国有企业委托代理关系的风险与回避

发布时间：2018-06-06 08:33

本文选题：国有企业 + 委托代理　；参考：《武汉理工大学》2003年硕士论文

【摘要】： 本文适应国家经济发展和经济体制改革的需要，在分析我国国有企业委托代理关系的基础上提出国有企业委托风险的回避措施。全文共分四章，各章主要内容概括如下：第一章从企业委托代理的起源与演变、委托-代理一般理论的代理风险原理两个方面，对企业委托代理的一般理论作一概述。企业委托代理关系起源于地理大发现以后所导致的世界经济史上的商业革命。16—18世纪，在地理大发现和新航路的推动下，国际贸易快速发展。贸易规模的扩大，需要有效率的商业组织相配合。在这一背景下，商业组织形式的创新之一，就是特许公司成为对外贸易的主要商业组织形式：一类是契约公司，另一类是早期的股份公司。18世纪90年代，美国的企业组织形式以合伙制为主，但为了适应迅速扩充的经济和联邦政体的需要，美国率先对商法进行调整，旨在确立股份公司的企业组织形式。美国对商法的高速，标志着委托代理机制的确立。现代股份公司表明，委托代理关系以分工和专业化为基础，它在本质上是一种合约。在这种合约下，一个人或更多人委托其他人代表他们来从事某些活动，并相应地把若干决策权托付给代理人。在这一契约关系中，人们将能够主动设计契约形式的当事人称为委托人，而将被动地接受或拒绝契约形式中进行选择的当事人称为代理人。现代企业中股东和经理人之间的关系因此而成为典型的委托代理关系，其特征就是所有权与管理权相分离。委托代理关系中，双方都是自身效用最大化者。一方面作为拥有资本财货的委托人之所以委托代理人，是因为追求收益的最大化。另一方面被委托的代理人追求的目标是效用的最大化。这样，有着独立利益的代理人在自身利益最大化的过程中，不会自动实现委托人收益的最大化，甚至基于机会主义动机，在最大限度增进自己利益的同时，可能造成委托人利益的损失，形成管理理论的代理风险问题。在委托代理关系中，代理人问题具体表现为以下两种基本类型：一是道德风险(moral hazard)问题；二是逆向选择(adverse selection)问题。阿罗(Arrow，1985)将这两类现象分别称为“隐蔽行动”(hidden action)问题和“隐蔽信息(hidden information)问题。理论与实践两个方面一直在探讨委托代理关系中代理问题的解决方案。那就是让委托人利用两种机制，把代理风险降到最低程度。一是通过合理设武汉理工大学硕士学位论文一计代理契约，明确界定代理人的责任、权利和义务，并给予代理人最佳的行一为激励和约束，使代理人的行为目标与委托人的目标接近，减少代理人的机会主义行为。二是通过代理人市场，在代理人之间引入竞争机制。竞争机制 —一确立后，委托人通过仔细考察代理人的业绩，声誉等，选择“信得过’。的代理人。现在，为了解决代理问题，理论和实践都在探索委托代理关系的更有＿效的激励与约束新模式，这些新模式包括独立董事制度模式、股票期权模式一和智力资本激励模式、风险投资企业模式。一第二章围绕国有企业委托代理关系问题，首先分析西方国有企业的委托代理关系，，其次考察我国国有企业委托代理关系的认识与实践，最后探讨对我国国有企业委托代理关系进行的再认识与实践。世界上几乎所有的国家都有国有企业。西方国有企业的组织形式基本上实行国家参与制（参股制），而在管理上则采取控股公司模式。其国有企业的激励机制分为货币激励与非货币，而约束机制包括所有权约束、内部监督和约束、外部监督和约束。我国国有企业被定义为社会主义全民所有制企业。在高度集权的非市场化条件下，国有企业名为企业，其实是政府的附属机构，企业没有自主经营权，－一政府从上到下对国有资产的经营形成大一统的包办，企业中一般意义上的委托代理关系消失。改革开始以后，人们对集权体制进行了猛烈的批判，随之扩大企业自主经营权，尔后实行企业承包制。企业承包制的实行使国有企业的行政约束更不规范地扩大，政府作为发包方实际垄断企业的一切。发包方可以任意中止，而承包方却不能随便转换，政府与企业的关系实质上仍在非市场化经营的旧体制上延续。20世纪故年代以前，国有企业改革方向的理论探讨集中到“所有权与经营权分离”的思路方面。围绕这一基本思路，理论界提出了许多改革设想。其中，国有企业体制改革实践，是当时理论研究成果的结晶，代表了主流派——一渐进式改革的改革思想。但是，它们远不是这一时期研究成果的全部，其他比较有代表性的观点有“变压器理论”和“综合制约的经理阶层论”。20世纪90年代中期，通过对国有企业委托代理关系的再认识，理论界提出了国家持股的构想、国有资产的股权化与债权化构想、主办银行制度的构想，并对此进行了实践。－一第三章以我国国有企业委托代理关系的风险与原因为题，分别讨论我国＿国
[Abstract]:This article is adapted to the needs of the national economic development and the economic system reform. On the basis of the analysis of the principal-agent relationship of the state owned enterprises in our country, this paper puts forward the avoidance measures of the trust risk of the state-owned enterprises. The full text is divided into four chapters, and the main contents of each chapter are summarized as follows:
The first chapter from the origin and evolution of the principal-agent, the principal agent general theory of the agency risk principle two aspects, an overview of the general theory of enterprise principal-agent. The enterprise principal-agent relationship originated in the world economic history of the business revolution.16 - eighteenth Century, in the geographical discovery and new navigation Under the impetus of the road, international trade has developed rapidly. The expansion of trade scale requires efficient business organizations to cooperate. In this context, one of the innovation of the form of business organization is that the Chartered Company has become the main business organization of foreign trade: one is the contract company and the other is the early stock company in the 90s.18 century. The form of enterprise organization is mainly in partnership, but in order to meet the needs of rapidly expanding economic and federal government, the United States is the first to adjust the commercial law to establish the organizational form of the joint stock company. The high-speed of the United States to the commercial law marks the establishment of the principal-agent mechanism. On the basis of specialization, it is essentially a contract in which a person or more person entrusts others to engage in certain activities on behalf of them and to give the agent a number of decisions accordingly. In this contractual relationship, the party who can actively design the contract form is called the client and will be passive. The party who accepts or refuses to choose in the form of contract is called agent. The relationship between shareholders and managers in modern enterprises is a typical principal-agent relationship, which is characterized by the separation of ownership and management.
In the principal-agent relationship, both sides are the maxims of their own utility. On the one hand, the principal who has the capital and goods is entrusted to the agent because it seeks the maximization of the income. On the other hand, the agent sought by the entrusted agent is the maximization of the utility. In this way, the agent with independent interests maximizes its own interests. In the process, it will not automatically realize the maximization of the principal's income, even based on the opportunist motivation. It may cause the loss of the principal's interests and form the agency risk in the management theory. In the principal-agent relationship, the agent problem is embodied in the following two basic types: one is the Dao The moral hazard problem; two is the adverse selection problem. AlO (Arrow, 1985) referred to these two types of phenomena as "hidden action" (hidden action) and "hidden information".
In the two aspects of theory and practice, we have been discussing the solution of agency problem in principal-agent relationship. That is to let the principal use two mechanisms to minimize the agency risk.
Master's degree thesis of Wuhan University of Technology
An agency contract, which clearly defines the responsibilities, rights and obligations of agents, and gives agents the best way to do so.
In order to encourage and restrain the agent's behavior goal and the client's goal, he can reduce the agent's machine.
The two is to introduce competition mechanism among agents through the agent market.
Once established, the trustor selects the "trustworthy" generation through careful inspection of the agent's performance, reputation and so on.
Now, in order to solve the agency problem, both theory and practice are exploring the relationship between principal and agent.
The new mode of incentive and restriction includes independent director system mode and stock option mode.
First, intellectual capital incentive mode, venture capital enterprise mode.
The second chapter focuses on the principal-agent relationship of state-owned enterprises. First, it analyzes the entrustment of western state-owned enterprises.
Secondly, we examine the understanding and practice of the principal-agent relationship in China's state-owned enterprises.
The recognition and practice of principal-agent relationship in state-owned enterprises in China. Almost all the countries in the world
There are state-owned enterprises. The organizational form of the western state-owned enterprises basically implements the state participation system (shareholding system).
In management, the mode of holding company is adopted. The incentive mechanism of state-owned enterprises is divided into monetary incentive and non cash incentive.
The constraint mechanism includes ownership restriction, internal supervision and restriction, external supervision and restriction.
State owned enterprises are defined as socialist enterprises owned by the whole people. Under the condition of highly centralized and non marketization,
The state-owned enterprise is called an enterprise, but it is actually a subsidiary organ of the government.
From top to bottom, the operation of state-owned assets is unified, and the principal-agent in general sense of enterprises is arranged.
After the reform began, people criticized the centralization system fiercely, and then expanded it.
The enterprise shall have the right to operate independently, and then the enterprise contract system shall be implemented.
The restriction is more irregular. The government acts as the owner of the actual monopoly of the enterprise.
The contractor will not be able to switch freely, but the relationship between the government and the enterprises is still non marketable.
The old system of operation extends the theoretical direction of the reform direction of state-owned enterprises before the.20 century.
Focus on the idea of "separation of ownership from management".
A lot of reform ideas have been put forward. Among them, the reform practice of state-owned enterprises is the result of theoretical research at that time.
Crystallizing represents the mainstream school - the idea of gradual reform.
All other research results are representative of the "transformer theory" and "comprehensive system".
In the middle of the.20 century, in 90s, the principal-agent relationship of state-owned enterprises was re established.
In theory, the theorists put forward the concept of State Shareholding, and the concept of stock ownership and creditor's rights of state-owned assets.
The idea of running a banking system has been put into practice.
The first third chapters discuss the risks and causes of the principal-agent relationship in China's state-owned enterprises.
State
【学位授予单位】：武汉理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2003
【分类号】：F276.1

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