控制股东篡夺公司机会法律规制研究

发布时间：2018-03-29 01:32

本文选题：控制股东　切入点：公司机会　出处：《上海师范大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：在经济高度市场化的信息时代,机会即财富。公司机会是公司开展经营活动的重要资源,对公司的发展起关键作用。如果公司机会被篡夺,将大大损害公司利益,破坏市场经济的稳定发展。目前,学界对公司机会规则的研究多以董事、高管为对象,而忽视机会篡夺的另一主体控制股东。实际上,控制股东作为公司的实际拥有者和控制者,通过自己强大的表决权和控制力掌控公司重大决策,影响公司未来发展,如果其肆意妄为,篡夺属于公司的商业机会,便会成为公司治理的症结,严重损害公司及其他股东利益。现实中,控制股东极有可能对公司机会予以篡夺,且其篡夺手段多样、方式隐秘,具有特殊性,亟需法律加以规制。然而,我国现行法律法规对控制股东篡夺公司机会的规定处于空白状态,致使公司机会保护规则存在疏漏,也无法对控制股东篡夺公司机会的行为进行规制,这不仅不利于公司及其他股东合法利益的保护,也不利于市场经济的稳定健康发展,因此,将控制股东纳入篡夺公司机会主体范围可谓意义重大、刻不容缓。本文以控制股东为研究对象,运用比较研究、实证研究等方法,重点论证为什么要对控制股东篡夺公司机会的行为进行规制和怎样进行规制的相关问题。首先,阐述相关理论基础。通过分析,得出现有的公司机会规制理论并不完全适合控制股东这一主体。针对控制股东,提出:禁止其篡夺公司机会的理论基础为诚实信用原则,并从控制股东篡夺公司机会违背公平、违背正义和破坏经济秩序的角度进行分析。其次,探讨公司机会认定的相关问题。提出坚持宽严适度、统一前提标准下具体问题具体分析的思路及统一前提标准和具体个性标准相结合的方法,在认定时将自然人控制股东和法人控制股东加以区分。再次,分析合理利用公司机会的正当情形,提出了应将正当利用情形法典化,同时允许公司根据时代变化通过公司章程约定或者协商的方式自行规定的思路。最后,思考机会被篡夺后的救济,提出了以保护公司利益为主、维护股东利益为辅;以对股东直接规制为主、间接规制为辅的救济思路。明晰了归入权当先、损害赔偿权为补充的救济方式,完善了归入权的具体程序,明晰了举证责任;区分了直接篡夺和间接篡夺等具体救济措施。本文的创新之处在于将控制股东作为篡夺机会主体进行专题探讨,以诚实信用原则的公平、公正、秩序三个要素来分析为什么要对控制股东加以规制;并将篡夺行为类型化,结合控股股东篡夺机会的特殊性提出认定标准的新思路;同时结合我国现实中的新情况明晰公司机会理论的例外情形,最后,在救济时,区分直接篡夺和间接篡夺,为救济措施的构建提供新的思考。通过写作,笔者期待能突破公司机会研究难点,更好地保护公司及其他股东的利益,最终达到优化公司治理、促进市场经济健康发展的目的。
[Abstract]:In the information age of highly market-oriented economy, opportunity is wealth. Corporate opportunity is an important resource for a company to carry out business activities and plays a key role in the development of the company. If the opportunity is usurped, it will greatly harm the interests of the company. To destroy the stable development of market economy. At present, the academic research on the rules of corporate opportunity mostly focuses on directors and executives, while neglecting another main controlling shareholder who is usurped by opportunity. In fact, As the actual owner and controller of the company, the controlling shareholders control the major decisions of the company through their own powerful voting power and control, and affect the future development of the company. If they act wantonly and usurp the business opportunities belonging to the company, It will become the crux of corporate governance, seriously damage the interests of the company and other shareholders. In reality, controlling shareholders are very likely to usurp the opportunity of the company, and their usurpation means are various, the ways of usurpation are secret, and they have particularity. However, the regulation of controlling shareholders usurping the opportunity of the company is in a blank state, which leads to the omission of the rules of corporate opportunity protection. Nor can we regulate the usurpation of corporate opportunities by controlling shareholders, which is not conducive to the protection of the legitimate interests of the company and other shareholders, nor to the stable and healthy development of the market economy. It is of great significance to bring controlling shareholders into the scope of usurping the subject of corporate opportunity. This paper takes controlling shareholders as the research object, using comparative research, empirical research and other methods. Focus on why to regulate the usurpation of corporate opportunities by controlling shareholders and how to regulate the relevant issues. First, explain the relevant theoretical basis. It is concluded that the existing theory of corporate opportunity regulation is not completely suitable for the controlling shareholder. In view of the controlling shareholder, the theoretical basis of prohibiting the usurpation of corporate opportunity is the principle of good faith, and the usurpation of corporate opportunity from the controlling shareholder violates the fairness. From the perspective of violating justice and disrupting economic order, this paper analyzes. Secondly, it discusses the relevant issues of the company's opportunity recognition. It proposes to adhere to leniency, strictness and moderation. The idea of concrete analysis under the unified premise standard and the method of combining the unified premise standard with the specific personality standard distinguish the natural person controlling shareholder from the legal person controlling shareholder. This paper analyzes the proper situation of making use of the company's opportunity reasonably, and puts forward the idea that the proper utilization situation should be codified, while allowing the company to regulate itself according to the changes of the times by the way of agreement or negotiation of the company's articles of association. Finally, Considering the relief after the usurpation of the opportunity, this paper puts forward the relief thought of protecting the interests of the company and safeguarding the interests of the shareholders, and taking the direct regulation of the shareholders as the main, and the indirect regulation as the supplementary. The right to compensation for damages is a supplementary relief method, improves the specific procedure of subsuming right, and clarifies the burden of proof; This paper distinguishes between direct usurpation and indirect usurpation and other specific relief measures. The innovation of this paper lies in the discussion of controlling shareholders as the subject of usurpation, so that the principle of good faith is fair and just. Order three elements to analyze why to regulate the controlling shareholders, and to type usurpation behavior, combined with the particularity of the usurpation opportunities of controlling shareholders to put forward a new way to identify the criteria; At the same time, combined with the new situation in our country, the exception of corporate opportunity theory is clarified. Finally, in the process of relief, we distinguish between direct usurpation and indirect usurpation, so as to provide new thinking for the construction of relief measures. The author expects to break through the difficulties in the research of company opportunities, better protect the interests of the company and other shareholders, and finally achieve the goal of optimizing corporate governance and promoting the healthy development of the market economy.
【学位授予单位】：上海师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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