违反勤勉义务的董事赔偿责任论

发布时间：2018-03-17 05:06

本文选题：勤勉义务　切入点：董事赔偿责任　出处：《中国政法大学》2010年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：我国《公司法》虽然规定董事对公司负有勤勉义务,但并没有进一步概括或者列举勤勉义务的内容,对董事违反勤勉义务的赔偿责任如何认定,《公司法》“沉默是金”;此种董事赔偿责任是否具有免责事由,《公司法》也不置可否。这显然容易造成“同案不同判”的审判乱象。为此,本文采用法解释学、比较研究等方法,分成三章对上述问题进行探讨,以期抛砖引玉,促使“真理”早日显现。导论在交待选题背景、原因和写作意义之外,还介绍了本文使用的主要研究方法及借鉴的主要参考文献;并以“黄光裕事件”为引子,提出八个问题,开启本文的思考之门。第一章从董事义务的法理基础开始梳理,就董事义务的确立依据评介了英美法系的“受信托人学说”、“代理人学说”及大陆法系的“受任人学说”,并指明了董事义务存续意义之所在。在此基础上,本文对勤勉义务的核心要素、职责范围进行了概括,并提出董事只对公司直接负担勤勉义务的观点。第二章自程序至实体,从原告的视角观察违反勤勉义务的董事赔偿责任如何成立。程序上,指出只有股东(大)会才有权自行作出起诉的决议;在股东提出起诉请求的情形下,监事会也可以以自己名义起诉而诉讼后果仍由公司负担。实体上,对董事赔偿责任的双重属性——违约责任性质与侵权责任性质进行阐述,并认为均应适用过错责任中的推定过错方式。董事赔偿责任构成要件系本文之重点,故按审判实践当中先易后难的思路,分别从主体要件、损害事实要件、违反勤勉义务的行为要件、过失要件、因果关系要件五方面分别展开论述。第三章从被告的视角思考违反勤勉义务的责任赔偿责任能否免除及如何免除。按立法、司法免除与公司自治免除的顺序,重点探讨了经营判断规则与公司机构决议免除的问题。为了识别合理的失误与不当的失策,经营判断规则必须是在“四要件”齐备的情形才能用于免除董事违反勤勉义务的赔偿责任。对公司机构的决议免除,本文构想了一种“三机构”互动机制:由董事会进行专业的初步判断,由监事会进行表决作出决议,由股东对监事会的决议提出异议;如果持有3%表决权的股东提出异议,则只能通过股东(大)会对董事赔偿责任的免除进行表决。通过这种机制,最大程度地利用董事会的专业、监事会的公正,克服股东(大)会的低效、董事会的偏私。结论部分,对各章节的观点进行归纳,再次回答导论提出的八个问题,并指出尚未解决的问题以求日后完善。
[Abstract]:Although the Company Law of our country stipulates that directors have the duty of diligence to the company, they do not further summarize or enumerate the contents of the duty of diligence. How to determine the liability of directors for violating the duty of diligence, "silence is golden" in the Company Law; whether such directors' liability for compensation has a reason of exemption, but also whether or not the Company Law does not. This obviously leads to a "different judgment in the same case". The trial was chaotic. For this reason, This paper uses the methods of legal hermeneutics and comparative study to discuss the above problems in three chapters in order to make the truth appear as soon as possible. In addition to the background, reasons and significance of writing, the introduction also introduces the main research methods used in this paper and the main references for reference, and takes Huang Guangyu incident as the introduction to put forward eight questions to open the door of this paper. The first chapter begins with the legal basis of directors' obligations. On the basis of the establishment of directors' obligations, this paper reviews the fiduciary theory, the agent theory and the appointed person theory of the common law system and the continental law system, and points out the significance of the directors' obligations. This paper generalizes the core elements and scope of duty of diligence obligation, and puts forward the viewpoint that directors only bear diligence obligation directly to the company. The second chapter from the procedure to the entity, from the plaintiff's angle of view to observe how the directors' liability for violating the duty of diligence is established. In the procedure, it points out that only the shareholders (big) will have the right to make the resolution of suing themselves; In the case of shareholders' suing request, the board of supervisors may sue in their own name and the litigation consequences are still borne by the company. In the entity, the dual attributes of directors' liability for compensation, the nature of breach of contract liability and the nature of tort liability, are expounded. It is believed that the constructive fault mode in fault liability should be applied. The constitutive elements of directors' liability for compensation are the focus of this paper. Therefore, according to the train of thought that it is easy to be first and then difficult in trial practice, the main elements and the elements of damaging facts should be applied respectively. The behavior elements, negligence elements and causality elements of violating diligence obligation are discussed separately. The third chapter from the defendant's angle of view to consider whether and how to exempt from the duty of diligence. According to the legislation, judicial exemption and corporate autonomy exemption order, In order to identify reasonable mistakes and improper missteps, this paper focuses on the issue of business judgment rules and company organization resolution exemption. The rules of business judgment must be in the condition of "four elements" in order to be used to relieve the directors of their liability for breach of the duty of diligence. In this paper, an interactive mechanism of "three organs" is conceived: the board of directors makes a professional preliminary judgment, the board of supervisors votes to make a resolution, and the shareholders object to the resolution of the board of supervisors; if the shareholders who hold 3% voting rights object, Through this mechanism, the profession of the board of directors, the fairness of the board of supervisors, the inefficiency of the shareholders and the bias of the board of directors can be overcome. In conclusion, the views of each chapter are summarized, and the eight questions raised by the introduction are answered again, and the unsolved problems are pointed out in order to perfect them in the future.
【学位授予单位】：中国政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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