关联公司法律问题研究

发布时间：2018-05-17 22:37

本文选题：关联公司 + 关联交易　；参考：《吉林大学》2010年博士论文

【摘要】： 工业革命后期,连锁企业的大量涌现标志着规模经济时代的到来。企业功能、价值已远非单一公司所能实现,以追求特定经济利益为目的,将若干独立法人借由股权或契约纽带联结而成的关联公司,已成为当代社会主流经济现象。关联公司自成立之初就颇受争议。一方面,关联公司顺应了规模经济下现代市场的发展趋势,具有无可比拟的集团优势;另一方面,它又对公司法的基础理论——公司人格独立、股东有限责任提出挑战,非公平关联交易和不平等的收益分配政策增加了控制公司、公司管理者逆向选择的可能,也使从属公司、从属公司少数股东及债权人的利益面临更大的风险。随着商业实践的发展,关联公司立法状况成为反映各国公司法制完善程度的重要标尺。自19世纪下半叶开始,各主要资本主义国家就开始了关联公司立法的探索之旅。19世纪末20世纪初,德国康采恩法开创了大陆法系国家关联公司专门立法的先河,第一次引入了契约康采恩、契约康采恩、平行康采恩等概念,并对不同类型康采恩中控制公司与从属公司的归责体系、权利分配规则进行系统规定,成为现代各主要公司法国家可资借鉴的立法范式。与之相呼应,1890年美国新泽西州率先承认了关联公司的合法性,以美国为代表的英美法系国家,也在现代市场的推动和指引下开始接受关联公司这一法律概念。本文以比较法学与实证法学为视角,兼采法经济学分析方法,首先阐释了关联公司的概念范畴、立法动因,总结了各主要公司法国家关联公司立法的利弊得失;然后分析了关联公司的核心法律问题,即从属公司及其少数股东的利益保护问题、从属公司债权人保护问题以及交叉持股的限制规则;最后在总结与分析的基础之上,对我国现行关联公司立法进行反思和评述,指出我国关联公司立法的完善方向。本文一直试图表达这样一种观点:关联公司法律规制的基础是控制公司与从属公司之间的“委托—代理”关系;关联公司法律规制的核心是解决控制公司与从属公司之间三大代理问题,即控制公司与从属公司、控制公司与从属公司少数股东、控制公司与从属公司外部债权人间的利益分歧;解决关联公司法律问题的有效途径是建立一套涵盖各方利益主体在内的利益平衡机制。
[Abstract]:In the late industrial revolution, the emergence of chain enterprises marked the arrival of the era of scale economy. The function and value of an enterprise is far from being realized by a single company. In order to pursue the specific economic interests, it has become the mainstream economic phenomenon of contemporary society to connect some independent legal persons by equity or contract ties. Affiliated companies have been controversial since their inception. On the one hand, the affiliated company conforms to the development trend of the modern market under the economy of scale, and has unparalleled group advantages; on the other hand, it challenges the basic theory of company law, namely, the independence of corporate personality and the limited liability of shareholders. Unfair related party transactions and unequal income distribution policies increase the possibility of adverse selection for controlling companies and managers, and make the interests of affiliated companies, minority shareholders and creditors of subordinate companies more risky. With the development of commercial practice, the legislative status of affiliated companies has become an important yardstick to reflect the perfection of corporate legal system in various countries. Since the second half of the 19th century, the major capitalist countries have begun to explore the legislation of affiliated companies. At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the law of Koncein in Germany pioneered the special legislation of affiliated companies in the countries of the continental law system. For the first time, the concepts of contract consonant and parallel Connexion are introduced, and the liability system of control company and subordinate company and the rules of rights distribution in different types of Kangzaien are systematically stipulated. It has become the legislative paradigm of modern major company law countries. In contrast, in 1890, New Jersey first recognized the legitimacy of affiliated companies. Anglo-American legal system countries, represented by the United States, also began to accept the legal concept of affiliated companies under the impetus and guidance of the modern market. From the perspective of comparative law and empirical law, and adopting the analytical method of law and economics, this paper first explains the concept category and legislative motivation of affiliated company, and summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of the related company legislation in the major company law countries. Then it analyzes the core legal issues of affiliated companies, that is, the protection of the interests of affiliated companies and their minority shareholders, the protection of creditors of dependent companies and the restriction rules of cross-shareholding. Finally, on the basis of summary and analysis, This paper reviews and comments on the current related company legislation in China, and points out the perfect direction of the related company legislation in our country. This paper has been trying to express such a view: the legal regulation of affiliated companies is based on the control of the "principal-agent" relationship between companies and subordinate companies; The core of the legal regulation of affiliated companies is to solve the three major agency problems between the control company and the subordinate company, namely, the control company and the subordinate company, the minority shareholders of the control company and the subordinate company. The effective way to solve the legal problems of affiliated companies is to establish an interest balance mechanism which includes the main interests of all parties.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：D922.291.91

【引证文献】