我国公司商业判断规则的法律研究

发布时间：2018-06-04 23:14

本文选题：董事 + 商业判断规则　；参考：《华东政法大学》2011年硕士论文

【摘要】：我国新《公司法》出于保护中小股东、规范公司治理的需要,大大加强了公司董事、监事和高管的信义义务责任,规定其对公司及其股东负有勤勉义务和忠实义务,并且需要就其签字同意通过的商业决策承担法律责任；同时,赋予了公司股东起诉董事、监事和高管决策损害公司及其利益的直接起诉权,对公司董事、监事和高管的违法和损害公司利益的商业决策行为以法律问责。然而,与其他国家的董事注意义务相关法律规定相比,我国在立法和司法中仍有不足,亟待完善。我国注意义务(即我国《公司法》的勤勉义务)立法的缺点在于,仅仅有一条宽泛的概括性规定,对于何为注意义务及其判断规则,则没有设置相应的具体性条文,使得勤勉义务这在司法实践中的判断标准和内容难以判断,从而无法引导法院和当事人行事。因此笔者建议健全我国勤勉义务的法律体系,通过司法解释的方式丰富勤勉义务的内容,采用以客观为原则、主观例外的判断标准,再辅之以列举的方式,从而明确一些比较常见的违反勤勉义务行为。根据笔者对我国商业判断规则相关司法案例进行统计,得出的结论,我国司法实践中的问题在于,由于立法没有明文规定商业判断规则,因此在具体的审查涉及公司董事、监事和高级管理人员的注意义务责任时,我国法院习惯性的扮演强势商人的角色,对公司内容治理的事宜进行介入,一方面进行形式审查,在另一方面进行实质审查。由此导致没有统一规范的裁判标准之下,此类案件法院裁判的自由裁量权和随意性很大。,通过对《公司法》进行修改,增设商业判断规则的概括性条款,同时出台司法解释,对新条款进行详细规定,明确商业判断规则的适用条件：(一)董事的行为必须是经营决策行为；(二)董事的行为不违反法律、行政法规、公司章程和股东大会决议；(三)董事在作出判断的事项中不存在未经允许的利益。同时明确原告的举证责任。我们通过引入一整套规范的商业判断规则立法体系,对法院的公司司法裁量权进行合理限制,从而保持公司自治的同时,平衡公司内司法民主,实现自治与民主的统一。本文除了导言和结语外,正文主要有四部分,各部分的具体内容如下：第一部分,主要介绍了商业判断规则的基础理论,探讨了商业判断规则的源起源及其存在的正当性,阐述了商业判断规则的功能与本质。第二部分,主要介绍了商业判断规则在美国、英国及澳大利亚、日本的立法和司法适用情况。第三部分,主要介绍了我国商业判断裁判情况。第四部分,主要介绍了引入商业判断规则的必要性以及如何从完善商业判断规则的适用。
[Abstract]:In order to protect minority shareholders and standardize corporate governance, the new Company Law of our country has greatly strengthened the fiduciary duty of directors, supervisors and executives, and stipulated that it has the duty of diligence and loyalty to the company and its shareholders. At the same time, the company's shareholders are given the right to sue the directors, supervisors and executives directly against the company and its interests. Supervisors and executives are legally accountable for illegal business decisions that undermine the interests of the company. However, compared with the relevant laws and regulations of directors' duty of care in other countries, there are still some deficiencies in legislation and judicature in China, which need to be improved urgently. The shortcoming of the legislation of the duty of care (that is, the diligence obligation of the Company Law of our country) lies in the fact that there is only a broad and general stipulation that there is no corresponding specific provision on what is the duty of care and its rules of judgment. It makes it difficult to judge the standard and content of diligence obligation in judicial practice, so that it can not guide the court and the parties to act. Therefore, the author suggests that we should perfect the legal system of diligence obligation in our country, enrich the content of diligence obligation by means of judicial interpretation, adopt the criterion of judgment based on the principle of objectivity and subjective exception, and then add the method of enumeration. In order to identify some of the more common violations of diligence obligations. According to the statistics of judicial cases related to the rules of commercial judgment in our country, the author draws a conclusion that the problems in the judicial practice of our country lie in the fact that the legislation does not explicitly stipulate the rules of commercial judgment, so the company directors are involved in the specific examination. When the supervisors and senior managers are responsible for the duty of care, the courts of our country are accustomed to play the role of strong businessmen, to intervene in matters of corporate content governance, on the one hand, to conduct formal reviews, and on the other hand to carry out substantive reviews. As a result, there is no uniform standard of adjudication, and the discretion and arbitrariness of court decisions in such cases are very great. Through the revision of Company Law, the general provisions of the rules of commercial judgment are added, and judicial interpretations are introduced at the same time. To specify in detail the new provisions, and to clarify the applicable conditions for the rules of commercial judgment: (1) the behavior of a director must be an act of business decision-making; (2) the director's behavior does not violate the law, the administrative regulations, The articles of Association and the resolution of the general meeting of shareholders (3) the directors do not have unauthorized interests in matters to be judged. At the same time clear plaintiff's burden of proof. By introducing a set of normative legislative system of commercial judgment rules, we can reasonably limit the judicial discretion of the court, so as to balance the judicial democracy in the company and realize the unity of autonomy and democracy while maintaining the autonomy of the company. In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the text has four main parts, the specific content of each part is as follows: The first part mainly introduces the basic theory of commercial judgment rules, probes into the origin and legitimacy of commercial judgment rules, and expounds the function and essence of commercial judgment rules. The second part mainly introduces the application of commercial judgment rules in the United States, Britain and Australia, and Japan. The third part, mainly introduces our country commercial judgment situation. The fourth part mainly introduces the necessity of introducing commercial judgment rules and how to perfect the application of commercial judgment rules.
【学位授予单位】：华东政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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