混合寡头模型下企业的技术授权模式研究

发布时间：2018-05-13 13:15

本文选题：技术授权 + Hotelling模型　；参考：《山东大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着科技进步日新月异、科技竞争日渐加剧及对知识产权的保护日趋完善,技术授权成为很多企业获得技术创新的主要途径。通过技术授权,专利持有人获得授权费用,同时被授权的厂商也可以通过接受授权改善自己的技术水平。前人对专利授权的研究主要集中在追求利润最大化的私人厂商,很少有人关注混合所有制厂商。随着我国混合所有制改革的推进,混合所有制厂商在市场上会越来越多。不同于国有制厂商和私有制厂商,混合所有制厂商追求的目标并不单一,它既追求利润最大化,又追求社会福利最大化。在此背景下,本文通过建立空间异质产品模型—Hotelling模型,分析当模型中生产型厂商分别由两个私有制寡头厂商或者由私有制厂商、混合所有制厂商组成的混合寡头厂商组成时,专利持有厂商的授权行为和最优模式的选择。本文假定专利持有厂商为外部人,其获得收益的方式是通过持有的技术进行授权,追求授权利润的最大化。本文最大的创新之处在于引入了混合所有制厂商,研究混合寡头下的技术授权问题并且比较生产型厂商的所有制构成不同时,对授权行为和最优授权模式的影响。通过分析我们发现:在固定费用制下,当专利持有者授权给由私有化厂商组成的寡头时,最优的技术授权模式是独家授权;当专利持有者授权给由混合所有制厂商和私有制厂商构成的混合寡头时,最优的技术授权模式的选择取决于混合所有制厂商的私有化程度、初始的技术水平和技术创新程度,其中,当私有化程度比较高时,专利持有厂商选择独家授权给私有制厂商,当私有化比较低时,被授权厂商选择独家授权给混合所有制厂商。在可变费率制下,无论专利的创新程度如何、生产型厂商的所有制形式如何,外部的专利持有人都会选择同时授权给两个生产型厂商。在两部收费制下,无论生产型厂商的所有制形式如何、厂商A的私有化程度如何、专利的创新程度如何,专利持有者都倾向于同时授权。在最优授权模式的确定上,出于自身利润最大化考虑,专利持有厂商都会选择两部收费模式进行授权。但是在生产型厂商为私有制厂商时,两部收费制完全转化为可变费率制。由此本文可以得出,所有制结构的不同会对专利持有厂商的授权行为产生影响,但是在最优授权模式的选择上,两部收费制都是最优的授权模式。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of science and technology, the competition of science and technology is becoming more and more serious, and the protection of intellectual property rights is becoming more and more perfect. Technology authorization has become the main way for many enterprises to obtain technological innovation. Through technology licensing, patent holders receive licensing fees, and authorized manufacturers can improve their technology level by receiving licenses. Previous researches on patent licensing mainly focus on private firms that pursue profit maximization, and few people pay attention to mixed ownership firms. With the development of China's mixed ownership reform, there will be more and more mixed ownership manufacturers in the market. Different from state-owned and private ownership firms, mixed ownership firms pursue not only the goal of maximization of profit, but also the maximization of social welfare. In this context, this paper establishes a spatial heterogeneous product model, Hotelling model, and analyzes when the model consists of two private oligarchs or mixed oligarchs, which are composed of private ownership firms and mixed ownership firms, respectively. The licensing behavior of the patent holder and the choice of the optimal mode. This paper assumes that the patent holder is an outsider, and the way to obtain the profit is to license the technology held and to maximize the profit of the license. The biggest innovation of this paper is the introduction of mixed ownership firms, the study of technology authorization under mixed oligopoly, and the comparison of the different ownership structure of production firms on the influence of authorization behavior and optimal authorization mode. Through the analysis, we find that under the fixed fee system, when the patent holders license to the oligopoly composed of privatized firms, the optimal technology licensing mode is the exclusive licensing; When the patent holder authorizes the mixed oligopoly composed of the mixed ownership firm and the private ownership firm, the choice of the optimal technology authorization mode depends on the degree of privatization, the initial technology level and the technological innovation degree of the mixed ownership firm. Among them, when the degree of privatization is relatively high, the patent holder chooses the exclusive license to the private ownership firm, and when the privatization is relatively low, the authorized firm chooses the exclusive license to the mixed ownership firm. Under the variable rate system, regardless of the degree of innovation of the patent and the ownership form of the producer, the external patent holder will choose to license the two manufacturers at the same time. Under the two-part charging system, regardless of the ownership form of the producer, the degree of privatization of the manufacturer A, the degree of innovation of the patent, the patent holder is inclined to license at the same time. In order to determine the optimal licensing mode, the patent holders will choose two charging modes to license for their own profit maximization. However, when the producer is private-owned, the two-part charge system is completely transformed into variable rate system. Therefore, it can be concluded that the different ownership structure will have an impact on the licensing behavior of the patent holder, but in the choice of the optimal licensing mode, the two fee systems are the optimal licensing mode.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F273.1

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