反垄断审查中效率抗辩制度的研究
本文选题:并购 + 效率抗辩 ; 参考:《华东政法大学》2015年硕士论文
【摘要】:并购可以在短期内迅速扩大企业经营规模、提升企业竞争力,企业并购是企业的一种扩展形式,不仅对企业的收益以及生存有举足轻重的作用,而且对整个产业经济乃至整个国民经济都有非常重要的影响。企业并购具有两面性,一方面,它可能限制竞争,另一方面,它可以提高企业效率,促进经济发展,带来社会福利,因此在反垄断法中,并购控制是其核心内容。本文主要研究横向与纵向并购对竞争与福利的影响。横向并购可以产生规模经济,节约成本,另一方面又会产生或增强其市场势力以及减少市场竞争者数量等反竞争效应;在纵向并购中,一方面可以产生成本节约、消除双重加价以及提高资源配置整合等效率,另一方面又可能使并购企业引起市场封锁从而排挤竞争对手等。因此,关于并购的积极与消极效应的分析,在经济学界与反垄断司法中都存在较大的争议。长期以来,反垄断政策的观点也发生了变化。在二十世纪70年代前,以美国哈佛学派的SCP结构为主要理论;在70年代中期,逐渐出现对哈佛学派的批判,产生了芝加哥学派以效率为核心的理论观点,该观点认为,如果一项并购可以获得较大的效率提高,甚至可以抵消潜在的反竞争效应,那么该项并购应当因考虑效率因素而通过审查并获得批准。文章的研究对象是横向与纵向并购的竞争效应与并购规制,这是经济学问题也是法学问题,文章采取学科交叉的研究方法,从经济学角度分析,采用了实证研究与比较分析,运用产业组织理论,系统梳理欧盟与美国对效率抗辩研究的理论成果与主要观点,对横向并购与纵向并购的反竞争效应与福利效应进行系统研究与探讨,结合我国的反垄断政策提出相应建议。文章的研究针对效率抗辩中的关键点,即横向与纵向并购的竞争损害机理与产生的福利结果问题。具体来说,可以归纳为以下几个问题。首先,对于横向与纵向并购损害竞争的机理是什么?横向与纵向并购的福利结果是什么?第二,效率抗辩中运用福利标准的问题,以及从经济学模型分析横向与纵向并购的福利结果是否可以传递给消费者?第三,比较欧盟与美国并购指南中对效率抗辩的态度与实施标准,我国应采取怎样的并购控制?围绕这些问题,结合其他学者的研究,文章从以下几个部分进行了探讨。第一,文章对横向与纵向并购的反竞争效应与效率改进进行梳理与探讨研究。反竞争效应与效率改进是反垄断审查中的重要指标,因为福利的结果取决于这两者的比较。这也是效率抗辩的核心内容。第二,效率抗辩的另一重要部分是福利标准的选择,不同福利标准的严格程度不同,从而影响评估审查的结果。分析福利标准的选择,利用经济学模型分析效率传递在不同市场中对价格的影响,探讨效率对消费者的传递程度。第三,对于并购效率的前后是否存在变化,文章引入了包络模型的数据分析,测算了横向与纵向并购前后的投入效率值的变化,对效率分析提供了一定的依据。最后,在政策规制方面,对欧盟与美国并购控制政策进行了比较分析,根据我国反垄断法的立法宗旨,提出了关于我国反垄断政策的建议。认为应当重视并购效率,吸纳芝加哥及后芝加哥学派的精华,借鉴欧美并购指南的做法,对不同的并购类型循序渐进地建立初步的分析框架。
[Abstract]:M & A can rapidly expand the business scale and enhance the competitiveness of enterprises in the short term. Merger and acquisition is an extended form of enterprise. It not only plays an important role in the income and survival of the enterprise, but also has a very important influence on the whole industrial economy and the whole national economy. It may restrict competition, on the other hand, it can improve enterprise efficiency, promote economic development and bring social welfare. Therefore, in the anti monopoly law, merger control is its core content. This paper mainly studies the impact of horizontal and vertical mergers and acquisitions on competition and welfare. Horizontal mergers and acquisitions can produce economies of scale, cost saving, and on the other hand it will come into being. On the one hand, it can produce cost saving, eliminate double price increase and improve the integration of resource allocation in vertical merger and acquisition, on the other hand, it may cause the merger and acquisition enterprise to cause market blockade to exclude competitors. The analysis of the negative effects existed in both the economics and the antitrust judiciary. For a long time, the views of the antitrust policy have changed. Before 70s twentieth Century, the SCP structure of the Harvard School of America was the main theory; in the middle of 70s, the criticism of the Harvard School was gradually emerged, and the Chicago school was produced. Based on the theory of efficiency, this view holds that if a merger can gain greater efficiency and even counteract the potential anti competitive effects, the merger should be examined and approved for consideration of efficiency factors. The object of the study is to regulate the competition effect and merger and acquisition of horizontal and vertical mergers and acquisitions. This is a problem of economics as well as a law problem. This article takes a cross study method, analyzes from the perspective of economics, uses empirical research and comparative analysis, and uses industrial organization theory to systematically comb the theoretical results and main views of the European Union and the United States on the study of efficiency defense, and the anti competitive effect of horizontal merger and vertical merger and acquisition. The welfare effect is systematically studied and discussed, and the corresponding suggestions are put forward in combination with the anti monopoly policy of China. The study of the article is aimed at the key point of the efficiency defense, that is, the competition damage mechanism of horizontal and vertical mergers and acquisitions, and the problem of welfare results. What are the mechanism of the harm competition? What are the welfare results of horizontal and vertical mergers and acquisitions? Second, the problem of the use of welfare standards in the efficiency defense, and the analysis of the welfare results of horizontal and vertical mergers and acquisitions from the economic model to the consumers? Third, compare the attitude and implementation of the efficiency defense in the EU and the US M & a guide. Standard, what kind of M & a control should China take? Around these questions and other scholars' research, the article is discussed from the following parts. First, the article combs and studies the anti competitive effect and efficiency improvement of horizontal and vertical mergers and acquisitions. The anti competitive efficiency and efficiency improvement are the important indexes in the antitrust review. The result of welfare depends on the comparison between the two. It is also the core content of the efficiency defense. Second, the other important part of the efficiency defense is the choice of the welfare standard, the difference of the strict degree of the different welfare standards, and the results of the evaluation review. The influence of the market on the price and the degree of efficiency to the consumer. Third, whether there is any change in the efficiency before and after the merger and acquisition, the paper introduces the data analysis of the envelope model, calculates the change of the input efficiency before and after the merger and acquisition, and provides a certain basis for the efficiency analysis. Finally, in the policy regulation aspect This paper makes a comparative analysis of the merger control policy between the EU and the United States. According to the legislative purpose of China's antitrust law, it puts forward some suggestions on China's anti monopoly policy. It is believed that the efficiency of merger and acquisition should be paid attention to, the essence of Chicago and the post Chicago school should be absorbed, and the practice of South and West merger and acquisition in Europe and the United States should be used for the gradual construction of different types of mergers and acquisitions. Establish a preliminary analytical framework.
【学位授予单位】:华东政法大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2015
【分类号】:D922.294
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