论董事违反勤勉义务的赔偿责任

发布时间：2018-03-16 13:38

本文选题：公司董事　切入点：董事义务　出处：《河北经贸大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：一般认为,在董事与公司的关系上,无论将其视为何种法律关系,勤勉和忠诚是对董事在经营过程中的基本要求,由此产生在公司法上的董事两大义务。如果说忠诚义务是对董事在诚信品质上的要求,那么勤勉义务则更加侧重于对董事在技能方面的要求。由于勤勉义务的性质,对董事是否尽到该义务的考察必须建立在合理的理论界限和判断标准之上。违反勤勉义务的行为更多地是以比较隐蔽的不作为行为表现出来的。在“董事会中心主义”的现代公司治理结构中,公司法必须关注董事勤勉义务的履行。原因在于,只有董事的勤勉尽职才是公司及股东利益实现的保证。当董事因“不勤勉”的过错造成公司损害时,自应负担相应的损害赔偿责任。本文通过规范分析、比较研究等方法,借鉴民法学上关于损害赔偿的一般理论,以务实原则兼顾体系化之思考方法,梳理并试图澄清有关董事违反勤勉义务而导致损害赔偿责任的公司法理论。法律义务的不履行将导致法律责任的承担,这是法律运行的基本逻辑。同样,董事勤勉义务与董事赔偿责任也具有理论和实践上的逻辑联系。董事损害赔偿责任的学理根据在于公司与董事之间具有的特别委任关系。相比于一般民事受托人,董事所负担的义务更具有身份上的特殊性,这是董事勤勉义务得以形成的基础之一。在勤勉义务的要求上,为期衡平董事经营自由与公司商业风险的关系,董事损害赔偿责任宜采过错责任之归责原则.董事勤勉义务的内在本质要求归责原则的具体化,同时也是探讨董事损害赔偿责任构成要件的核心问题,二者共同构成了董事对公司损害赔偿责任的两条主线。这-分析框架的依据在于,作为公司行为的实际控制者,“不勤勉”的董事如果将公司置于其行为的傀儡地位并致害时,则不应拘泥于“公司人格独立”的概念法学栓桔,而应根据诚实信用原则的衡平法思想,迫使董事直接承担损害赔偿责任。无论是理论上的辨析还是制度上的比较,所有的目的最终都指向我国法律制度。我国公司法第148条规定了董事及高级管理人员的“勤勉义务”,这无疑进一步健全了董事义务制度,有利于我国公司法人治理结构的逐步完善。但是,由于该条规定过于原则化,缺乏具体的衡量标准及相应的配套机制,可能导致该条规定在实践中难以具体操作和应用而被架空论为“摆设”。因此,有必要对我国制度进行全面的反思,并从一般条款设计、判断标准选择、经验判断原则、董事责任限制以及董事责任保险等角度入手,构建适合我国的制度。其中一般条款的设计和判断标准的选择是合理确定董事勤勉义务进而决定是否对其追究责任的重要依据；而经营判断原则构成了对董事责任的抗辩。当然,就整体而言,董事损害赔偿制度的运行效果,或许存在弱化董事责任的现象。其中,董事责任保险使将董事实际负担赔偿责任与对责任董事的可非难性评价相分离,体现了现代公司制度的人性化进步,而公司对董事责任之减免以及对董事费用之补偿,则是私法自治(公司自治)原则在董事损害赔偿制度上的具体演绎。
[Abstract]:Generally, the relationship between directors and companies, no matter be considered what kind of legal relationship, diligence and honesty is the basic requirement for the board of directors in the business process, resulting in the company law board two obligations. If the duty of loyalty is to the board of directors in good faith on the quality requirements, it is the duty of diligence more focus on the board of directors in terms of skills required. Due to the nature of the duty of diligence of directors, whether to make the investigation of the obligation must be based on a reasonable theoretical limits and judgment standard. In violation of the obligation of diligence behavior is more subtle in not as behavior out. Modern corporate governance structure in the "board of directors centrism", company law must fulfill the duty of diligence attention. The reason is that due diligence is the only director of the company and the interests of shareholders. When the board of directors for the guarantee for the realization of "Qin Mian fault caused damage to the company's self burden, the corresponding liability for damages. In this paper, through normative analysis, comparative research methods, from the civil law on compensation for damage to the general theory of pragmatic principles, methods of systematic thinking, combing and trying to clarify the relevant directors in violation of the obligation of diligence and the corporation law theory of liability the damage.
The legal obligation does not perform will lead to legal liability, which is the basic logic of legal operation. Also, the duty of diligence and the board of directors liability also has the logical connection between theory and practice. The board of directors for damages according to the theory that has the special appointment relationship between the company and the board of trustees. Compared to the general civil the board of directors obligations, more special identity, this is one of the basic form of the duty of diligence. The duty of diligence requirements, the relationship between a business risk equity free operation and company directors, directors liability should adopt fault liability imputation principle. The intrinsic requirement of the duty of diligence the imputation principle of the concrete, but also on board for damages constitute the core elements of the problem, the two together constitute the board of directors of company liability for damage compensation The two main line. This framework is based on the actual control of the company, as a behavior, "diligent" Directors if the company in their behavior and the damage caused by the puppet position, should not rigidly adhere to the concept of law forcible "independent personality of the company", and should be based on equitable idea of honesty and credit in principle, forcing directors directly liable for damages.
From the comparison of theory analysis and system, all the ultimate purpose of all point to the legal system of our country. Our company law provisions of article 148th of the board of directors and senior management personnel of "duty of diligence", which will further improve the system of duty, is conducive to China's corporate governance structure gradually improved. However, since this provision is too principle, the lack of specific criteria and the corresponding mechanism, may lead to the provision in practice to specific operation and application is on the overhead "decoration". Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a comprehensive reflection of our system, and from the general clause design criteria choose, experience judgment principle, limitation of liability of directors and liability insurance perspective, to construct our system. The design of general terms and the judgment standard is a reasonable choice to determine the director Qin The duty of encouragement determines the important basis for its accountability, and the principle of business judgment constitutes a defense against the responsibility of the director.
Of course, on the whole, the running effect of system of compensation for damage of directors, may weaken the responsibility of directors. Among them, the board of directors liability insurance will be the actual burden of liability and the liability of directors accusable in evaluation of phase separation, embodies the humane progress of modern company system, and the relief of director liability company and on the cost of compensation, is the autonomy of private law (corporate autonomy principle) in the system of compensation for damage to specific interpretation of the board of directors.

【学位授予单位】：河北经贸大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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