公司法变革与日本公司治理结构演化研究

发布时间：2018-05-28 05:04

本文选题：股份公司 + 公司治理结构　；参考：《南开大学》2010年博士论文

【摘要】：现代经济中的社会化大生产使投资规模大大超过了个人的投资能力,同时出于分散投资风险的需要产生了以有限责任为基础的股份公司,其突出的特征是财产所有权与企业控制权的分离,由此产生了所有者与经营者利益不一致所导致的委托—代理问题。为解决这一委托—代理问题,以企业控制权分配为核心的公司治理机制应运而生,并在各国的经济发展过程中和经济体制的约束下,产生了不同类型的公司治理结构。其中现代日本的公司治理结构,在日本经济陷入长期萧条以及为走向复苏而进行包括企业制度在内的经济体制改革的背景下,引起了学术界的重视,成为日本经济研究中最为重要的研究领域之一。本文的研究即属于上述范畴,但与以往的同类研究有所不同,本文将在一个公司法及其变革的视角下,以战后日本的公司治理结构及其演化为研究对象,分析公司法变革与公司治理结构演化之间的关系。通过这种公司法视角下的公司治理结构研究,将有可能在更大的学术空间内阐释现代日本经济体制的微观基础,从中揭示出政府与法制、政府与市场、政府与企业之间更为细微、复杂的关系,对这些问题的阐明,可以在相当大程度上解释现代日本经济体制不同于其它类型经济体制的特征。本文的结构如下。在绪论阐述了本文的研究背景、研究意义、研究现状、研究思路、研究方法的基础上,第一章首先在一般意义上论述了公司制度、公司法、公司治理的产生和内在的逻辑关系,系统地梳理了近代以来日本移植西方公司法的历史过程,并详细阐述了直到战后1950年代初期历次公司法的修订及其对公司治理结构的影响,特别指出了公司法语境下的公司治理结构与现实中的公司治理结构在观念上、机制上、运行上的差异。第二章论述了现代日本企业制度以及相应的公司治理结构起源于战后由美国占领军主导的外生强制的民主化改革,但是由美国占领军依据美国模式设计,并通过广泛分散的个人所有制、企业控制权再分配建立起来的日本企业制度以及相应的公司治理结构,在由统制经济向市场经济过渡完成后发生了适应性演化,在产权结构、融资结构、控制权分配等各个方面均发生了对美国模式的偏离。第三章承接上一章论述了日本公司治理结构适应性演化的后果,是形成了相互持股的法人所有制、由银行进行相机治理的主银行制、“内部人控制”的层级结构,这些制度安排不仅是对战后日本公司治理结构进行经验观察所得到的特征化事实,而且是构成了日本传统公司治理结构的最为关键的要素,在战后日本由后发展经济向工业化经济转变的过程中发挥了重要作用。第四章论述了在完成向工业化经济转变之后,围绕日本企业运行和公司治理的经济形势、制度环境发生了重大变化,在资本市场日益替代主银行制对企业进行监管、稳定股东不断趋于消散而使公司控制权转移成为现实威胁的条件下,日本传统的公司治理结构面临困境,在长期萧条中开始进行公司治理结构改革,同时迎来了公司法变革的时代。第五章着重论述了1990年代初开始的公司法修订及其与日本公司治理结构新一轮演化之间的关系,这是战后数十年来第一次真正意义上的公司法变革,本章详细介绍了包括董事会结构改革、激励机制改革、信息披露制改革、股东诉讼条件改革在内的公司法变革内容,在此基础上阐述了公司法变革对日本传统公司治理结构改革及其演化方向的影响。第六章带有全文总结的性质,探讨日本公司治理结构演化的趋势,在经济全球化和国际市场竞争的作用下,在世界范围内的确出现了公司治理结构趋同的倾向,并且在日本公司治理结构的演化方向上反映出来,但本章强调指出了公司法变革背景下日本公司治理结构改革的特征是,属于外部市场约束的改革迅速,但属于内部监管机制的改革滞后,即外部治理结构和内部治理结构是非均衡演化的,两者之间的磨合增大了公司治理结构演化方向的不确定性,到目前为止没有确切的证据表明会收敛于盎格鲁—撒克逊模式。
[Abstract]:The large-scale social production in the modern economy makes the investment scale more than the individual's investment ability. At the same time, the joint stock company based on the limited liability is produced out of the need of the limited liability. The prominent feature is the separation of property ownership and the control right of the enterprise, thus producing the inconsistency between the owner and the proprietor. In order to solve this principal-agent problem, in order to solve this principal-agent problem, the corporate governance mechanism, which takes the distribution of enterprise control as the core, arises at the historic moment, and has produced different types of corporate governance structure under the constraints of economic development and economic system in various countries. Under the background of the long-term depression and the economic system reform, including the enterprise system for the recovery, it has attracted the attention of the academic circle and became one of the most important research fields in the Japanese economic research.
The study of this paper belongs to the above category, but it is different from the previous studies of the same kind. This article will take the corporate governance structure and its evolution as the research object in the perspective of a company law and its change, and analyze the relationship between the change of corporate law and the evolution of corporate governance. It is possible to explain the microcosmic basis of the modern Japanese economic system in a larger academic space. It reveals that the government and the legal system, the government and the market, the government and the enterprise are more subtle and complex, and the clarifying of these problems can explain to a considerable extent that the modern Japanese economic system is different from other categories. The characteristics of the type of economic system.
The structure of this article is as follows.
On the basis of the introduction of the research background, research significance, research status, research ideas and research methods, the first chapter first discusses the production of company system, company law, corporate governance and internal logical relationship in general meaning, and systematically combs the historical process of Japan's transplantation of western company law in modern times and detailed the process of modern Japan. This paper expounds the revision of the company law and its influence on the corporate governance in the early 1950s, and especially points out the differences in the concept, mechanism and operation of corporate governance structure in the context of the company law and the corporate governance structure in the reality.
The second chapter discusses that the modern Japanese enterprise system and the corresponding corporate governance structure originate from the post-war foreign compulsory democratization reform dominated by the American occupying forces, but the Japanese enterprise system established by the American occupation army, based on the American model, and by the widely dispersed individual ownership and the redistribution of the right of enterprise control. As well as the corresponding corporate governance structure, the adaptive evolution has taken place after the transition from the unified economy to the market economy. The deviation of the American model has occurred in all aspects of the structure of property rights, the structure of financing, the distribution of the right of control and so on.
The third chapter deals with the consequences of the adaptive evolution of the corporate governance structure in Japan, which is the formation of a mutual shareholding system of corporate ownership, the main banking system governed by the bank and the hierarchical structure of "insider control". These institutional arrangements are not only a special experience of the post-war Japanese corporate governance structure. It is the most critical element of the Japanese traditional corporate governance structure, which has played an important role in the process of post-war Japan from the post development economy to the industrialized economy.
The fourth chapter discusses the economic situation surrounding the operation of Japanese enterprises and corporate governance after the completion of the transition to the industrialized economy. The institutional environment has changed greatly. In the condition that the capital market is increasingly substitutes for the main bank system to supervise the enterprises, the stable shareholders tend to dissipate to make the control of the company a real threat. The traditional corporate governance structure is in a predicament. In the long run, the company began to reform its corporate governance structure and ushered in the era of corporate law reform.
The fifth chapter focuses on the revision of the company law and its relationship with the new evolution of Japanese corporate governance in the early 1990s. This is the first real change in corporate law in the last few decades. This chapter describes in detail the reform of the board of directors, the reform of the incentive mechanism, the reform of the information disclosure system, and the shareholder's lawsuit. On the basis of the reform of company law, the impact of corporate law reform on the reform and evolution of Japanese traditional corporate governance is expounded.
The sixth chapter, with the nature of the full text summary, discusses the trend of the evolution of corporate governance in Japan. Under the effect of economic globalization and international market competition, the tendency of the convergence of corporate governance has appeared in the world, and it is reflected in the evolution of corporate governance in Japan. However, this chapter emphasizes the company law. Under the background of change, the reform of corporate governance in Japan is characterized by the rapid reform of the external market constraints, but the reform of the internal regulatory mechanism is lagging behind, that is, the external governance structure and internal governance structure are unbalanced, and the combination between them increases the uncertainty of the evolution direction of the corporate governance structure. There is definite evidence that it will converge on the Anglo Saxon model.
【学位授予单位】：南开大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：F276.6;D912.29

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