基于控制权归属的管理层股权激励效果研究

发布时间：2018-01-29 13:46

本文关键词： 管理层股权激励实质控制权股东控制管理层控制　出处：《北京交通大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：2005年我国启动股权分置改革,随后《公司法》、《证券法》进一步修订,为我国管理层股权激励铺平了道路,此后我国掀起了股权激励的热潮,截止到2011年12月31日,我国共有322家上市公司公告股权激励预案358次,真正实施股权激励197次。伴随着股权激励在我国的不断实践,学术界对激励效果展开了大量的研究,然而得出的结论并不一致,实践中也出现了伊利股份由于股权激励导致巨亏等问题。究竟是什么原因导致了激励效果的不同呢,是否是公司实质控制权的不同影响了股权激励的效果?基于此,本文选择从上市公司实质控制权归属的角度出发,研究不同控制权归属类型的公司的股权激励效果是否存在差异。本文通过研究影响公司实质控制权的各种因素,设置了公司控制权归属划分的标准,并将进行股权激励的上市公司划分为两类样本：控制权归属于股东的公司样本和控制权归属于管理层的公司样本。基于此,本文沿着股权激励的各个阶段对两类样本进行对比研究。首先,以截止到2011年12月31日所有公告股权激励预案的上市公司为样本,通过描述性统计的方法对比研究两类样本公司的股权激励方案特征；然后,以上述样本中单独公告股权激励预案的上市公司为样本,采用事件研究法对比分析两类样本在股权激励预案后的市场反应；最后,以截止到2010年12月31日真正实施了股权激励的上市公司为样本,对比研究两类样本在股权激励实施一年后公司绩效的变化,以截至到2008年12月31日真正实施了股权激励的上市公司为样本,对比研究两类样本在股权激励实施两年后的公司绩效变化。通过对两类样本的对比研究,本文得出以下结论：(1)相对于控制权归属于股东的公司,控制权归属于管理层的公司在设置股权激励方案时,由于缺少大股东的有效监督,会设置更利于管理层的激励方案；(2)相对于控制权归属于管理层的公司,控制权归属于股东的公司在公告股权激励预案后得到了更好的市场反应；(3)相对于控制权归属于管理层的公司,控制权归属于股东的公司在进行股权激励后,公司绩效得到了更为显著的提高。
[Abstract]:In 2005, China started the reform of the split share structure, and then the Company Law and the Securities Law were further revised, which paved the way for the equity incentive of our management. Since then, China has set off an upsurge of equity incentive. Up to December 31st 2011, there are 322 listed companies in China announced 358 stock incentive plans, the real implementation of equity incentives 197 times, with the equity incentive in our country with the continuous practice. Academic circles have carried out a lot of research on incentive effect, but the conclusions are not consistent. In practice, there are also problems such as the Erie shares because of equity incentive resulting in huge losses. What causes the difference of incentive effect? is it the difference of the company's substantive control right that affects the effect of equity incentive? Based on this, this paper chooses to study whether there are differences in the equity incentive effects of different ownership types of companies from the point of view of the ownership of substantive control of listed companies. In this paper, through the study of various factors affecting the substantive control of the company, set up a standard for the division of ownership of corporate control. The listed companies with equity incentive are divided into two kinds of samples: the corporate sample where the control right is vested in the shareholders and the company sample where the control right belongs to the management. This paper makes a comparative study of the two kinds of samples along the different stages of equity incentive. First of all, we take all listed companies that have announced stock incentive plans until December 31st 2011 as the sample. Through descriptive statistics, the characteristics of equity incentive schemes of two kinds of sample companies are compared. Then, taking the listed companies which separately announce the stock incentive plan among the above samples as the samples, the market reaction of the two kinds of samples after the stock incentive plan is analyzed by using the event research method. Finally, taking the listed companies that really implemented the equity incentive as samples up to December 31st 2010, this paper compares the changes of corporate performance between the two samples after the implementation of equity incentive for one year. Taking the listed companies that had implemented the equity incentive as the sample up to December 31st 2008, this paper compares the performance changes of the two kinds of samples after the implementation of the equity incentive for two years. Through the comparative study of the two kinds of samples, this paper draws the following conclusion: 1) relative to the company whose control belongs to the shareholders, the control right belongs to the management when setting up the equity incentive scheme. Due to the lack of effective supervision by large shareholders, incentive schemes that are more conducive to management will be set up; (2) compared with the company whose control right is vested in the management, the company whose control right belongs to the shareholders gets a better market response after the announcement of the stock incentive plan; Compared with the company whose control is vested in the management, the corporate performance of the company whose control is vested in the shareholders has been improved more significantly after the equity incentive.
【学位授予单位】：北京交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F276.6;F224

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