two parts: descriptive orientation and normalization. Dworkin's descriptive orientation of critical law positivism is the law. The central and organizational propositions of the positivist structure: the rule proposition, the pedigree proposition, the discretionary proposition, the source proposition of the legal obligation, and the descriptive orientation of its early legal theory - the principle theory. In order to criticize the normative positivism of the legal positivism, Dworkin developed the rules of his early law theory. The right orientation is the theory of rights. This article is a traceable study of Dworkin's theory of rights from the presupposition of his theory to the concrete development of his theory.
Including introduction and conclusion, this article is divided into five parts. The first part is an introduction, which introduces the background of the time and space of the theory of rights, as well as the motivation of the study, the consciousness of the problem, the method of research and the arrangement of the structure of this article.
The second part discusses the nature of the theory of rights. A descriptive part of the theory of general law is rooted in the philosophy of language, and uses logic and metaphysics through the philosophy of language; the normative part is rooted in political philosophy and moral philosophy, while political philosophy and moral philosophy are dependent on philosophical theories and customs about human nature. The philosophical theory of Yu Daode's objectivity. As a normative part of the general law theory, Dworkin's theory of rights is a political theory. Political theory needs to conform to the principle of political responsibility. The principle of political responsibility is required to be treated the same way, that is, clear and consistent. So, like any kind of political theory, There is also a consistent requirement for the theory of rights. As to which aspect is consistent, it depends on the presupposition of the theory.
The third part discusses the presupposition of Dworkin's theory of rights. The method of Dworkin's normative criticism of legal positivism is to find out the presupposition of the theory of legal positivism. The presupposition of Dworkin's right theory comes from the acceptance of the characteristics of Rawls's theory of justice, and further analyzes and extends it on the basis of acceptance. Dworkin's unspoken argument has a deeper level of presupposition. From the demonstration characteristics of the three Rawls justice theories of reflective balance, social contract and original state, the most fundamental presupposition of Rawls's justice theory is the right of "equal heart and respect" under the construction model, which is the justice theory of Rawls. Dworkin accepted it as the most basic value in the theory of rights.
The fourth part, based on the argument of the above three parts, describes the expansion of Dworkin's theory of rights. Dworkin is from three directions: the analysis of the concept of rights, the principle system of the law, the individual belief of the judge and the political morality of the society. First, in the direction of the conceptual analysis of the rights and interests, Dworkin is from two The direction is to explain the "right": the angle of use of political argument, the characteristics of the distribution of interests and burdens in society. Second, on the basis of the principle of law, Dworkin established the principle of providing evidence for each precedent at each level of authority, which must be provided for other precedents at this level of authority. The principle of evidence is consistent, and for any principle, this principle at each level of authority should be consistent with this principle at the higher level of authority, so as to construct a seamless net of legal principles. Third, Dworkin emphasizes his judgment on the individual morality of the judge and the political and moral orientation of the society. The theory does not provide a choice between the judges in their own political beliefs and the political beliefs that the judges think of the society. On the contrary, the social morality is the first political morality of the law and the social system, and the judge must rely on its own judgment to determine the principles of the social morality, and the social morality is not. The sum of the competing opinions of members of a society is based on every competing proposition advocated by them.
The fifth part is the conclusion. The debate between Dworkin and legal positivism begins with the debate on the existence of judicial discretion in the judge. This article shows the two logic paths of the free discretion of the critical law positivism of Dworkin's early legal theory with the two logic diagrams of principle and right theory, and points out the argument. The reason for the change of logic is that Dworkin, after putting forward the principle of principle, was influenced by Rawls's "theory of justice" published in 1971, accepted the presupposition of Rawls, and extended its presupposition, and further developed his theory of rights. From principle theory to right theory, the law of devo gold was established and the law of "seamless net" was constructed. The theory of rights. Although the theory of rights describes an explanation of the American law system, it also has a great reference to the reality of China. Dworkin's theory of rights came from the rapid change in American society, a period of legal theory dominated by utilitarianism as a normative theory, and a sense of social responsibility and history. The intelligentsia with a sense of mission, Dworkin, stressed the personal rights of a certain degree that was overlooked by the dominant legal theory of that era. The Chinese mainland has also undergone tremendous changes over the past thirty years, the rapid economic development, the expansion of the people's personal rights, and the government, to a certain extent, that the law has already realized that the law is not only As a man, as a citizen, what rights and why, as a citizen, as a citizen, as a citizen, as a citizen, Dworkin gives a kind of explanation which deserves the study and reference of Chinese society.

【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D90

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