WTO裁决的执行机制及其对发展中国家的影响

发布时间：2018-08-05 15:11

【摘要】：WTO争端解决规则(DSU)解决了GATT时期争端解决规则的重大缺陷：即败诉方会阻止专家小组或上诉机构报告后裁决的通过,从而使得案件不能进入执行阶段。DSU新设的“反向一致”原则顺利地解决了报告的通过问题。但是,这并不代表裁决能够得到妥善执行。WTO争端解决实践显示,如今贸易纠纷案件中的主要问题已经从报告或裁决的通过问题转向了这些裁决的执行问题,主要表现在败诉方执意拖延裁决的执行。若发展中国家利用DSU成功地挑战了发达国家的贸易措施,却因为发达国家的延迟执行而得不到及时救济。这样的执行问题不仅无助于胜诉方的贸易利益,还会打击和减弱成员国利用DSU解决贸易纠纷的信心和积极性。对发展中国家实行特殊和差别待遇(Special and Different Treatment)是WTO协定的重要理论基础。作为WTO框架下的争端解决规则,它也采取对发展中国家实行特殊和差别待遇的做法。仅就执行方面而言,DSU规定要特别注意影响发展中国家成员利益的执行事项且要特别注意发展中国家提出的事项。但是,这样的原则性规定高度概括,缺乏操作性,未能有效保护发展中国家的利益。本文主要分为三个部分。第一部分就是本文的第一章。该部分探讨了WTO框架发展中国家的范围以及执行机制给予发展中国家的优惠措施。由于发展中国家的定义标准不一且不断变化,WTO框架下的发展中国家范围一直处于变化当中。但是这不会阻碍本文分析执行机制对发展中国家的影响。此外,本部分简单介绍了执行规则中涉及到特殊和差别待遇的条款。第二部分是本文的第二章至第五章。该部分是本文的重点,它依次序介绍了执行机制中的各个程序,即合理期限制度、执行复审制度、补偿制度和报复制度。每个章节不仅会从理论上分析它的概念和性质,而且还会结合实践数据分析这些制度对发展中国家的影响。通过分析,笔者认为执行阶段的程序存在着一些缺陷且使得发展中国家未能受益于争端解决条款。因此,发展中国国家在多哈回合中提出了大量的改革方案,包括延迟合理期限,引入金钱补偿,共同报复等等措施。笔者分析了这些改革意见并给出了自己的意见。本文最后一部分涉及到中国参与争端解决的实践情况以及中国在DSU改革上的努力。本部分首先简要概括了涉华案件的执行情况。然后,文章介绍和分析了我国就执行机制提出的改革意见。最后,文章提出了我国在争端解决机制中的若干建议和应有态度。
[Abstract]:The WTO dispute settlement rule, (DSU), addresses a major flaw in the dispute settlement rules of the GATT era: that a losing party will block the passage of a ruling after a panel of experts or an appellate body reports it. So that the case can not enter into the implementation phase. DSU's new principle of "reverse consistency" successfully solved the problem of report adoption. However, this does not mean that decisions can be properly implemented. WTO dispute settlement practice shows that the main issues in trade dispute cases have now shifted from the issue of the adoption of reports or awards to the issue of enforcement of these awards. The main manifestation is that the losing party insists on delaying the execution of the award. If developing countries successfully challenge the trade measures of developed countries by using DSU, they can not get timely relief because of the delay of implementation in developed countries. Such an enforcement issue will not only not help the trade interests of the successful parties, but will also undermine and weaken the confidence and enthusiasm of member countries to use DSU to resolve trade disputes. Special and differential treatment (Special and Different Treatment) for developing countries is an important theoretical basis of WTO agreement. As a dispute settlement rule under the framework of WTO, it also adopts special and differential treatment for developing countries. As far as enforcement is concerned only, special attention shall be paid to matters of enforcement affecting the interests of developing country members and to matters raised by developing countries. However, such principled provisions are highly generalized and inoperable, and fail to effectively protect the interests of developing countries. This paper is divided into three parts. The first part is the first chapter of this paper. This part discusses the scope of developing countries in the WTO framework and the preferential measures given to developing countries by the implementation mechanism. Because the definition standard of developing country is different and the scope of developing country under WTO framework is changing all the time. But this does not prevent this article from analyzing the impact of the implementation mechanism on developing countries. In addition, this section briefly introduces the provisions of the executive rules relating to special and differential treatment. The second part is the second chapter to the fifth chapter. This part is the focus of this paper, it introduces the implementation mechanism in order of each procedure, that is, the system of reasonable time limit, the system of executive review, the system of compensation and the system of retaliation. Each chapter will not only theoretically analyse its concept and nature, but also analyse the impact of these regimes on developing countries in the context of practical data. Based on the analysis, the author thinks that there are some defects in the procedure of the implementation stage and that the developing countries are unable to benefit from the dispute settlement clause. Therefore, developing countries put forward a large number of reform proposals in the Doha Round, including the delay of reasonable period, the introduction of monetary compensation, common retaliation and other measures. The author analyzes these reform opinions and gives his own opinions. The last part of this paper deals with the practice of China's participation in dispute settlement and China's efforts in DSU reform. This part first briefly summarizes the implementation of cases involving China. Then, the article introduced and analyzed our country to carry out the mechanism to propose the reform opinion. Finally, the paper puts forward some suggestions and attitudes in the dispute settlement mechanism.
【学位授予单位】：中国政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：D996.1

【参考文献】