基于合作博弈模型的不当解雇赔偿机制研究

发布时间：2018-03-20 11:46

  本文选题：不当解雇赔偿　切入点：合作博弈　出处：《中国人力资源开发》2017年03期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：在中国,不当解雇引起的赔偿金争议日益增多。本文首先对美、英、法、德四国相关规制进行比较研究,分析并总结出不当解雇赔偿需经劳雇双方博弈来确定赔偿责任和赔偿标准的内在运行机制。以诺基亚(苏州)不当解雇赔偿案例为引导,基于一个合作博弈分析,得出赔偿金数额的大小受劳雇双方赔偿金谈判的风险偏好影响等结论。
[Abstract]:In China, disputes over compensation caused by improper dismissal are increasing day by day. This paper first makes a comparative study of the relevant regulations of the United States, Britain, France and Germany. This paper analyzes and summarizes the inherent operating mechanism of the compensation for improper dismissal based on the game between labor and employee. Based on the analysis of a cooperative game, this paper takes the case of improper dismissal compensation in Suzhou as the guide. It is concluded that the amount of compensation is influenced by the risk preference in the negotiation of compensation.
【作者单位】： 北京物资学院劳动科学与法律学院;
【分类号】：D922.52
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本文编号：1638939