论公司董事的清算提出义务
发布时间:2018-03-16 05:09
本文选题:公司终止 切入点:解散清算 出处:《华东政法大学》2010年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】: 公司终止除分立、合并外必经清算。广义的清算包括解散清算和破产清算。在公司出现终止事由时,应及时进入清算。但是,目前中国公司在进入清算阶段出现了问题,一方面解散的公司出现了许多不合法不合理的现象,自愿解散的公司放任自流,被吊销营业执照、责令关闭或被撤销的公司不进行清算而悄然从“人间蒸发”,判决解散后无人负责清算等使公司财产被耗损、流失或恶意处置,甚至被隐匿、转移、私分;另一方面已经资不抵债的公司在已经没有资产信用担保的情况下,仍以独立法人的资格在市场上继续进行交易。当前资不抵债的公司进行超出其负债能力的交易并不受到我国公司法的限制,公司并无义务在资不抵债的情况下提出破产清算申请,这使得公司敢于冒险进行远超自己负债能力的交易,导致许多公司破产时连债务的“零头”都还不起。这些该提出清算而不提出的公司或者丧失交易资格,或者丧失交易的资产担保,仍在市场上无阻碍地进行欺诈性交易活动,无疑是“不定时炸弹”,不止损害已有债权人的利益,还很可能扩大公司债权人范围,这严重地破坏了市场交易秩序和交易安全。现有的强制清算制度等规定并不能有效地扼制这些问题。针对解散清算中出现的问题,中国司法界提出了清算义务人理论,认为由清算义务人履行启动并组织清算的义务。本文是将解散清算和破产清算两种清算情形中出现的清算提出不力问题共同考虑,将着眼点放在出现应进行清算的情形时及时提出清算这一阶段,从而将清算情形与清算制度衔接起来,将此时公司董事负有的义务概括称为公司董事的清算提出义务,明确董事在公司出现清算事由时及时、按程序地提出清算,保证公司及时进入清算程序。 本文通过探讨目前中国清算提出不力的表现及原因,提出明确董事清算提出义务的现实需要,再围绕董事的清算提出义务分析其源于董事的忠实义务和注意义务以及资产维持原则,并进行价值分析,然后对清算提出义务的提出条件、具体内容和法律后果进行建构,最后对我国提出立法建议和建立相关配套制度的建议。本文试图通过明确董事清算提出义务,并建立配套的程序规定和制度,规范出现清算事由的公司在存续期间的行为,确保公司及时进入清算程序,维护股东、债权人和其他利害关系人的权益,了结各种利益关系。
[Abstract]:In a broad sense, liquidation includes dissolution, liquidation and bankruptcy liquidation. When a company has a cause of termination, it should enter into liquidation in a timely manner. However, at present, a Chinese company is experiencing problems in entering the liquidation phase. On the one hand, many illegal and unreasonable phenomena have appeared in the disbanded company. The voluntarily dissolved company has been allowed to do its own thing and its business license has been revoked. The company that is ordered to close or be revoked is quietly "vaporized" without liquidation, and no one is responsible for liquidation after the dissolution of the judgment, which causes the company's property to be destroyed, lost or maliciously disposed of, or even concealed, transferred and privately divided; On the other hand, a company that has become insolvent without an asset credit guarantee, The current insolvent company is not restricted by the company law of our country for the transaction beyond its debt capacity. The company has no obligation to file an application for bankruptcy liquidation in the event of insolvency, which allows the company to venture into transactions that far exceed its debt capacity. Many companies fail to pay off even the small amounts of debt they owe when they go bankrupt. These companies, which should be liquidated but not proposed, either disqualify from trading or lose their asset guarantees for transactions, and continue to engage in fraudulent transactions in the market without hindrance. There is no doubt that the "time bomb" is not only harmful to the interests of existing creditors, but also likely to expand the scope of creditors of the company. This has seriously damaged the order of market transactions and the security of transactions. The existing provisions of the mandatory liquidation system cannot effectively curb these problems. In view of the problems arising from dissolution and liquidation, the Chinese judicial community has put forward the liquidation obligor theory. It is believed that the liquidation obligor shall perform the obligation of initiating and organizing liquidation. The focus of this paper is to put forward the liquidation stage in time when the liquidation should occur, so as to link the liquidation situation with the liquidation system, and to generalize the obligations of the directors of the company at this time as the liquidation obligation of the directors of the company. Make clear that the director should bring forward liquidation according to procedure in time when the company has liquidation cause, and guarantee the company to enter liquidation procedure in time. In this paper, the author discusses the performance and reasons of the ineffectiveness of liquidation in China at present, and puts forward the realistic need to make clear the obligation of director liquidation. Then it analyzes the duty of loyalty and care derived from directors and the principle of asset maintenance, and then analyzes the value of the obligation of liquidation, and then constructs the conditions, concrete contents and legal consequences of the obligation of liquidation. Finally, it puts forward legislative suggestions and suggestions on establishing relevant supporting systems. This paper attempts to clarify the obligations of directors liquidation and establish supporting procedural provisions and systems to standardize the behavior of companies with liquidation reasons during their existence. Ensure that the company enters the liquidation process in a timely manner to safeguard the interests of shareholders, creditors and other interested parties.
【学位授予单位】:华东政法大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2010
【分类号】:D922.291.91
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