我国公司治理法律问题研究

发布时间：2018-04-14 04:13

本文选题：我国 + 公司治理　；参考：《中国政法大学》2003年博士论文

【摘要】： 自1932年Berle和Means研究报告显示，美国大型股份有限公司股权结构相当分散，导致公司所有与经营之分离，形成经营者控制的现象，而经营者的目标与公司所有者股东的目标未必一致，致产生了代理问题。为解决或降低代理及代理成本问题，厥为公司治理的目的。从1997年底发生的亚洲金融风暴，到2001年美国陆续爆发安隆及世界通讯等弊案丑闻，掀起了讨论公司治理的热潮，同时，也正值我国大陆地区国有企业改革的关键时刻，实有必要研究各国公司治理的法律制度以为借鉴。公司治理是一个从法律学、经济学、财务学、会计学，，甚至政治学与社会学等多元角度来探讨公司企业组织运作，以及各种利害关系人之间的互动并评估其绩效，同时也是透过市场机制与法律规范等制度因素，提升公司企业的营运绩效与股东价值。而股权结构分散与否牵涉到股东有无动机及激励去监督公司，故不同股权结构可能有不同的公司治理机制，应该说，公司治理并没有一个固定、完美的格式，各国公司治理的差异正是公司股权结构不同所导致的。股权结构在某种程度决定公司治理模式，公司治理决定公司绩效。论文从探讨公司治理的概念与相关理论，进而讨论公司治理的相关立法理论与制度，并通过美国、德国与日本等国公司治理的比较分析研究，并为我国大陆地区公司治理的完善提出建议。本论文共分三章，约十万字，以下拟就各章之纲要，论述如下。第一章主要论述股权结构与公司治理之相关理论。由公司股权的分散，意味着公司股东不再被看作一个整体存在，而系与公司经营相分离的投资者而已，故产生公司治理的相关理论，包括两权分离理论，委托代理理论。两权分离理论论及所有权与控制权相分离之理论、此一理论论述了公司治理问题产生的前提与过程。委托代理理论论证两权分离的现代公司中，公司治理所采取模式为委托代理制，公司治理的问题是如何使具有独立利益的控制权主体最大限度维护所有权主体的利益，是公司治理的核心组成部分。同时，本章并论述制度及市场环境对公司治理结构的影响以及融资结构与股权结构的不同，分别造成以公司外部治理结构与公司内部治理结构等不同的外部人控管机制与内部人控管机制。第二章介绍国外公司治理结构与相关立法的比较分析，首先介绍各国股权及融资的法律与管制而产生不同结构的公司治理模式，再据此分别分析美国、德国与日本公司治理结构与实务及相关法律制度，最后予以比较分析。本章中有关各国公司中国政法大学博士学位论文我国公司治理法律问题研究治理模式的特点，尽可能的论述，包括采单轨制之美国公司治理结构中董事与董事会制度中董事独立性，董事会委员制度及董事责任与商业经营判断原则等及美国公司经理层激励与制约机制，以及外部公司控制权市场与代理权竞争等公司外部治理的机制。德国公司治理的特色在于，德国全能银行对公司治理的影响;及德国公司采双轨制的组织结构，即由股东及员工选出监事会，再由监事会选任董事会，股东会、监事会、董事会分有不同的职责与功能。德国公司治理另一主要特色即员工参与制，较具社会主义的公司治理制度。在日本公司治理方面，有主银行制及法人资本的监督，其公司治理与德国相近，均属以内部控管是为主。所不同的是日本公司的组织架构的监事会系与董事会相同，平行由股东会选出，其监事会主要职责为对董事会的业务监督与会计监督，而无对董事会的选任与解任之权。同时，日本政府于2002年5月1日修改其商法，赋予“大公司”董事会得设置提名委员会、报酬委员会、监察委员会取代监事会，致使日本公司治理将澳.现单轨制及双轨制并行，惟此次修法，尚保留会计监察人制，亦是日本公司治理的一大特色。透过对上述三个国家不同治理结构的比较分析，笔者整理归纳分就外部人控管式及内部人控管式的主要比较项目，并汇总上述三国之公司治理特色，另外美国为整顿其公司内部治理失灵，采用强硬的萨班法案，使私法自治与政府强制性规范的界线有相当的突破，萨班法案造成政府高度管制的利弊得失，值得我们长期观察。第三章系透过分析我国大陆地区国有企业改革之问题，就我国大陆地区企业体制改革向现代企业制度变迁所引发的问题，透过问题之产生及相关对策之法律制度修改，及其产生之效果作有关之分析探讨。并就我国大陆地区企业体制改革向现代企业制度变迁所引发的问题，笔者透过对我国大陆地区产权结构及股权结构的改革过程中所引发问题及国有企业股份公司化之法制问题及相关规范论述后，并以提出对我国大陆地区公司治理的建议，首先在完善我国大陆地区公司内部治理结构，包括优化股权结构，加强股东会职能的发挥、董事会的法制建设与制衡机制、公司经理层的激励与制约及扩充监事会的监督职权等，此部份主要核心在完备公司法律制度。其次，在完善我国大陆地区公司外部治理，主要是市场机制的建立和完善。同时，笔者认为首要是完善公司内部治理结构，使公司治理绩效能发挥，与国际企业有竞争力，企业的内部控管透明化，必然需完善资本市场，?
[Abstract]:According to Berle and Means Research Report 1932 , the equity structure of large - scale companies in the United States is quite dispersed , which leads to the separation of all companies from operation and the formation of operator control , and the objective of the operators is not necessarily consistent with the objectives of the shareholders of the company , resulting in the problem of agency . In order to solve or reduce the cost of agents and agents , it is the purpose of corporate governance .

The Asian financial turmoil , which occurred at the end of 1997 , has raised discussion on the upsurge of corporate governance in 2001 , and meanwhile , it is the key time for the reform of state - owned enterprises in the mainland of our country , and it is necessary to study the legal system of corporate governance in our country for reference .

Corporate governance is a kind of corporate governance mechanism , such as law , economics , finance , accounting , even politics and sociology .

This paper discusses the concept and relevant theories of corporate governance , then discusses the relevant legislative theory and system of corporate governance , and makes recommendations for the improvement of corporate governance in the mainland of China through comparative analysis of corporate governance in the United States , Germany and Japan .

Chapter one deals with the theory of ownership structure and corporate governance . It means that the shareholder of the company is no longer regarded as a whole , but it is an investor separated from the company ' s management . The theory of corporate governance is the premise and process of corporate governance .

The second chapter introduces the comparative analysis of corporate governance structure and relevant legislation in foreign countries . First , it introduces the laws and regulations of national equity and financing to produce corporate governance model of different structures , and then analyzes the governance structure and practice of American , German and Japanese companies and relevant legal system , and then compares them .

Doctorate Degree in China University of Political Science and Law

A Study on the Legal Issues of Corporate Governance in China

The characteristics of the governance model , as far as possible , including the directors and directors in the American corporate governance structure of the single track system .

The independence of directors in the meeting system , the system of the board of directors and the principle of the director ' s responsibility and business operation judgment , and the American public .

Division Manager ' s incentive and restriction mechanism , as well as external corporate control market and agency right competition , etc . external governance

The German company ' s corporate governance is characterized by its impact on corporate governance ; and German companies

The organizational structure of the double - track system shall be selected by the shareholders and employees , and the board of directors and shareholders shall be elected by the board of supervisors

The board of supervisors and the board of directors have different duties and functions . German corporate governance is another major feature , namely , employee reference .

A system of corporate governance with a relatively socialist system . In the area of corporate governance in Japan , there are main bank systems and corporate finance .

The supervision of the Company is similar to that of Germany , which is mainly based on internal control . The difference is Japanese company .

The board of supervisors of the organizational structure shall be the same as the board of directors . The board of supervisors shall be elected by the shareholders ' meeting and the main responsibilities of the board of supervisors shall be as follows :

Business supervision and accounting supervision of the board of directors , without the right to choose and interpret the board of directors . Meanwhile , the Japanese government

Modified its commercial law on May 1 , 2002 , giving " big company " board of directors to set up nominating committee , remuneration

in addition , that committee and the supervisory committee replace the board of supervisors so that the government of Japan will adopt the single - track system and the double - track system in parallel ,

However , it is a major feature of the governance of Japanese companies . It is also a major feature of the governance of Japanese companies .

The comparative analysis of different governance structures in a country , the author organizes and sums up the external personal control tube type and the inner human control tube type

The major comparative projects of the three countries are summarized and the corporate governance characteristics of the above three countries are summarized , and the internal governance of the company is to be rectified in the United States .

The line of autonomy of private law and the mandatory norms of government has a considerable breakthrough .

It is worth our long - term observation that the Sarban Act has led to the disadvantages of the government ' s high - level regulation .

The third chapter is to analyze the reform of the state - owned enterprises in the mainland of China .

The problems caused by the reform of the system to the modern enterprise system , the generation of the transmission problem and the legal system of the relevant countermeasures

On the basis of the analysis and discussion on the effect of the modification and its production , and the reform of the enterprise system in the mainland of China

The problem caused by the change of enterprise system is the reform of property rights structure and equity structure in the mainland of China .

After discussing the problems caused in the process and the legal system of the joint stock company of the state - owned enterprises and the related norms , the author also puts forward

On the proposal of corporate governance in mainland China , first , the internal governance structure and package of Chinese mainland companies are perfected .

To optimize the equity structure , strengthen the function of the shareholders ' meeting , the legal system construction and balance mechanism of the board of directors , and the company

The main core of this part is the legal system of complete company .

Secondly , it is mainly the establishment and perfection of the market mechanism in improving the external governance of Chinese mainland companies .

At the same time , the author thinks it is the first thing to perfect the internal governance structure of the company , to make the corporate governance performance exert , with the international enterprise

Competitive , enterprise ' s internal control tube transparency , inevitably need to perfect the capital market , ?

【学位授予单位】：中国政法大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2003
【分类号】：D922.29

【引证文献】