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我国上市公司管理层股权激励研究

发布时间:2018-05-10 20:33

  本文选题:股权激励 + 管理层 ; 参考:《东北财经大学》2011年硕士论文


【摘要】:西方发达国家的实践经验告诉我们,股权激励是解决现代公司委托代理问题的一种行之有效的长期激励机制。股权激励已经成为美国、日本等发达国家上市公司吸引人才、留住人才、促进公司长期可持续发展的重要措施,同时也为这些发达国家创造了无数财富。 我国在20世纪90年代就开始研究管理层股权激励问题,但我国的特殊制度背景一直制约着股权激励机制的施行。从2005年5月股权分置改革开始全面推行,继而《公司法》、《证券法》的修订,到2006年《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》等股权激励相关操作法规相继出台,这些规范和法律政策逐渐清除了阻碍我国上市公司股权激励机制实施的障碍,使得我国的股权激励进入实际可操作阶段。据统计,自2006年初正式实施股权激励开始至2010年底已经有200多家上市公司推出股权激励计划草案,同时我国上市公司管理层股权激励问题也越来越受到实务界、理论界和监管层的关注。 本文采用规范研究和案例研究相结合的研究方法,主要内容如下:第一部分主要讲述本文的研究背景与意义,国内外研究现状,本文的逻辑框架以及研究方法。第二部分介绍股权激励的相关概念、基本要素,并详细分析我国常用的几种股权激励模式,比较它们的特点及适用的公司。重点讲述了委托代理理论、人力资本产权理论、现代企业契约理论三大理论,为下文我国股权激励的研究分析做好理论上的铺垫。第三部分选取2006-2010年我国上市公司公布的股权激励计划草案为研究对象,首先从行业分布、最终控制人性质、公司规模等方面分析我国上市公司的特征,然后分析股权激励方案各要素存在的特征。第四部分对光明乳业的股权激励计划进行全面、系统分析和评价,包括股权激励实施背景分析及股权激励方案要素分析评价。第五部分根据第三部分统计分析的特征,对比光明乳业成功案例,总结出我国上市公司股权激励方案设计存在的问题,主要有:股权激励模式单一化、缺乏完善的业绩考核指标体系、行权价格设置过低等问题。第六部分针对我国股权激励实施中存在的问题,结合我国实际情况提出完善我国上市公司股权激励机制的对策建议。第七部分是结论,总结本文的研究成果,指出研究局限和进一步研究方向。 本文通过对我国上市公司管理层股权激励方案设计存在问题的分析和建议,有助于企业根据自己公司的实际情况设计恰当的激励方案,丰富和完善我国股权激励制度,促进我国上市公司股权激励的有效实施。 本文创新之处:第一,国内股权激励数据都是2010年之前的,且没有全面分析公司特征和方案特征。本文全面、系统研究了2006-2010年我国公布股权激励计划草案的全部上市公司的特征和方案各要素特征,为股权激励今后的研究提供参考;第二,采用规范研究和案例研究相结合的方法,对股权激励的实践具有一定的指导意义;第三,针对我国上市公司现阶段股权激励方案设计存在的问题,提出相应的对策及建议。
[Abstract]:The practical experience of the developed countries in the West tells us that equity incentive is an effective long-term incentive mechanism to solve the problem of modern company principal-agent. Equity incentive has become an important measure to attract talents, retain talents and promote the sustainable development of the company for a long period of time. The developed countries have created countless wealth.
In 1990s, China began to study the problem of equity incentive in management, but the special system background of China has been restricting the implementation of equity incentive mechanism. From the reform of the share division reform in May 2005, it began to carry out comprehensively, followed by the company law, the revision of the securities law, and the equity incentive management method (Trial) in 2006, and so on. These regulations and legal policies have gradually cleared up obstacles to the implementation of equity incentive mechanism in China's listed companies and made the equity incentive in our country enter the practical operation stage. According to statistics, more than 200 listed companies have launched their shares since the beginning of 2006. The draft of incentive plan has been increasingly concerned by the practical circles, theorists and regulators in China's listed companies.
The main contents of this paper are as follows: the first part is mainly about the background and significance of the research, the current situation at home and abroad, the logical framework of this paper and the research methods. The second part introduces the related concepts and basic elements of equity incentive, and analyzes in detail several common ways in China. Equity incentive model, comparing their characteristics and applicable companies, focusing on the principal-agent theory, human capital property rights theory, modern enterprise contract theory three theories, the theoretical paving for the research and analysis of China's equity incentive below. The third part selects the equity incentive plan published by Listed Companies in China for 2006-2010 years. The draft is the research object. First, the characteristics of the listed companies in China are analyzed from the distribution of industry, the nature of the final controller and the scale of the company. Then the characteristics of the various elements of the equity incentive plan are analyzed. The fourth part is a comprehensive and systematic analysis and evaluation of the equity incentive plan of the bright dairy industry, including the background analysis of the implementation of equity incentive and the implementation of the equity incentive plan. The fifth part, according to the characteristics of the statistical analysis of the third part, compares the success cases of the bright dairy industry, and summarizes the problems in the design of the equity incentive scheme for the listed companies in China, which are mainly: the simplification of the mode of equity incentive, the lack of a perfect performance appraisal index system, and the low setting of the right price. The sixth part, in view of the problems existing in the implementation of China's equity incentive, combined with the actual situation in China, proposed the countermeasures and suggestions to improve the equity incentive mechanism of Listed Companies in our country. The seventh part is the conclusion, summarizes the research results of this paper, and points out the limitations and further research direction of the research.
Through the analysis and suggestion of the problems in the design of the equity incentive scheme for the management of the listed companies in China, this paper will help the enterprise to design the appropriate incentive plan according to the actual situation of its own company, enrich and perfect the equity incentive system in our country, and promote the effective implementation of the equity incentive of the listed companies in our country.
The innovation of this article: first, the domestic equity incentive data are all before 2010, and do not fully analyze the characteristics of the company and the characteristics of the scheme. This paper systematically studies the characteristics of all listed companies in the 2006-2010 year announcement of the draft equity incentive plan in China and the characteristics of the various elements of the scheme, so as to provide reference for the future research on equity incentive. Second, the method of combining normative research and case study has a certain guiding significance to the practice of equity incentive. Third, the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are put forward in view of the problems existing in the design of equity incentive scheme at the present stage of China's listed companies.

【学位授予单位】:东北财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2011
【分类号】:F276.6

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