外资并购中反收购法律问题研究
本文选题:外资并购 + 敌意收购 ; 参考:《西南财经大学》2010年硕士论文
【摘要】:毋庸置疑,外资并购是一柄“双刃剑”,其积极意义表现在有利于优化我国上市公司的股权结构和提高上市公司的质量,有利于国有经济战略重组和产业结构调整、升级等等;其消极意义则表现在可能导致阻碍我国企业的发展壮大,造成国有资产流失,出现垄断,威胁民族产业甚至国家经济安全等等。所以,笔者认为,在宏观层面,政府应当重视收购与反收购立法,加强外资并购审查;在微观层面,企业应当做好外资敌意并购的预防措施以及在面对敌意并购时正确运用法律手段积极应对。然而,由于我国目前反收购立法的缺位,理论上的各种反收购措施是英、美等敌意收购活动比较活跃的国家和地区,通过大量的公司并购实践及相关的司法实践而逐步创造和发展起来的。由于各国文化、传统、法律的差异,许多反收购措施并不具有普适性。就我国而言,资本并购市场出现也只有十来年,还是新生事物,有关制度规范大部分是借鉴于市场成熟的资本主义国家。具体的反收购措施也大部分是直接引进、借鉴,因而鱼龙混杂,合法与非法并存。对于具体的反收购措施,我国法律还没有予以明确规范,即规定哪些是许可的,哪些是禁止的,以及这些具体措施的构成要件、适用条件和产生的具体法律后果。本文基于应当正确引导我国上市公司反收购的立场,展开本文的探讨。 具体而言,本文在结构体系上拟分为以下五个部分: 第一章为本文的导论部分。首先以一个案例展开探讨,本文选取“中国上市公司首宗恶意收购案--哈啤集团VS SABMiller"一案作为引子,并进一步对我国的市场环境和法律环境方面进行分析,不难看出我国企业面临着遭遇外资敌意并购的潜在风险,最后简析外资在我国的发展现状和并购我国企业的勃勃雄心,明确指出要对外资并购我国企业给予更多的关注,在看到其积极方面的同时还要看到其消极方面,怀抱“凡事预则立,不预则废”的姿态正确考量外资并购,尤其是外资敌意并购。然后分析本文的研究意义,指出本文不仅具有重要的理论意义,更具有重要的现实意义。最后对本文涉及的几个基本概念作出应有的交代。 第二章分析外资并购中反收购之理论基石、动因以及价值。首先探究反收购之理论基石,从否认目标公司拥有反收购权的公司控制权市场理论追寻到肯定目标公司拥有反收购权的利益相关者理论,重点对后者展开论述,接着简要分析了外资并购中反收购之动因和价值,探寻在外资并购国内企业的情景下反收购的动因以及反收购存在的价值,并将该部分作为本文的理论基础展开下文。 第三章主要分析我国上市公司采用反收购策略的现状与存在的问题。作为中心论题的铺垫,分析现状,发现问题。实事求是的发现问题是分析问题所在的前提和基础。 第四章对国外反收购主要策略在我国当前法律制度下的适用性进行分析。本部分进行了比较系统详细的分析,并采取了分块研究,即将国外反收购主要策略分为预防性策略和对抗性策略。在预防性策略部分,比较详细的探讨了绝对多数条款、公平价格条款、轮换董事条款、限制大股东表决权条款、提高临时股东会召集权持股比例和时间、股东提案权比例条款、双重资本制、“毒丸计划”、管理层优先收购、“降落伞条款”等反收购策略的具体内容、实施方法以及在我国的应用情况分析;在对抗性策略部分比较详细的探讨了股份回购、“白衣骑士”、“白衣护卫”、“帕克曼”战略、“焦土政策”、运用控告、诉讼手段等反收购策略的具体内容、实施方法以及在我国的应用情况分析,探究这些策略与我国法律的兼容性,即是与我国法律、政策相容还是相冲突,亦或是虽然我国目前法律没有明确规定却体现了其精神,能够与我国法律相协调但实际作用却有限,如果有冲突,冲突又何在,能否转化适用等等。在本部分论述中,对不同的观点进行比较、评价和驳论,限于篇幅,辅以相关案例简洁介绍,点到为止。 第五章我国反收购立法的不足与完善。首先简单总结上一部分的分析结果,明确当前我国法律制度下外资并购中反收购策略的可以考虑的现实选择,在预防性策略中有轮换董事制、限制大股东表决权的累积投票制、管理层优先收购、降落伞条款(包含黄金降落伞、银降落伞及锡降落伞)以及发行可转换公司债券等可供选择,在对抗性反收购策略中有白衣骑士、白衣护卫、帕克曼战略、控告、诉讼以及对股份回购等可供选择。然后从我国现行反收购立法体系和我国现行反收购立法中有关反收购行为的具体规定两个方面来分析我国反收购立法的现状,在立法体系这一小节中,从法律、行政法规、部门规章、自律性文件四个层次简单加以归类介绍,在具体规定这一小节中,分别分析了《公司法》、《证券法》、《反垄断法》、《上市公司收购管理办法》、《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》等法律法规中有关反收购的规定,或简洁或详细,试图给出较为完整的总结。在本章第三节中,探讨当前我国反收购措施立法的不足,本文认为,当前我国立法对反收购重规制、轻引导的态度不利于正当的反收购,我国《公司法》、《证券法》对可采用的反收购策略缺乏具体规定,我国《反垄断法》、《关于经营者集中申报标准的规定》对外资并购申报标准、执法机构和程序等缺乏明确规定不利于反收购以及《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》、《上市公司收购管理办法》等一系列部门规章对反收购规定缺乏体系且可操作性较差等,并对各个观点作出阐释说明。在本章第四部分即本文最后一部分提出了完善我国反收购措施的立法构想,首先谈到了我国反收购立法原则:处理好收购与反收购的和谐发展原则,信息公开原则,保护公司股东权益原则,保护公司利益相关者权益原则,优化资源配置原则,维护国家经济安全原则等,然后在后面各个部分加以阐述:完善并建立起以《公司法》、《证券法》为基础的调整外资并购方式、反并购措施的法律规范体系;完善《反垄断法》中相关市场的界定、申报标准以及反垄断执法等规定;构建我国外资并购安全审查制度;在正确引导反收购的同时,确立适度的的反收购监管制度等等。 本文的贡献:先前的相关研究主要有以下两个方向,一是反收购决策权的归属,借鉴英美国家的立法和实践,探讨我国反收购决策权究竟是应该归属于董事会还是股东(大)会;二是站在鼓励并购的立场,探讨反收购的规制问题,这与我国目前政策鼓励外资并购相吻合。也有个别文章探讨此类问题,但由于其关注点侧重不同,所以探究的不够全面和深入。而本文则旗帜鲜明地站在应当合理引导反收购的立场,聚焦于探讨国外反收购策略在我国的应用问题,分析哪些反收购策略在我国可以直接适用,哪些可以转化适用以及哪些不适用,最后提出自己的立法完善构想,研究角度比较新颖,且在这一个研究方向上作出了比较全面而又深入的探讨。
[Abstract]:There is no doubt that foreign merger and acquisition is a "double-edged sword". Its positive significance is to optimize the ownership structure of the listed companies in China and improve the quality of the listed companies. It is beneficial to the strategic reorganization of the state-owned economy, the adjustment of the industrial structure, the upgrading of the industrial structure and so on. Its negative significance may lead to the development and expansion of our enterprises. Therefore, at the macro level, the government should attach importance to the acquisition and anti acquisition legislation, and strengthen the review of foreign merger and acquisition. At the micro level, the enterprises should do well in the prevention and purchase of foreign investment and the correct use of the hostile merger and acquisition. However, due to the absence of the current anti acquisition legislation in China, the various anti acquisition measures in theory are countries and regions with relatively active hostile takeover activities such as Britain and the United States, which have been gradually created and developed through a large number of mergers and acquisitions and related judicial practices. Many anti takeover measures are not universal. As far as China is concerned, the capital merger and acquisition market is only a decade or a new thing. Most of the rules of the system are in view of the mature capitalist countries. For specific anti takeover measures, China's law has not yet been clearly regulated, that is, what is permissible, which is prohibited, and the elements of the specific measures, the conditions of application and the specific legal consequences. This article is based on the correct guidance of the stand of anti takeover of Listed Companies in China and the discussion of this article.
Specifically, this paper is divided into five parts on the structural system.
The first chapter is the introductory part of this article. First of all, this article begins with a case study. This article selects "the first malware purchase case of Chinese Listed Companies -- VS SABMiller" as an introduction, and further analyzes the market environment and the legal environment of our country. It is not difficult to see that Chinese enterprises are confronted with foreign hostile merger and acquisition. In the end, the current situation of foreign investment in China and the ambition of M & A in China are briefly analyzed. It is clearly pointed out that we should pay more attention to the foreign capital merger and acquisition of our enterprises, and see its negative aspects while seeing its positive aspects, and cherish the correct consideration of the foreign capital M & A, especially in the posture of "precondition and not" This paper analyzes the significance of this study, and points out that this article not only has important theoretical significance, but also has important practical significance. Finally, we have made a due account of the basic concepts involved in this article.
The second chapter analyzes the theoretical cornerstone, motivation and value of anti takeover in foreign capital mergers and acquisitions. First, it explores the theoretical cornerstone of anti takeover. From the theory that the Target Corp has the right to control the right of anti takeover, it seeks the stakeholder theory that affirms the anti takeover right of the Target Corp, focuses on the latter, and then briefly analyzes the theory. The motivation and value of anti takeover in foreign capital mergers and acquisitions, explore the motivation of anti takeover and the value of anti takeover in the situation of foreign merger and acquisition of domestic enterprises, and take this part as the theoretical basis of this article.
The third chapter mainly analyzes the current situation and existing problems of the anti takeover strategy of Listed Companies in China. As the paving of the central topic, it analyzes the status quo and finds out the problems. The finding problem of seeking truth from facts is the premise and foundation of the analysis of the problem.
The fourth chapter analyzes the applicability of the foreign anti takeover strategy under the current legal system in China. This part makes a systematic and detailed analysis, and adopts a separate study. The main strategies of foreign anti takeover are divided into preventive and antagonistic strategies. In the part of preventive strategies, the absolute majority are discussed in detail. The provisions, the terms of the fair price, the rotation of the terms of the directors, the restrictions on the voting rights of the large shareholders, the increase of the proportion and time of the holding right of the provisional shareholders, the proportion of the shareholder's proposal, the double capital system, the "poison pill", the priority of management, the parachute clause, and the specific contents, the methods of implementation and in our country. The application situation analysis; in the antagonistic strategy part of the more detailed discussion of share repurchase, "white clothes Knight", "white coat guard", "Parkman" strategy, "coke soil policy", the use of accusations, litigation means and other anti acquisition strategies, the implementation method and application analysis in China, to explore these strategies and China's law. The compatibility of law, that is, is in conflict with our country's laws and policies, or even though our country's current law does not have clear provisions but embodies its spirit. It can be coordinated with our laws but the actual role is limited. If there is conflict, conflict, and whether it can be adapted, and so on. In this part, the different views are carried out in this part. Comparison, appraisal and refutation are limited to space and complemented by relevant cases.
The fifth chapter is the deficiency and perfection of China's anti takeover legislation. First, a brief summary of the analysis results of the previous part is made, and the realistic choice of the anti takeover strategy under the current legal system of China is clearly defined. In the preventive strategy, there is a rotation of the board of directors, the cumulative voting system that limits the decision of the large shareholders, the priority of management and the reduction of the purchase. The Umbrella Clause (including the golden parachute, the silver parachute and the tin parachute) and the issuance of Switching Company bonds are available. In the anti takeover strategy, there are white knights, white clothes, Parchman strategy, accusation, litigation, and share repurchase. The present situation of anti takeover legislation in China is analyzed in two aspects of the specific provisions on anti takeover act in the acquisition legislation. In this section of the legislative system, it is simply classified and introduced from the four levels of law, administrative regulations, departmental rules and self-discipline documents. In this section, the company law, the securities law, and the anti ridges are analyzed. In the third section of this chapter, the shortcomings of the anti takeover measures in China are discussed in the third section of this chapter. Our country < Company Law > Securities Law > lacks specific regulations on the anti takeover strategy that can be adopted, our country "antitrust law >", < the regulations for the centralized declaration of the operator > the declaration standard for foreign capital mergers and acquisitions, the law enforcement agencies and procedures and so on is not conducive to the anti takeover and < In the fourth part of this chapter, the legislative conception of improving China's anti takeover measures is put forward in the fourth part of this chapter: the last part of this chapter, which is the first part of this chapter. First, it talks about the principles of anti takeover legislation in China: to deal with the principle of harmonious development of acquisition and anti takeover, the principle of information disclosure, the principle of protecting the rights and interests of the shareholders of the company, the principle of protecting the rights and interests of the stakeholders of the company, the principle of optimizing the allocation of resources, and the maintenance of the principle of national economic security. The legal system of the merger and acquisition of foreign capital based on the company law and the securities law, the legal system of anti merger and acquisition measures, the definition of the relevant markets in the anti monopoly law, the declaration standards and the anti-monopoly law enforcement regulations, and the establishment of the security review system for foreign capital mergers and acquisitions, and the establishment of a moderate counter collection at the same time in the correct guidance of the anti takeover. Purchase supervision system and so on.
The contribution of this article: the previous related research mainly has the following two directions, one is the attribution of the right of anti takeover decision and the legislation and practice of the British and American countries to discuss whether our anti takeover decision-making power should belong to the board of directors or the shareholders (big), and the two is to stand in the position of encouraging and purchase, and discuss the regulation of anti takeover, which is with me China's current policy encourages foreign capital mergers and acquisitions. There are also some articles to discuss such problems, but because their focus is different, the inquiry is not comprehensive and thorough. The acquisition strategy can be applied directly in our country, which can be applied and which can not be applied. Finally, it puts forward its own legislative perfect conception, and the research angle is new, and makes a comprehensive and in-depth discussion on this research direction.
【学位授予单位】:西南财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2010
【分类号】:D922.29
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