跨国合资公司僵局的法律对策

发布时间：2018-04-05 07:05

本文选题：跨国合资　切入点：公司僵局　出处：《华东政法大学》2013年博士论文

【摘要】：从组织法的角度看，，跨国合资可以采用合伙、公司或者合同等不同的方式，合资公司是兼具合伙和公司特征的企业组织形式，有人称之为“公司型合伙”，即在具有资合和有限责任特点的同时，合资公司具有较高的人合性。合资各方之间的信任和协同一致是合资成功的基础，但合资各方的利益并非总是一致，利益冲突最终都将在合资公司的董事会、股东会等层面表现出来。合资公司的封闭性限制了合资公司股份的自由转让和股东的退出，使得发生利益冲突的合资方极易陷入僵局的困局，甚至无法脱身。平衡合资各方的利益，发挥合资的利益、规避可能的缺陷，成为利用合资工具最重要的考虑之一。本研究试图从公司僵局这一合资公司的常见现象出发，结合跨国合资公司治理的特点，从僵局的预防、自救到司法救济的各个层面探讨僵局破解的法律对策，以期对合资公司这一组织形式有更深入的了解、并为未来在国内国外更好地利用合资工具提供帮助。本研究以“跨国”和“内部人”为特征。跨国因素，意味着法律适用的冲突和不同国家公司（企业）法制的竞争；“内部人”因素则重点在风险的识别和防范于未然。在经济全球化的背景下，有限责任公司法制显现出立法上的独立化（不再作为股份公司的附庸或例外）、组织形式上的灵活化（比如不再强制要求设立监事会）、股东自治的自由化（允许股东在强制法之外对所有内部治理问题自由约定）等特点，作者希望选取的研究视角能够反映这些发展趋势。全文分为六章。第一章讨论跨国投资与合资企业。合资的本质在于独立企业之间开展合作，有合伙、公司或者合同等不同组成方式，跨国合资是就是不同国际的投资者之间组建的合资企业。可以从不同角度解释合资的理由。如果将市场和公司视为市场条件下分配资源两种基本方式的话，合资就是介于独资公司和市场之间的一个企业组织选择，存在的原因在于交易成本更低。通过合资可以获得新的竞争优势，或者互补的资源，合资还是开展组织学习的重要工具，这些好处可望提升合资参与方的市场竞争能力。合资因此成为跨国公司开展全球竞争在组织工具上的一个重要选择。在主权国家放松管制的背景下，传统的、基于东道国法律限制的合资企业数量在减少，应对全球竞争加剧、市场风险提高的“新合资”（更多基于商业考虑）将是跨国合资的主要形式。在新型合资企业中，合资方自治将发挥基础性作用，在自治失效的时候需要司法干预的及时救济。第二章讨论合资公司的公司治理与公司僵局。不同性质的公司具有不同的利益格局，应当选择不同的治理方式。合资公司是合伙和有限责任公司的混合，属于“公司型合伙”。合资公司兼具人合和资合的特征，与公众公司相比，合资公司的人合性和封闭性表现得更强。合资公司常见的治理问题是公司僵局和股东压迫。公司僵局，源于股东间的利益冲突和封闭公司治理规则的共同作用。股东各有战略目标从而利益冲突不可避免，信任是合资的基础因而合资不允许轻易发生现有股东的退出或新股东的加入，公司僵局于是产生尤其在跨国合资中高发。发生公司僵局，最大的受害者是股东，对于其他利益相关方也将产生负面影响。跨国投资者应充分认识合资作为企业组织形式的优缺点，为公司僵局的事前预防和事后救济做好充分的准备。在放松管制的背景下，跨国合资公司的良好治理与公司僵局防范将以股东自治为主，国家干预为辅。第三章讨论合资公司僵局的风险防控。预防，是跨国公司国际投资实践中控制风险的首要环节。僵局预防就是预见风险并据其设计出平衡各种利益的制度机制。本章讨论了促进合资成功、防止发生公司僵局的具体措施，涵盖合资设立和运营的各个主要环节，包括合资工具的选择、合资伙伴的选择、合资公司控制权在股东之间的合理分配、表决机制中的僵局破解安排等内容。所有这些预防措施都应当反映在合资公司的法律文件上，清楚的约定将为未来纠纷的预防和及时化解提供基础。选择合资，就意味着选择妥协和合作，伙伴的重要性相当于婚姻当中的伴侣。只有平衡的利益分配方能保证持续的成功，欺压将导致丧失信任、发生僵局、并致使合资最终失败。合资公司的决策不得不在公司效率和股东公平之间平衡，某种意义上进入了艺术而非科学的范畴。第四章讨论合资公司董事的双重效忠问题与合资的公司僵局。合资公司的董事地位尴尬，随时面临股东与合资公司利益之间利益的直接冲突，极易陷入“双重效忠”的困境。这种困境是合资公司董事会僵局发生的重要原因，对合资公司经营绩效产生或多或少的负面影响。理论上，合资公司可以追究董事决策时选择股东利益、违反对合资公司“受信”义务的行为。实践中，这类诉讼只是作为寻求解决股东之间利益冲突的手段，董事个人因此承担法律责任的情形较少实际发生。应当考虑从公司治理机构的层面隔离董事的利益冲突，“凯撒的归凯撒、上帝的归上帝”，由股东（代表）负责处理股东之间的事务（如利益冲突）、而让董事专注于合资公司的成功。同时，应当在合资公司的法律文件中清楚地界定合资公司董事的职责。第五章讨论通过股东退出合资公司的方式破解合资的公司僵局。在维持公司存续的前提下，某些股东可以选择转让股份而退出合资公司，实现合资僵局的破解。合资公司的章程和股东协议往往根据合资封闭性的特点，为合资股权的转让设定各种限制，常见的是“同意条款”和优先购买权限制。股东退出公司是股东不能剥夺的权利，为此要在退出股东与其他股东的利益间寻求平衡。为保证合资股权的转让以当事人合意和预见的方式进行，防止不合意的新股东加入，合资股东可设立出售权、购买权或选择权等安排。这些约定可能没有当事人期望地有效，执行上也可能存在困难，但约定本身为将来可能发生的股权转让，仍然最大限度地提供了指引。合资公司的小股东在特定情形下还可利用股份购买请求权实现退出公司。在当事人无法自立救济的情形下，司法干预可强制完成股权的转让。第六章讨论通过解散合资公司的方式来破解合资的公司僵局。解散公司是破解合资僵局的最后手段，属于“核武器”。解散公司通常对社会整体福利不利，还可能被机会主义的股东滥用，所以要特别慎重地运用。解散公司有自愿和强制解散之分，司法解散实质是干预封闭公司内部私力强制（公司僵局和股东压迫）的救济手段。国家干预是股东自治失灵后的选择，其运用应有严格的条件和程序。本章讨论司法解散的适用条件、当事人地位、适用原则、主要程序等问题。为防止滥用解散公司诉讼，法律可设定诸如诉讼担保和败诉赔偿的制约机制。法院在作出判决解散公司的选择前，应考虑替代性措施。各国基于各自的法律传统，创立了不同的替代性措施，如美国的临时董事和监管人制度、德国的股东退出权和公司除名权制度，都是比较解散公司更为缓和的解决股东争议、破解公司僵局的措施。合资公司解散后需要进行清算，以了结各方面的法律关系、终止公司人格。
[Abstract]:From the point of view of the organization law , the joint venture can adopt different modes , such as partnership , company or contract , and the joint venture company is the form of enterprise organization which has both the partnership and the company ' s characteristics . The joint venture company is referred to as " company type partnership " .

Based on the common phenomenon of the joint venture between the Company and the Company , this paper discusses the legal countermeasures of the deadlock in the aspects of the deadlock prevention , self - rescue and judicial relief from the aspects of the deadlock prevention , self - rescue and judicial relief , with a view to better understanding the organization form of the joint venture , and providing help for the better use of the joint venture in the future .

The study is characterized by " transnational " and " inner human " , which means the conflict of law application and the competition of the legal system of different state companies ( enterprises ) ;
In the background of economic globalization , the legal system of limited liability company appears to be independent in legislation ( no longer act as a proxy or exception to the joint stock company ) , the flexible activation in the form of organization ( such as the requirement for the establishment of the board of supervisors no longer mandatory ) , the liberalization of shareholder autonomy ( which allows shareholders to freely agree on all internal governance issues outside the jus cogens ) , and the author hopes that the selected research perspective can reflect these trends .

The text is divided into six chapters . The first chapter discusses cross - border investment and joint ventures . The essence of the joint venture is the cooperation between independent enterprises , and the joint venture is a joint venture between different international investors .

Chapter 2 discusses the corporate governance and corporate deadlock of the joint venture . The joint venture company is a mixture of partnership and limited liability company . The joint venture company is a partnership and a limited liability company . The joint venture is a joint venture .

Chapter Three discusses the risk prevention and control of the deadlock of the joint venture company . The prevention is the first step of controlling the risk in the international investment practice of transnational corporations . The deadlock prevention is to foresee the risk and to design the institutional mechanism for balancing the various interests . All these preventive measures should be reflected in the joint venture company ' s legal document , which means the choice of the joint venture , the choice of the joint venture partner , the reasonable distribution of the control of the joint venture between the shareholders , the deadlock in the voting mechanism , etc . All these preventive measures should be reflected in the joint venture company ' s legal document , which will lead to the loss of trust , the deadlock and the eventual failure of the joint venture . The decision of the joint venture company has to balance between the efficiency of the company and the fairness of the shareholders , and in a sense enters the artistic rather than scientific category .

Chapter four discusses the double effect of the directors of the joint venture company and the deadlock of the joint venture . The position of the director of the joint venture company is awkward , and the direct conflict between the shareholders and the interests of the joint venture company is very easy to fall into the dilemma of " double allegiance " . In practice , the joint venture can hold the director ' s decision - making with less adverse effect . In practice , the joint venture can hold the director ' s decision - making , and it is less practical . In practice , the joint venture can hold the affairs of the shareholders ( such as conflict of interest ) from the level of the corporate governance institution , and let the director focus on the success of the joint venture . At the same time , the role of the directors of the joint venture should be clearly defined in the legal documents of the joint venture .

Chapter V discusses the deadlock in the joint venture between the shareholders and the joint venture . Under the precondition of maintaining the company ' s existence , some shareholders may opt to transfer the shares to exit the joint venture and realize the joint venture deadlock . The Articles of Association and the shareholder agreement of the joint venture may set various restrictions on the transfer of the joint venture . In order to ensure that the transfer of the joint venture is carried out in a consensual and predictable manner , the joint venture may establish the right to sell , purchase power or option .

Chapter 6 discusses the way to break up the joint venture by dissolving the joint venture company . The dissolution of the company is the last resort to break the joint venture , which belongs to the " nuclear weapons " . The dissolution of the company usually has a negative effect on the whole welfare of the society and may be abused by the shareholders of opportunism . In order to prevent the abuse of the company ' s lawsuit , the law can set up various alternative measures .

【学位授予单位】：华东政法大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：D996.1

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