董事会中心论之辩—“国美大战”之反思

发布时间：2018-01-13 06:09

本文关键词：董事会中心论之辩—“国美大战”之反思　出处：《中国政法大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：本文的出发点在于国美集团在控制权争夺中的股东大会和董事会的权力博弈问题，集中体现在“国美大战”中著名的一幕：陈晓召集了董事会会议，投票否决了白天股东大会的决议，重选贝恩资本的3名董事入国美董事局，这一事实引起笔者的思考。发现了在一个全球化的商业背景中，国美作为一个代表中国走向世界的民营品牌在公司治理国际化过程中的担当。本文的论证基础在于制度经济学中关于公司是一个“降低成本的机制”：长期契约在交易的过程中由于时间的差异和市场的瞬息万变，就需要一个“权威”出来单独的对这些契约的履行做出详细的说明和解释，这样企业和企业家这个实体就以一个权威的身份，以节约市场交易成本为理由诞生了。而关于企业的性质：“公司是一个契约束”或者“公司内部包含一个契约束”的理论探讨；股权是传统意义上的“可以被拥有的权利”还是基于代理权的认定而推定为是一种“剩余主张权”；“社会决策理论”应用到公司治理的生态环境中到底是“权威决策”还是“一致决策”会获得青睐；“有效市场理论”在多大程度上可以解释公司的治理现状，这些理论问题的探讨都构成文章论证的基础理论。而文章的分析思路就体现在西方尤其是美国关于企业的性质、“契约束”和股权性质的论证，以及在此基础上关于董事会中心论的论证，试图给正在走向国际的中国公司在这方面提供一面镜子。文章首先介绍了关于董事会权限和股东会权限在当下公司立法上的表现：作为公司权力机关二者的权限冲突一直存在模糊地带，而2005年的公司立法增加了“兜底条款”，这在一方面给董事会的权限进一步开绿灯，但是，在另一方面也大大的增加了二者权力边界的不确定性，加剧了二者的潜在冲突。其次，文章通过公司当下的治理机制中股东参与机制缺乏现状的“有效市场理论”解释；控制权和所有权分野后的代理问题解决机制分析和由此带来的控制权欲求性的主张；“漠不关心”的股东之理论和实证分析；“董事会中心论”相对于“股东会中心论”的理论论争，这一系列方面直接的论证了“董事会中心论”的优越性。再次，文章引出鲁西昂．Ａ.鲍齐克教授对“渐增的股东权利”的主张：增加股东在公司的设立、章程修改、解散和分红等方面的权利。进而同意史蒂芬．Ｍ．贝八奇教授对鲁西昂．Ａ.鲍齐克教授的反驳：股东和董事在现代公司法制度下的利益趋同性和股东参与下的种种弊端。通过这样的分析否认了“渐增的股东权利”的主张，反证了“董事会中心论”。最后，文章分析了与公司的治理结构最为密切相关的“商业判断规则”的司法适用之演变和发展：从“理性人标准”到作为“忠实义务”和“信义义务”之外的第三种义务的“善意标准”，再到作为“忠实义务”一个组成部分的“善意标准”，最后到最新的司法走向分析，，从中反映出来的公司治理理念：应用对董事会的“归责”作为对其“授权”的补充，佐证了“董事会中心论”的论断。
[Abstract]:The starting point of this paper lies in the power game problem of the shareholders ' general meeting and the board of directors in the competition of control right of Guome Group , which is reflected in the meeting of the Board of Directors , voted to reject the resolution of the general meeting of the day , and the three directors of the re - election of Mr . Benn ' s capital into the Board of Directors of the Republic of China , which has caused the author ' s thinking . In a globalized commercial context , the state and the United States act as a private brand representing China to the world in the internationalization of corporate governance . This paper is based on the theory that the company is a " cost - reducing mechanism " in the system economics : the long - term contract is based on the difference of time and the rapid change of the market in the course of the transaction , so that the entity of the enterprise and the entrepreneur is born on the basis of the fact that the enterprise is a contract bundle " or " the company contains a contract bundle " . The " effective market theory " can explain the state of the company ' s governance . The paper first introduces the definition of the competence of the board of directors and the powers of the shareholders ' meeting in the current company legislation : the conflict between the powers of the board of directors and the rights of the shareholders of the company has always been vague , and the company legislation in 2005 has increased the " touting clause " , which in the one hand gives the board permission to further open the green light , but on the other hand , it also greatly increases the uncertainty of the power boundary of the two . Secondly , the article explains the " effective market theory " of shareholder ' s participation mechanism in the current governance mechanism of the company ; the analysis of the agency problem after the control and ownership is resolved and the claim of the control right ; the theory and demonstration analysis of the shareholder with indifference ; the theory debate of the Board ' s central theory with respect to the central theory of the board of shareholders , which directly demonstrates the superiority of the " Board of Trustees " . Thirdly , Professor Lu Xionang A . Bouzik ' s claim to " increasing shareholder rights " is to increase the rights of shareholders in the establishment , amendment , dissolution and dividend of the company . Finally , the article analyzes the evolvement and development of the judicial application of the " Business Judgment Rule " which is closely related to the corporate governance structure : from the " rational person standard " to the " good faith standard " as an integral part of " faithful obligation " and " faith obligation " , and then to the latest judicial trend analysis , which reflects the corporate governance idea : the application of the " accountability " of the board of directors as a complement to its " mandate " supports the assertion of the " Board of Trustees " .

【学位授予单位】：中国政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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