美国公司法视角下控制股东信义义务的本义与移植的可行性

发布时间：2018-01-18 03:04

本文关键词：美国公司法视角下控制股东信义义务的本义与移植的可行性　出处：《比较法研究》2017年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：由于特殊的历史背景,控制股东滥用权利损害公司以及其他股东利益的情形在我国非常普遍。因此,如何有效规范控制股东的行为一直是我国公司法中的一个重要问题。对此,很多学者主张我国应当引入美国公司法中的控制股东信义义务规则。但是,本文通过深入考察美国公司法中的控制股东信义义务规则,全面整理美国公司法中控制股东信义义务规则的两大模式,即马萨诸塞州模式与特拉华州模式的基本内涵、现状与存在的问题,提出由于美国控制股东信义义务规则所要解决的问题与我国当下多有差异,因此认为我国不宜引入美国公司法中的控制股东信义义务规则,而应当通过法解释学的方法,有效运用我国《公司法》第20条之规定来实现规范控制股东行为的目标。
[Abstract]:Because of the special historical background, it is very common for the controlling shareholders to abuse their rights to harm the interests of the company and other shareholders in our country. How to effectively regulate the behavior of controlling shareholders has always been an important issue in our company law. Many scholars advocate that our country should introduce the rules of fiduciary obligations of controlling shareholders in American company law. Through the in-depth investigation of the rules of fiduciary obligations of controlling shareholders in the United States Company Law, this paper comprehensively arranges the two models of the rules of fiduciary obligations of controlling shareholders in the United States Company Law. That is, the basic connotation, current situation and existing problems of the Massachusetts model and Delaware model, it is pointed out that the problems to be solved by the rules of fiduciary obligations of the controlling shareholders in the United States are different from those in our country at present. Therefore, China should not introduce the rules of fiduciary obligations of controlling shareholders in American Company Law, but should adopt the method of legal hermeneutics. Effective use of the provisions of Article 20 of the Company Law to achieve the goal of regulating the behavior of controlling shareholders.
【作者单位】：北京大学国际法学院;
【分类号】：D971.2;DD912.29
【正文快照】： 一、问题的提出由于特殊的历史背景,我国资本市场中大量的上市公司都存在着集中持股的现象。[1]在这样的背景下,由于缺乏有效的权力制衡机制,控制股东为追求自身的利益而损害公司以及少数股东利益的事例层出不穷。[2]如何有效规范控制股东的行为,构建良好的公司治理结构,作

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