土地征收中的“行政包干制”及其后果

发布时间：2018-04-09 12:01

本文选题：行政包干制　切入点：土地征收　出处：《政治学研究》2015年01期

【摘要】：在当前的农村土地征收领域,一些地方政府采用"行政包干"的方式将其中的各种复杂事务承包给村委会来完成。通过权力和责任的双重下放,地方政府得以避免与农民发生直接的冲突和对抗,农民的不满对象主要是村委会,土地征收中的矛盾就更多地发生在村庄内部。而且,从性质上看,农村土地征收矛盾在发生之初更多地是围绕着补偿物的价格核定,不一定具有对抗性。在"行政包干"的制度限制下,由于陷入了与各自村委会就补偿物价格核算的争议之中,农民无法形成相对一致的行动目标,以致更大范围的集体行动难以发生。在这个意义上,"行政包干制"的运作转移了冲突的发生场域,防止了冲突的升级和集中爆发,进而降低了地方政府的执政风险。但是,从长远来看,"行政包干制"中普遍存在的利益激励导向消解了基层组织的公共性,并非一种稳定的治理机制。
[Abstract]:In the current field of rural land expropriation, some local governments use the method of "administrative contract" to contract all kinds of complicated affairs to the village committee to complete.Through the dual decentralization of power and responsibility, the local government can avoid the direct conflict and confrontation with the peasants. The main object of the peasants' dissatisfaction is the village committee, and the contradiction in the land expropriation occurs more frequently in the village.Moreover, from the nature, the contradiction of rural land expropriation is mainly determined around the price of compensator at the beginning of the land expropriation, and it is not necessarily antagonistic.Under the restriction of "administrative contract" system, farmers can not form a relatively consistent action target because they are in dispute with their respective village committees on the price accounting of compensatory property, so collective action on a larger scale is difficult to take place.In this sense, the operation of "administrative contract system" has shifted the field of conflict, prevented the escalation and centralized outbreak of conflict, and reduced the ruling risk of local government.However, in the long run, the common interest incentive orientation in the administrative contract system dispels the publicity of grass-roots organizations and is not a stable governance mechanism.
【作者单位】：华中科技大学法学院;
【基金】：2012年国家社会科学基金项目“农村土地流转的社会学研究”(12CSH026)的研究成果
【分类号】：D922.3;D921.8

【参考文献】