行政诉讼和解的合谋隐患及其消解

发布时间：2018-08-07 18:24

【摘要】：《行政诉讼法》第50条规定"行政诉讼不适用调解"。人民法院以"和解"之名行"调解"之实。在《行政诉讼法》中确立和解制度的呼声越来越高。行政诉讼和解中的"合谋"隐患应重点思考。通过利益博弈分析法与个案研究法发现:在行政诉讼和解过程中可能存在不同类型的合谋隐患;行政诉讼和解过程中的合谋行为会导致"案结事不了"的和谐隐患以及法官的角色迷失。在行政诉讼和解的制度构造中为抑制合谋应当采取一些必要手段,即通过和解与审判的事权分离保证法官严守中立;通过明确行政和解协议的先予执行效力和可强制执行性来实现"案结事了";在立法中增设继续审判请求权以进一步保障撤诉原告的合法权益。
[Abstract]:Article 50 of the Administrative procedure Law stipulates that mediation is not applicable in administrative proceedings. In the name of "reconciliation", the people's court acts as "mediation." In the Administrative Litigation Law, the voice of establishing reconciliation system is getting higher and higher. The hidden trouble of collusion in the reconciliation of administrative litigation should be considered emphatically. Through the interest game analysis method and the case study method, it is found that there may be different types of collusion hidden danger in the process of administrative litigation reconciliation; The collusive behavior in the process of administrative litigation reconciliation will lead to the harmonious hidden trouble of "the case cannot be concluded" and the loss of the judge's role. In order to restrain collusion, some necessary measures should be taken in the system structure of reconciliation in administrative litigation, that is, to ensure the judge's strict neutrality through the separation of the power of reconciliation and trial; In order to further protect the lawful rights and interests of the plaintiff, the author makes clear the enforcement effect and the enforceable effect of the administrative settlement agreement to realize the conclusion of the case, and to add the right to continue trial in the legislation to protect the lawful rights and interests of the plaintiffs who withdraw the lawsuit.
【作者单位】：重庆大学法学院;重庆行政学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金资助项目“食品安全风险警示制度研究”(13CFX028)
【分类号】：D925.3

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