“董事提名权限制”反收购措施的法律问题研究

发布时间：2018-04-22 01:22

本文选题：反收购措施 + 董事提名权限制　；参考：《北方工业大学》2011年硕士论文

【摘要】：上市公司在中国的出现,是中国经济体制不可逆转的具有里程碑意义的变革。从1990年底上海证券交易所和深圳证券交易所诞生至今,上市公司在中国已有了二十多年的历史。由于股权分置改革为公司的大股东提供了大量的财富增值的机会,公司控制权市场也将逐步形成,随着我国经济的不断发展,金融危机过后必然引发新一轮的收购与反收购浪潮,在成熟的市场经济国家,以及多数证券市场发达的国家大多是通过立法或者判例对目标公司的反收购行为进行规制。目前,我国在“董事提名权限制”反收购措施的立法上还存在很多不足,甚至可以说与发达国家还有很大的差距,因此,我们应当在不断的实践中寻找有利于自身的发展模式。公司的收购是通过购买一个公司的股权来获得该公司的控制权的行为,无论是有限责任公司还是股份有限公司,《公司法》都赋予了公司股东比较充分的权利,股东行使权力是通过出席股东大会会议,所持每一股份有一表决权。这样就使得大股东可以利用自己的投票权来选择对自己有利的管理者,从而达到控制公司经营的目的。股份公司的这种组织结构本身就含有公司实施反收购的可能性。由于这种收购常常有违目标公司经营者的意愿,因此,实践中,一些公司通过在修订的公司章程中置入反收购条款,达到狙击潜在并购方的目的。在修订章程时,这些上市公司都有一个偏好：在董事提名权上作文章,以限制潜在并购方获得控制公司的话语权。目前,上市公司在章程中就“股东提名董事人数等方面”加入限制条款是否合法,在理论界和法律实务界尚存很多争论。本文在前人研究的基础上,主要通过对我国具体的反收购实践和立法现状进行分析和研究,并且借鉴欧美发达国家成熟的立法经验,对董事提名权的法律问题利用实例进行论证。全文共分为五章,第一章,引言；第二章,公司章程自治与设置“董事提名权限制”条款的规制；第三章,“董事提名权限制”反收购措施的相关理论；第四章,国内外对反收购条款决定模式的选择和应用；第五章,董事提名权限制条款的价值及国内实践。
[Abstract]:The emergence of listed companies in China is an irreversible milestone change in China's economic system. Since the birth of Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange at the end of 1990, the listed companies have been in China for more than 20 years. As the reform of split share structure provides a large number of opportunities for the major shareholders of the company to increase their wealth, the market for corporate control will gradually form, and with the continuous development of our country's economy, After the financial crisis, a new wave of acquisition and anti-takeover is inevitable. In the mature market economy countries and most developed countries of the securities market, the anti-takeover behavior of the target companies is regulated by legislation or legal precedent. At present, there are still many deficiencies in the legislation of the anti-takeover measures of "restriction of director nominating right" in our country, and it can be said that there is still a big gap with the developed countries. Therefore, we should look for the development mode that is beneficial to our own in the continuous practice. The acquisition of a company is an act of acquiring control of a company by purchasing its equity. Whether it is a limited liability company or a joint stock limited company, the Company Law gives the shareholders more adequate rights. Shareholders exercise their rights by attending a general meeting of shareholders, each holding a right to vote. This enables major shareholders to use their voting rights to choose managers who are in their own interests, thus controlling the company's operations. The organizational structure of a joint-stock company itself contains the possibility of an anti-takeover. Since such acquisitions are often contrary to the wishes of the target company operators, in practice, some companies achieve the purpose of attacking potential acquirers by inserting anti-takeover clauses in the revised articles of association. In revising their statutes, these listed companies have a preference for writing on directors' nominating rights to limit the voice of potential acquirers to control the company. At present, whether it is legal for listed companies to add restrictions on the number of directors nominated by shareholders in the articles of association remains a lot of controversy in the theoretical and legal circles. On the basis of previous studies, this paper analyzes and studies the specific anti-takeover practice and legislation in China, and draws lessons from the mature legislative experience of developed countries in Europe and the United States. This paper demonstrates the legal problem of director's nominating right. The full text is divided into five chapters, chapter one, introduction; chapter two, the regulation of the autonomy of the articles of association and the establishment of "director nomination right restriction"; chapter three, the theory of anti-takeover measures of "director nomination right restriction"; chapter four, Chapter 5, the value and domestic practice of the limitation clause of director nomination right.
【学位授予单位】：北方工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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