论股东派生诉讼制度及其完善

发布时间：2018-03-29 18:14

本文选题：股东派生诉讼　切入点：制度价值　出处：《华中科技大学》2009年硕士论文

【摘要】： 股东派生诉讼是指当董事、经理等公司高级职员实施越权行为或不当行为使公司利益受损时,或者公司利益受到公司外部第三人的侵害之时,由于公司董事会、监事会或股东大会怠于起诉或者拒绝起诉时,公司一个或多个股东代表公司对实施越权行为、不当行为或其他侵权行为者提起诉讼,胜诉所得赔偿或利益恢复都直接归属于公司的一种法律制度。此制度起源于英国的衡平法,在美国得到全面的发展,是现在世界上大多数市场经济国家所规定的公司法上的一项重要制度。我国旧公司法并没有规定股东派生诉讼,在学者们“千呼万唤始出来”的股东派生诉讼制度被新修订的《公司法》采纳后弥补了这一立法空缺,适应了市场经济的现代化发展,在规范大股东和董事的行为、维护中小股东权益方面有着特殊的作用,但“犹抱琵琶半遮面”——仅仅规定了一个条文即公司法152条,该条文的规定过于原则和粗糙,关于怎么适用并没有作出明确的规定,造成司法实践的困难。本论文在借鉴其他国家相对成熟的规定的基础上,对我国股东派生诉讼制度的完善进行了一些思考。文章共分为四个部分: 第一部分为股东派生诉讼制度概述。本部分首先揭示了股东派生诉讼的含义和特征,考察了股东派生诉讼的历史发展,接着对股东派生诉讼与股东直接诉讼的区别作了详细的比较分析。第二部分为股东派生诉讼的制度价值。本部分主要阐述股东派生诉讼的制度价值,首先在于约束经营管理者、大股东和维护中小股东利益,其次以我国上市公司的公司治理困境为例,说明股东派生诉讼对加强公司治理平衡的重要意义。第三部分为我国股东派生诉讼的立法现状和司法实践。本部分主要介绍我国新公司法确立的股东派生诉讼制度的主要内容,及其存在的问题,在司法实践部分主要通过新公司法颁布前后的几个典型股东派生诉讼案例说明我国在股东派生诉讼方面的实践和操作的困难,以此呼吁新的司法解释的出台,便于股东派生诉讼的司法操作。第四部分是在比较法视野下完善我国股东派生诉讼,主要对股东派生诉讼制度在我国如何完善进行了设计。本部分主要着眼于股东派生诉讼制度比较发达的美国、日本和我国台湾地区的公司法或商法关于股东派生诉讼的先进经验,结合我国的实际情况,就股东派生诉讼制度的诉讼主体、管辖、案件受理费、前置程序、在审理中的特殊问题如驳回起诉、和解、撤诉等以及诉讼费用担保和诉讼后果承担等方面提出具体的建议。根据我国公司股权结构集中型特点以及现实中出现的各种大股东、董事、监事等公司高级职员侵害公司利益和中小股东的情况,笔者认为现阶段应该鼓励股东派生诉讼的提起,因此在提出具体建议的时候也倾向于扩大派生诉讼的诉讼主体范围;为方便股东提起诉讼,规定便于起诉的管辖制度;为避免加重股东起诉的负担,将股东派生诉讼定性为非财产性诉讼,降低案件受理费;前置程序应该有条件地引进,并严格限制范围等。
[Abstract]:Shareholder derivative litigation refers to when the board of directors, managers and other senior staff, the implementation of ultra vires or improper behavior to the interests of the company, or the interests of the company by the third person outside the company's infringement, due to the company's board of directors, the board of supervisors or the general meeting of shareholders fails to prosecute or refused to prosecute, the company one or more shareholders on behalf of the company for the implementation of ultra vires, litigation misconduct or other infringer, a legal system in favor of the compensation or benefits recovery are directly attributable to the company. This system originated in the United Kingdom law, obtain the comprehensive development in the United States, the company law is an important system now in most market economy countries in the world the provisions on the.
In our country the old company law does not stipulate the shareholder derivative litigation, scholars in the "time and again starting out" the shareholder derivative litigation system was revised "Company Law > post adoption to make up for the legislative vacancy, to adapt to the modern development of the market economy, in the standard large shareholders and directors, has a special role the maintenance of the rights and interests of minority shareholders, but the" veiled "-- simply provides a provision that Article 152 of company law, the provisions of the provisions are too principled and rough, about how the application is not clearly defined, resulting in the difficulty of judicial practice. This paper on the basis of provisions of other countries is relatively mature on the perfection of the shareholder derivative litigation system in our country.
The article is divided into four parts:
The first part is an overview of shareholder derivative litigation. This section first reveals the implications and characteristics of shareholder derivative litigation, examines the historical development of shareholder derivative litigation, and then makes a detailed comparative analysis of the difference between shareholder derivative litigation and shareholder direct litigation.
The second part is the value of the system of shareholder derivative litigation. This part mainly expounds the value of the system of shareholder derivative litigation, first of all is to restrain managers, shareholders and safeguarding the interests of small shareholders, followed by the governance of Chinese listed companies, for example, shows the importance of shareholder derivative litigation to strengthen corporate governance and balance.
The third part of our shareholder derivative litigation legislation and judicial practice. This part mainly introduces the establishment of the new company law of China's shareholder derivative litigation system, and the problems in the judicial practice mainly through several typical cases of shareholder derivative litigation before and after the promulgation of the new company law that practice and operation in general the derivative action in China, which calls for the new judicial interpretation issued for shareholder derivative litigation in the judicial operation.
The fourth part is to improve our shareholder derivative litigation in the perspective of comparative law, mainly on shareholder derivative litigation system in our country how to improve the design. This part mainly focuses on the shareholder derivative litigation system is developed in the United States, the advanced experience on the shareholder derivative litigation of company law or commercial law of Japan and China's Taiwan region, combined with the actual situation of our country, on the shareholder derivative litigation subject of litigation jurisdiction, the case acceptance fee, pre procedure, special problems in the trial of the rejected prosecution, reconciliation, withdrawal and the cost of litigation and litigation consequences and puts forward specific suggestions. According to various large shareholders, appeared in China's shareholding structure centralized characteristics and the reality of the directors, supervisors and senior staff of the company against the interests of the company and the minority shareholders, the author believes that at this stage should encourage shareholders derivative litigation A lawsuit filed, the scope of the subject of litigation on the specific proposals also tend to expand the derivative litigation; litigation for shareholders, under the jurisdiction of the provisions for the prosecution system; in order to avoid aggravating the burden of shareholder lawsuits, the shareholder derivative litigation as non property litigation, reduce the fees for accepting the case; procedural conditions the introduction should be, and strictly limit the scope.

【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2009
【分类号】：D922.291.91

【参考文献】