农地整理的委托代理关系研究

发布时间：2018-06-07 17:02

本文选题：农地整理 + 地方政府　；参考：《中国人口·资源与环境》2015年01期

【摘要】：农地整理有利于提高农业生产率,是优化配置土地资源的重要手段,但我国的农地整理效率亟待提高。在农地整理项目实施中,村组干部是地方政府与农民的共同代理人。本文运用共同代理模型从理论上进行推演,认为在委托人利益目标一致的前提下,委托代理双方利益达到次优均衡;而当委托人利益目标发生背离时,共同代理人的行为出现偏差,农地整理项目的效率降低。并通过多元定序变量回归分析,基于湖北省调查数据证明该理论推导。研究结果显示,影响农民评价农地整理工程质量的主要因素是农民身份、项目的规划设计与施工质量、农民的农地整理参与程度及对地方政府的信任程度。研究结果说明,地方政府与农民在农地整理中的利益目标不一致,属于异质的委托人,且两者地位悬殊,地方政府属于强势委托人,而农民则是弱势委托人。作为共同代理人的村组干部在利益抉择中会选择与强势的地方政府合作,并进行利益合谋,最终导致农地整理工程质量低下。研究结论如下:1打破现有农地整理中的共同代理关系,促使地方政府转变职能,强化其代理服务意识,与农民组成利益一致的同质委托人,避免共同代理人与强势委托人的利益共谋,从而提高委托代理效率。2构建完善的农民参与体系,激发农民的参与热情,并将农民的有效参与作为农地整理后评价的重要指标,促进地方政府履行应有职责。3建立健全农地整理项目的社会监督制度,尤其是强化项目区农民的社会监督力量,有利于显化代理人投入和行为,减少道德风险,提高农地整理效率。
[Abstract]:Farmland consolidation is beneficial to improve agricultural productivity and is an important means to optimize the allocation of land resources, but the efficiency of farmland consolidation in China needs to be improved urgently. In the implementation of farmland consolidation project, village cadres are the common agent of local government and farmers. In this paper, the co-agent model is used to extrapolate theoretically, and it is concluded that under the premise of consistent interest goals of the principal, the interests of both the principal and the agent reach a sub-optimal equilibrium, and when the principal's interest goal deviates, The behavior of co-agent is deviated and the efficiency of farmland consolidation project is reduced. Based on the investigation data of Hubei Province, the theory is proved by multiple ordinal variable regression analysis. The results show that the main factors affecting farmers' evaluation of farmland consolidation project quality are farmers' identity, project planning, design and construction quality, farmers' participation in farmland consolidation and their trust in local governments. The results show that the interests of local government and farmers in farmland consolidation are not the same, belong to heterogeneous clients, and the status of the two is very different, local governments belong to strong clients, while farmers are weak clients. As a co-agent, village cadres will choose to cooperate with the strong local government in the choice of interests, and collude with the interests, resulting in the low quality of the farmland consolidation project. The conclusions are as follows: 1 breaking the common agency relationship in the present farmland consolidation, prompting the local government to change its functions, strengthening its consciousness of agency service, and forming a consignor of the same quality with the farmers' interests. To avoid the co-agent and the benefit of the strong client collusion, so as to improve the efficiency of principal-agent .2 to build a perfect system of farmers' participation, stimulate farmers' enthusiasm for participation, and take the effective participation of farmers as an important index for the evaluation of farmland consolidation. To promote the local government to fulfill its due duties, to establish and improve the social supervision system of farmland consolidation projects, especially to strengthen the social supervision power of farmers in the project area, which is conducive to manifesting the input and behavior of the agents and reducing the moral hazard. Improve the efficiency of farmland consolidation.
【作者单位】：华中农业大学公共管理学院;南昌大学公共管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目“粮食主产区农地整理项目农户参与机制研究”(编号:12BGL078) 江西高校人文社会科学基金“农地城市流转中的利益博弈与制度创新研究”(编号:GL0807)
【分类号】：D922.32;D923.6

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