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WTO上诉程序的司法经济、中期审查及决策程序研究

发布时间:2018-05-20 13:14

  本文选题:WTO争端解决机制 + 司法经济 ; 参考:《吉林大学》2012年硕士论文


【摘要】:WTO争端解决机制作为国际贸易纠纷解决的最主要机制之一,有准司法性、权威性及中立性,已经成为各国间在解决贸易争端方面最重要的方式。与GATT时期的争端解决机制相比,现行的《关于争端解决规则和程序的谅解》(以下简称DSU)使得WTO框架下的争端解决机制更趋完善和规范化。其中最典型的程序性变革就是在专家组程序之后增加了上诉审查程序,使争端解决机制法院化。从WTO运作至今,WTO的争端解决机制作为全球经济稳定的程序性保障在国际贸易的舞台上发挥了重要的作用,成为多边贸易的主要支柱,其对维护全球贸易秩序稳定和推动全球贸易的自由化所做出的贡献有目共睹。 WTO争端解决机制对专家组报告采用的是“准自动通过”的通过方式,这在一定程度上增加了专家组报告出现法律错误的风险性,而上诉机构的设立则有效地缓解了此风险,这也是程序公正原则在贸易争端解决领域的一个很重要的表现。当然上诉程序并不是尽善尽美,其中也有很多值得探讨的争议点。本文通过对专家组程序的分析概括,对上诉程序中的上诉机构司法经济的运用、上诉阶段增加中期审查的必要性问题,以及上诉机构的决策程序这三个方面的大问题做一个综合性的理论和实证的探讨,以期加深对上诉程序的理解,进而能对上诉机构的将来的发展方向做出一个有益的探索。 司法经济原则在WTO专家组阶段已经得到广泛应用,而将此原则应用于上诉程序中也已经被上诉机构加以确认并实践。上诉机构司法经济分为程序性司法经济和实体性司法经济。其中实体性司法经济包括两种情况,即上诉机构对解决争端没有必要的诉请运用司法经济以及作为司法回避的司法经济。上诉阶段司法经济的运用不仅能使上诉机构节约大量的司法资源,而且具有一定的可行性。但需要指出的是,上诉机构司法经济在现阶段仍然被作为一项例外原则加以适用。 专家组阶段中的中期审查程序为当事方提供了一个在专家组裁断作出前提出意见以澄清案件事实的机会,增强了当事方对争端解决的过程控制,并且保证了专家组报告在事实和法律上的精确性,但同时也限制了上诉机构的司法性和权威性,将上诉机构置于一种不利的被动境地中。不仅如此,中期审查程序的功能发挥因为种种原因受到限制。中期审查程序的功能之一是为当事方在最终裁决作出前提供一个达成当事双方都满意的解决方式的机会,但是基于案件现实以及本国利益考虑,当事方达成这种意向的动机并不强烈,以往的案例表明确实如此。此外,上诉程序的存在也使得中期审查程序澄清法律事实的功能受到限制,因为上诉方可以在上诉程序中提出新的法律论证。因此,没有必要在专家组阶段继续保留中期审查程序,更没有必要将其扩展适用于上诉程序。 上诉机构决策程序堪称合议制决策领域的完美典范,它不仅满足了严格的时限,而且尽量避免分歧,保持了决策意见的高度统一。经济学和法学的民主决策分析方法以及美国最高法院的决策程序为我们分析上诉机构决策程序提供了一定的思路。上诉机构决策程序包括三人表决小组决策程序与意见交换程序。意见交换程序使得上诉机构全体成员参与到案件审理中,尽管最终的决策由表决小组成员做出,但是基于非表决小组成员有提出异议的权利,,表决小组成员需要权衡各方面的考虑做出裁决,这在一定程度上保证了决策程序的客观公正性。而最终的决策权仍然掌握在表决小组成员手中,从而保证了决策程序的高效性。上诉机构决策程序以极低的成本实现了高效的决策,其中的技巧和策略值得我们借鉴。
[Abstract]:As one of the most important mechanisms for the settlement of international trade disputes, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has a quasi judicial, authoritative and neutral manner. It has become the most important way among countries to solve trade disputes. Compared with the dispute settlement mechanism of the GATT period, the existing understanding of the dispute resolution rules and procedures (hereinafter referred to as DSU) makes W The dispute settlement mechanism under the TO framework is more perfect and standardized. The most typical procedural change is the addition of the appeal review procedure after the expert group procedure and the court of the dispute settlement mechanism. Since the operation of WTO, the dispute settlement mechanism of WTO plays a procedural role as a procedural guarantee for global economic stability on the stage of international trade. The important role has become the main pillar of multilateral trade, and its contribution to maintaining the stability of the global trade order and promoting the liberalization of Global trade is obvious to all.
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism adopted a "quasi automatic passage" approach to the expert group's report, which, to some extent, increased the risk of legal errors in the panel's report, and the establishment of the appellate body effectively alleviated the risk, which was also an important table in the field of trade dispute settlement. Now, of course, the appeals procedure is not perfect, and there are many controversial points. Through the analysis and summary of the procedure of the expert group, the application of the judicial economy in appellate appellate bodies, the necessity of adding the medium-term review in the appeal stage, and the big problems in the three aspects of the decision procedure of the prosecution institution. A comprehensive theoretical and empirical study is made to deepen the understanding of the appellate procedure and to make a useful exploration for the future direction of the appellate body.
The principle of judicial economy has been widely used in the WTO expert group stage, and the application of this principle to the appellate procedure has also been confirmed and practiced by the appellate body. The judicial economy of the appellate organization is divided into procedural judicial economy and substantive judicial economy. The substantive judicial economy includes two cases, that is, the appellate body has a dispute over the dispute. It is not necessary to appeal to the judicial economy and the judicial economy as a judicial avoidance. The application of the judicial economy in the appeal stage not only saves the appellate body from a large number of judicial resources, but also has certain feasibility. However, it should be pointed out that the judicial economy of the Appellate Body is still being used as an exception at this stage. Use.
The mid-term review process in the group of experts provides the parties with an opportunity to clarify the facts of the case before the expert group's decision is made to clarify the facts of the case, enhance the process control of the parties to the dispute settlement, and ensure the factual and legal accuracy of the report of the expert group, but also restrict the judiciary of the appellate body and the legal nature of the appellate body. Authority, placing the Appellate Body in an unfavorable passive position. Not only that, the function of the mid-term review process is limited by various reasons. One of the functions of the mid-term review procedure is to provide the party with an opportunity to achieve a satisfactory solution to both parties before the final decision is made, but based on the reality of the case. As well as national interests, the motive of the intention of Fang Dacheng is not strong. The previous case shows that it is true. In addition, the existence of the appellate procedure limits the function of the medium-term review process to clarify the legal facts, because the appellant can make a new legal argument in the appellate procedure. Therefore, it is not necessary to be in the expert group. The mid-term review process will continue to be retained, and there is no need to extend it to the appeal procedure.
The decision procedure of the appellate body is a perfect model in the field of collegial decision-making. It not only satisfies the strict time limit, but also avoids disagreement and maintains a high unity of decision-making opinion. The democratic decision analysis method of economics and law and the decision procedure of the Supreme Court of the United States provide us with the analysis of the decision procedure of the appellate body. The decision procedure of the appellate body includes the three party voting group decision procedure and the opinion exchange procedure. The exchange procedure allows all members of the appellate body to participate in the trial, although the final decision is made by the members of the voting group, but the members of the non voting group have the right to dissenter, and the members of the voting group are required. The decision procedure is guaranteed to a certain extent on the consideration of all aspects of the decision, and the final decision-making power is still in the hands of the members of the voting group, thus ensuring the efficiency of the decision-making process. The appellate organization's decision-making process has achieved efficient decisions at a very low cost, and the skills and Strategies of the decision are worthy of me. We can use it for reference.
【学位授予单位】:吉林大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:D996.1

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