股东压迫司法救济研究

发布时间：2018-04-24 00:00

本文选题：股东困境 + 司法救济　；参考：《中国政法大学》2011年硕士论文

【摘要】：2005年修订的《中华人民共和国公司法》(以下简称《公司法》)第183条增加了关于公司司法解散的规定,2008年最高人民法院《关于适用公司法若干问题的规定(二)》(以下简称司法解释(二))对该制度的适用作了具体规定,如适用条件、原被告的主体资格等。依照我国公司法的规定,公司僵局是司法解散的唯一事由,股东困境不适用该制度,司法实践中受压迫股东请求解散公司的,法院都没有支持。这不利于股东从公司中退出,不利于对受压迫股东利益的保护,进而会影响社会资本的利用率,不利于资本市场的健康运行和发展。论文的核心在于探讨有限责任公司股东压迫问题及其司法解散救济机制,主张在股东压迫的情形下,法院可以通过强制股权收购、司法解散、减少注册资本等方式保障公司退出机制的畅通,从而实现对中小股东利益的保护。论文阐述和分析了股东压迫的情形,国外及台湾地区有关股东压迫的公司立法及司法实践,论证了股东压迫问题产生的原因、股东压迫必须诉诸司法途径解决的必要性,最后得出论文的核心观点:应当赋予受压迫股东诉请法院解散公司的权利,股东压迫应当是法院判决解散公司的事由之一。论文包括四章。第一章论述股东压迫问题的提出,股东压迫的界定及具体的表现形式;第二章从三个方面论证了股东压迫产生的原因:有限责任公司的特点、章程无法平衡股东间的权利义务及有限责任公司不完善的治理结构;第三章列举了德、美、加、俄公司立法中有关股东压迫问题及我国有关司法解散的规定,分析了我国司法实践中三个涉及股东压迫情形的案例,得出了在我国股东压迫不是司法解散事由的结论,在此基础上论证了股东压迫必须诉诸司法途径解决的必要性;第四章阐释了如何通过司法途径解决实务中出现的股东压迫问题,包括法院可以通过司法解散及其他替代性救济措施保护受压迫股东的权利,法官在审理案件的过程中应当被赋予自由裁量权,无须动辄解散公司等内容。受压迫股东在投资设立有限责任公司时,怀有参与公司经营管理活动的期望,即他期望他能在公司中任职并领取工资、参与公司的经营管理、对公司经营决策有发言权、获取公司的经营收益、分取红利等,正是这种期望才促成了公司的设立,当这种期望在公司的存续过程中被挫败时,股东应当获得权利的救济,否则将会挫伤股东的投资热情。在股东权保护上,绝大多数发达国家已建立较为完善的法律体系,并辅之以司法救济,中小股东的利益亦能兼顾。实践证明,要构建公平合理的投资秩序和健康和谐的投资环境,必须保护受压迫股东的权利,只有这样才能活跃资本市场,实现资本的合理优化配置,最终推动社会经济的发展。
[Abstract]:Article 183 of the Company Law of the people's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as "Company Law"), as amended in 2005, added provisions on judicial dissolution of companies. The application of the system is specified in the judicial interpretation (II). Such as the applicable conditions, the principal qualifications of the original defendant, etc. According to the provisions of our company law, corporate deadlock is the only reason for judicial dissolution, shareholders' dilemma does not apply to the system, and in judicial practice, the court does not support the oppressed shareholders who request to dissolve the company. This is not conducive to the withdrawal of shareholders from the company, to the protection of the interests of the oppressed shareholders, to the utilization of social capital and to the healthy operation and development of the capital market. The core of the paper is to discuss the problem of shareholder oppression and its judicial dissolution relief mechanism of limited liability company. It is argued that under the circumstances of shareholder oppression, the court can be dissolved by compulsory equity acquisition and judicial dissolution. Reduce the registered capital and other ways to ensure the smooth exit mechanism, so as to achieve the protection of the interests of minority shareholders. This paper expounds and analyzes the situation of shareholder oppression, the corporate legislation and judicial practice of shareholder oppression in foreign countries and Taiwan, and demonstrates the reasons for the problem of shareholder oppression, and the necessity that shareholder oppression must be resolved through judicial means. Finally, the core point of the paper is that the oppressed shareholders should be given the right to appeal to the court to dissolve the company, and the shareholder oppression should be one of the reasons for the court ruling to dissolve the company. The thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter discusses the problem of shareholder oppression, the definition of shareholder oppression and its concrete form of expression, the second chapter demonstrates the causes of shareholder oppression from three aspects: the characteristics of limited liability company, The articles of association cannot balance the rights and obligations between shareholders and the imperfect governance structure of limited liability companies. Chapter three lists the problems of shareholder oppression in the legislation of German, American, Canadian and Russian companies and the provisions concerning judicial dissolution in our country. This paper analyzes three cases of shareholder oppression in China's judicial practice, draws the conclusion that shareholder oppression is not the cause of judicial dissolution in our country, and on this basis demonstrates the necessity that shareholder oppression must be resolved through judicial means; The fourth chapter explains how to solve the problem of shareholder oppression in practice through judicial means, including that the court can protect the rights of oppressed shareholders through judicial dissolution and other alternative relief measures. Judges should be given discretion in hearing cases without dissolving the company. When an oppressed shareholder invests in the establishment of a limited liability company, he has the expectation of participating in the operation and management of the company, that is, he expects him to be able to work in the company and receive his wages, to participate in the operation and management of the company, and to have a say in the company's business decisions. It is this expectation that leads to the establishment of the company. When this expectation is defeated in the course of the company's existence, the shareholders should obtain the relief of the right, otherwise it will dampen the shareholders' investment enthusiasm. In the protection of shareholders' rights, most developed countries have established a relatively perfect legal system, supplemented by judicial relief, the interests of minority shareholders can also be taken into account. Practice has proved that in order to build a fair and reasonable investment order and a healthy and harmonious investment environment, we must protect the rights of the oppressed shareholders. Only in this way can we activate the capital market and realize the rational and optimal allocation of capital. Finally promote the development of social economy.
【学位授予单位】：中国政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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