主权债务重组模式研究

发布时间：2019-07-09 17:33

【摘要】：在2008年的金融危机之后,迪拜、希腊、冰岛先后出现了主权债务危机,主权债务危机不仅引起债务国内部的经济动乱,还会给全球经济造成连锁影响。目前就主权债务重组模式的争论主要集中在是建立一个由超国家机构主导的法律框架还是扩大适用集体行动条款。本文以IMF提出的主权债务重组机制和主权债务重组的合同方法——集体行动条款为研究对象,就二者的程序设计特点做介绍,并分析程序设计的目标和用意,采用比较的、实证的方法来研究两种主权债务重组模式各自的优点和不足,并横向比较两者之间的异同。本文第一章介绍了主权债务问题的含义、由来以及分类,并简要介绍了主权债务危机的背景情况,分析了在理论上总资产总是大于负债的国家确实在某一点存在债务不可持续的情况,例如有多笔债务到期却无力偿还,又不能举借新的债务来偿还旧债,而传统的国际救助方式如援助贷款又存在种种不足,这时国家的债务就存在重组的必要。重组是破产法上的概念,在主权债务语境下,就是主权债务人与债权人就债务的重新安排进行协商达成重组协议。而具体到主权债务重组模式,就是设计一个公开、透明的程序来促成主权债务人与债权人达成重组协议,这个模式必须克服重组中的集体行动问题并且兼顾双方的利益。本文第二章介绍并分析了由IMF所设计的主权债务重组机制(SDRM)。首先介绍了SDRM的提出以及设计目的,它的适用范围、程序设计。其次就SDRM的总体框架分析了它的特点以及设计上的不足之处。最后就SDRM的实际障碍进行了分析,也正是这些障碍导致SDRM的流产。本文第三章介绍并分析了主权债务重组的合同方法——集体行动条款。集体行动条款是在主权债务合同中加入的通过合格多数债权人限制少数不合作债权人的行为来达到集体行动的目的的条款。因为主权国家融资方式的多样化,尤其是主权债务工具在二级市场上不断交易,使得债务人分散且有不同的利益立场,不合作债权人通过诉讼等方式阻碍重组程序的进行,是主权债务重组的最大障碍。集体行动条款主要包括多数修改条款和多数执行条款,为了应对在具体实施中出现的问题,又发展出了集体代表条款、发起条款和合并条款。本文第四章分析了仲裁是否会是解决主权债务争端的一个新的选择,如果答案是肯定的话,那么将会是主权债务重组的一个新的障碍。尤其是国际投资争端解决中心(ICSID)登记了意大利债券持有人诉阿根廷的仲裁请求,该案仍处于管辖权异议阶段。本章分析了ICSID对于主权债务所引发的争端是否具有管辖权以及仲裁作为未来主权债务合同的争端解决方式的可能性,从而研究仲裁会不会构成对主权债务重组的威胁。
[Abstract]:After the financial crisis in 2008, Dubai, Greece and Iceland appeared sovereign debt crisis one after another. The sovereign debt crisis not only caused economic turmoil within debtor countries, but also had a chain impact on the global economy. The current debate over the sovereign debt restructuring model mainly focuses on whether to establish a legal framework led by supranational institutions or to expand the application of collective action provisions. This paper takes the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism proposed by IMF and the collective action clause, the contract method of sovereign debt restructuring, as the research object, introduces the characteristics of their programming, analyzes the objectives and intentions of the program design, adopts a comparative and empirical method to study the advantages and disadvantages of the two sovereign debt restructuring models, and compares the similarities and differences between the two models horizontally. The first chapter of this paper introduces the meaning, origin and classification of the sovereign debt problem, and briefly introduces the background of the sovereign debt crisis, and analyzes the fact that countries whose total assets are always greater than their liabilities in theory do have unsustainable debt at a certain point, such as multiple debt maturing but unable to repay it, and unable to borrow new debt to repay the old debt. However, the traditional international rescue methods, such as aid loans, have a variety of shortcomings, when the country's debt is necessary to restructure. Reorganization is the concept of bankruptcy law. In the context of sovereign debt, the sovereign debtor and creditors negotiate and reach a reorganization agreement on the rescheduling of debt. Specifically, the sovereign debt restructuring model is to design an open and transparent procedure to facilitate the sovereign debtor to reach a restructuring agreement with creditors. This model must overcome the collective action problem in the restructuring and take into account the interests of both sides. The second chapter of this paper introduces and analyzes the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM). Designed by IMF. First of all, this paper introduces the proposal and design purpose of SDRM, its applicable scope and program design. Secondly, the characteristics and design shortcomings of SDRM are analyzed. Finally, the actual obstacles of SDRM are analyzed, and it is these obstacles that lead to the abortion of SDRM. The third chapter introduces and analyzes the contract method of sovereign debt restructuring-collective action clause. Collective action clause is a clause added to sovereign debt contract to achieve the purpose of collective action by restricting the behavior of a small number of uncooperative creditors by qualified majority creditors. Because of the diversification of financing methods of sovereign countries, especially the continuous trading of sovereign debt instruments in the secondary market, debtors are scattered and have different interest positions. Uncooperative creditors hinder the reorganization procedure through litigation and so on, which is the biggest obstacle to sovereign debt restructuring. The collective action clause mainly includes most modified clauses and most implementing clauses. In order to deal with the problems in the concrete implementation, the collective representative clause, the initiation clause and the merger clause have been developed. The fourth chapter of this paper analyzes whether arbitration will be a new choice to solve sovereign debt disputes. If the answer is yes, it will be a new obstacle to sovereign debt restructuring. In particular, the International Centre for the settlement of Investment disputes (ICSID) registered the Italian bondholder v. Argentina for arbitration, the case is still in the stage of jurisdiction dissent. This chapter analyzes whether ICSID has jurisdiction over disputes caused by sovereign debt and the possibility of arbitration as a dispute settlement method for future sovereign debt contracts, so as to study whether arbitration will pose a threat to sovereign debt restructuring.
【学位授予单位】：中国政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D996

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