德国股份有限公司股东派生诉讼制度及其借鉴

发布时间：2018-03-30 16:20

本文选题：德国股份法　切入点：股东派生诉讼　出处：《中国政法大学》2009年硕士论文

【摘要】： 现代公司制度中,公司所有权和经营权的分离造成了公司股东和公司董事等管理人员的利益冲突;公司实行股权平等原则和资本多数决定原则,表面上平等,实际上会造成多数对少数的侵害,导致大股东和小股东的对立。这两个矛盾是公司内部治理的核心,完善公司内部治理结构,关键要处理好这两个矛盾。股东派生诉讼制度作为完善公司内部治理结构、保护投资者权益的利器而受到重视,被引入各国的公司法律制度中。股东派生诉讼最初起源于英美法系,并逐步为大陆法系国家所继受。但是,德国立法者在制定《德国商法通则》的时候,却有意的摒弃了这一制度,制定了代替该制度的法定强制起诉制度。该法定强制起诉制度并未起到预期的作用,德国立法者于2005年修订德国《股份法》,引入了股东派生诉讼制度,其目的就是为了完善公司内部治理结构和加强对投资者尤其是小股东的保护。在引入该制度时,德国立法者吸取了之前法定强制起诉制度的经验和教训、借鉴了美国等世界其他国家关于股东派生诉讼制度最新的发展、考虑到本国特定情况和法律体系,制定了先进的股东派生诉讼制度。我国2005年修订的《公司法》也引入了股东派生诉讼制度,但是该规定却因为过于简单、粗糙以及不完整而备受批评。本文基于对德国股东派生诉讼的研究,致力于对完善我国股东派生诉讼制度提出建议。当然,德国的股东诉讼制度并不是完美无瑕的,本文不同于其他文章,仅仅泛泛介绍德国股东派生诉讼,而是基于德国法学界关于股东派生诉讼的最新讨论以及对德国股东派生诉讼详尽分析的基础上,“拿来”为我所用。本文主要采用了比较、历史分析和功能分析等方法研究德国股东派生诉讼制度,对完善我国股东派生诉讼制度提供参考。基于此,本文主要分为以下几个部分: 第一部分,德国股东派生诉讼制度的建立。在该部分,详细介绍了德国立法者最初摒弃股东派生诉讼制度的原因、法定强制起诉制度的发展,以及最终引入股东派生诉讼制度的历史背景。第二部分,诉讼许可程序。在该部分,主要分析了德国股东派生诉讼特有的前置许可程序——派生诉讼许可程序,指出其优点和不足。此外,该部分还涉及了其他相关的制度,如:股东论坛和“商业判断规则”等,旨在完整地、从多个角度分析德国股东派生诉讼制度。第三部分,股东派生诉讼程序。在该部分,分析了提起诉讼的期限和再次要求公司起诉,指出了优劣。在股东派生诉讼过程中,公司均有权利随时提起新的诉讼或者继受该诉讼,这是德国股东派生诉讼制度的创新。该创新是否对德国法律体系造成冲击、其现实功能作用有多大等都是本部分分析的重点,并最后得出结论。诉讼费用的承担是股东派生诉讼制度的重点,德国规定了较为合理的诉讼费用承担制度,有效的降低了股东派生诉讼的门槛,是值得我国借鉴的。德国立法者在股东派生诉讼中引入公告制度,要求上市公司必须及时地公告股东派生诉讼的提起和终结。该部分主要分析了公告制度的具体适用、内容和效果等,为我国的借鉴提供更详细的资料。并且最后总结了以上对德国股东派生诉讼制度分析而得出的结论,承接了下文对完善我国股东派生诉讼的建议。第四部分,完善我国股东派生诉讼制度的建议。在该部分主要叙述了我国对于股东派生诉讼制度的具体规定,分析了其不足,并逐项提出了完善建议。在研究德国的股东派生诉讼制度的基础上,还参考了其他国家和地区的股东派生诉讼制度,以此提出更加全面的完善建议。最后,总结得出本文结论,即降低我国股东派生诉讼制度的门槛以及规定更为合理的诉讼费用承担制度,旨在完善我国的股东派生诉讼制度,保护公司和小股东权益。
[Abstract]:In modern company system, company's separation of ownership and management rights caused the conflict of interests of shareholders and the board of directors of the company and other management personnel; company to implement the principle of equality and equity capital majority principle, on the surface of equality, will actually cause the minority majority against the opposition, guide by large and small shareholders. The two contradictions is the core of corporate governance, improve the internal governance structure, the key to deal with these two contradictions. Shareholder derivative litigation system as a tool to improve the internal governance structure, protect the interests of investors and attention, the company was introduced into the legal system.
Shareholder derivative litigation originated in the Anglo American law system, and gradually accepted by countries of continental law. However, the German legislators in the development of German Commercial Law > <, intends to abandon this system, making the place of the legal system of mandatory prosecution system. The legal system of prosecution system is not strong in the expected the role of German lawmakers in 2005 revised German law > < shares, the shareholder derivative litigation system, its purpose is to improve the internal governance structure and strengthen the investors especially the protection of minority shareholders. In the introduction of the system, the German legislators from the statutory mandatory prosecution system the experience and lessons from the United States and other countries in the world on the shareholder derivative litigation system of the latest development, taking into account the specific situation of the country and the legal system, establish the advanced system of shareholder derivative litigation in China in 2005. The revised "company law" has also introduced shareholder derivative litigation, but it has been criticized because it is too simple, rough and incomplete.
This paper studies on the shareholder derivative litigation based on Germany, committed to put forward proposals to improve shareholder derivative litigation system in our country. Of course, the German shareholder litigation system is not perfect, this is different from other articles, only the general introduction of shareholder derivative litigation in Germany, which is the latest discussion on Shareholder derivative litigation in German jurisprudence on the basis of the detailed analysis of Germany and shareholder derivative litigation, "used to" use them. This paper mainly adopts comparative research, historical analysis and functional analysis methods such as Germany to improve shareholder derivative litigation, shareholder derivative litigation system in China to provide a reference. Based on this, this paper is mainly divided into the following sections:
The first part is the establishment of German shareholder derivative litigation system. In this part, the reasons why German legislators initially abandoned shareholder derivative suit system, the development of mandatory compulsory prosecution system and the historical background of the introduction of shareholder derivative suit system were introduced in detail.
The second part, permission procedure of litigation. In this part, mainly analyzes the characteristic of German shareholder derivative litigation pre licensing procedures -- derivative litigation licensing procedures, points out their advantages and disadvantages. In addition, this part also relates to other related systems, such as: shareholders forum and the business judgment rule ", in order to complete. Analysis of German shareholder derivative litigation system from different angles.
The third part, shareholder derivative litigation procedure. In this part, analysis of the lawsuit time and again asked the company to sue, pointed out the advantages and disadvantages. In the process of shareholder derivative litigation, the company has the right to bring a new lawsuit or following the lawsuit, this is the innovation of German shareholder derivative litigation system. The innovation is the impact on the German legal system, the practical function of how the role of this part are analyzed, and finally draw the conclusion. The key is to bear the cost of litigation of shareholder derivative litigation system, Germany provides reasonable litigation costs borne system, effectively reduces the threshold of shareholder derivative litigation, is worthy of our reference. The German legislators introduced the announcement system in shareholder derivative litigation, requires listed companies to timely notice filed and the end of the shareholder derivative litigation. This part mainly analyzes the announcement The specific application, content and effect of the system provide more detailed information for our reference. Finally, we conclude the above conclusions on the German shareholder derivative litigation system, and undertake the following suggestions for improving our shareholder derivative litigation.
The fourth part, perfecting shareholder derivative litigation system in China. In this part mainly describes China's specific provisions for the shareholder derivative litigation system, analyzes its shortcomings, and put forward the suggestions. Based on the study of German shareholder derivative litigation system, also made reference to other countries and regions of the shareholder derivative the litigation system, put forward a more comprehensive suggestions.
Finally, we conclude the conclusion that we should reduce the threshold of shareholder derivative litigation and provide a more reasonable system of litigation costs, aiming at improving our shareholder derivative litigation system and protecting the rights and interests of companies and small shareholders.

【学位授予单位】：中国政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2009
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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