上合组织环境利益协调机制的法经济学研究——以典型国家为例

发布时间：2019-04-02 04:14

【摘要】：上海合作组织框架内,各成员国既拥有共同的环境利益,同时又存在环境利益的失衡。基于博弈分析得出,成员国各方的环保合作可以较低的成本实现组织环境利益的增进;而在组织内部的环保合作进程尚且无法全面推进时,由合作意愿更强的一方负责环保可以更高的效率获得环境利益的增进。为实现上海合作组织成员国间环境利益的协调,应按照双边、多边、国际公约的顺序分阶段地建立起成员国间的环保合作机制;同时加强组织环境立法,矫正成员国间环境利益的失衡并协调各方环境行为;依照该组织现有法律体系,分层次地构建起环境法律体系。
[Abstract]:In the framework of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), each member country has not only the common environmental interest, but also the imbalance of the environmental benefit at the same time. Based on the game analysis, it is concluded that the environmental protection cooperation of the member countries can realize the promotion of the environmental benefits of the organization at a lower cost. When the process of environmental protection cooperation within the organization is still unable to be fully promoted, it is the one who is more willing to cooperate to take charge of the environmental protection, which can improve the environmental benefits with higher efficiency. In order to realize the coordination of environmental interests among SCO member states, the environmental protection cooperation mechanism should be established in stages according to the order of bilateral, multilateral and international conventions. At the same time, strengthen the organization of environmental legislation, correct the imbalance of the environmental interests among the member countries and coordinate the environmental behavior of all parties; according to the existing legal system of the organization, construct the environmental legal system at different levels.
【作者单位】：上海政法学院经济管理学院;复旦大学法学博士后流动站;
【基金】：上海市哲学社会科学规划一般课题“当代中国多元利益矛盾的法经济学分析—以环境利益为典型”(2013BJL003)的阶段性研究成果
【分类号】：D922.6

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