基于市场约束视角的我国存款保险制度研究
发布时间：2018-08-26 18:22
【摘要】：自1997年亚洲金融危机，特别是时隔十年，美国再次爆发大规模的金融危机以来，越来越多的国家或地区开始重新审视银行的系统性风险，而建立显性存款保险制度被奉为防止银行挤兑的法宝。长期以来，我国一直采用的是政府的隐性保护，这种隐性存款保险制度不仅给政府造成沉重的财务负担，而且不利于银行业的公平竞争与良性发展。对于建立我国的显性存款保险制度一直是学术理论界十分关注的课题，而我国政府相继出台的有关法律法规，将我国的存款保险制度从学术理论研究逐步引入实际的操作层面，相关部门正加紧制定我国显性存款保险制度的相关政策和法律法规。但显性存款保险制度是一把“双刃剑”，，必须对其进行合理的设计和运作，最大限度发挥其应有的用途。所以，设计我国的显性存款保险制度，既要借鉴国际的最新发展趋势和成功经验，又要审时度势，深刻分析我国的国情和金融环境。随着市场约束作为《新巴塞尔协议》中银行监管的“三大支柱”之一，逐渐登上历史舞台，因此如何将市场约束这一关键要素加入我国显性存款保险制度的建立之中，从有效发挥市场约束和存款保险的双重作用这一新视角，研究我国存款保险制度的构建和如何运行问题，具有非常强的理论意义和现实意义。本文综合运用信息经济学和制度经济学的相关理论，在对相关概念和现有研究进行总结后，首先分析了隐性存款保险制度对我国金融业所产生的不利影响，然后通过对我国15家银行风险的面板数据进行了模型分析，验证了我国隐性存款保险制度确实在很大程度上减弱我国市场约束的力量；随后对我国建立显性存款保险制度内部环境和基础条件进行了阐述；接着对基于市场约束视角下，国际存款保险制度的变革和发展趋势进行了对比分析；最后结合我国现实国情和国际经验，基于市场约束这一视角，从存款保险制度的目标定位、组织形式和基金来源、参保资格、最高理赔限额和参保费率等方面进行了设计，以期为我国建立市场约束和存款保险激励相容的存款保险制度提供理论支持，促进我国金融业的健康稳定发展。
[Abstract]:Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, especially in the past ten years, the United States has once again broken out a large-scale financial crisis, more and more countries or regions began to re-examine the systemic risks of banks. The establishment of explicit deposit insurance system is regarded as a magic weapon to prevent bank runs. For a long time, our country has been adopting the implicit protection of the government. This hidden deposit insurance system not only causes a heavy financial burden to the government, but also is not conducive to the fair competition and healthy development of the banking industry. The establishment of explicit deposit insurance system in our country has always been a topic of great concern to academic theorists. However, the relevant laws and regulations issued by our government one after another have gradually introduced the deposit insurance system from academic theoretical research into the practical operational level. Relevant departments are stepping up the formulation of China's explicit deposit insurance system related policies and laws and regulations. But the explicit deposit insurance system is a "double-edged sword", it must be reasonably designed and operated to maximize its use. Therefore, in designing our country's explicit deposit insurance system, we should not only draw lessons from the latest international development trends and successful experiences, but also review the current situation and analyze our country's national conditions and financial environment. As one of the "three pillars" of banking supervision in the New Basel Accord, market constraint has gradually stepped onto the historical stage, so how to add the key element of market restraint to the establishment of explicit deposit insurance system in China. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the construction and operation of deposit insurance system in China from the new perspective of exerting the dual functions of market restriction and deposit insurance effectively. Based on the relevant theories of information economics and institutional economics, this paper summarizes the relevant concepts and existing studies, and analyzes the adverse effects of the recessive deposit insurance system on the financial industry in China. Then, through the analysis of the panel data of 15 banks in China, the author verifies that the implicit deposit insurance system in our country really weakens the power of market restraint to a great extent. Then it expounds the internal environment and basic conditions of establishing explicit deposit insurance system in China, and then makes a comparative analysis of the reform and development trend of international deposit insurance system from the perspective of market constraints. Finally, according to the actual situation of our country and international experience, based on the perspective of market restriction, this paper designs the target orientation, organization form and fund source, insurance qualification, maximum claim limit and premium rate of deposit insurance system. The purpose is to provide theoretical support for the establishment of a deposit insurance system which is compatible with market constraints and deposit insurance incentives, and to promote the healthy and stable development of our financial industry.
【学位授予单位】：华东交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.2;F842.6
[Abstract]:Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, especially in the past ten years, the United States has once again broken out a large-scale financial crisis, more and more countries or regions began to re-examine the systemic risks of banks. The establishment of explicit deposit insurance system is regarded as a magic weapon to prevent bank runs. For a long time, our country has been adopting the implicit protection of the government. This hidden deposit insurance system not only causes a heavy financial burden to the government, but also is not conducive to the fair competition and healthy development of the banking industry. The establishment of explicit deposit insurance system in our country has always been a topic of great concern to academic theorists. However, the relevant laws and regulations issued by our government one after another have gradually introduced the deposit insurance system from academic theoretical research into the practical operational level. Relevant departments are stepping up the formulation of China's explicit deposit insurance system related policies and laws and regulations. But the explicit deposit insurance system is a "double-edged sword", it must be reasonably designed and operated to maximize its use. Therefore, in designing our country's explicit deposit insurance system, we should not only draw lessons from the latest international development trends and successful experiences, but also review the current situation and analyze our country's national conditions and financial environment. As one of the "three pillars" of banking supervision in the New Basel Accord, market constraint has gradually stepped onto the historical stage, so how to add the key element of market restraint to the establishment of explicit deposit insurance system in China. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the construction and operation of deposit insurance system in China from the new perspective of exerting the dual functions of market restriction and deposit insurance effectively. Based on the relevant theories of information economics and institutional economics, this paper summarizes the relevant concepts and existing studies, and analyzes the adverse effects of the recessive deposit insurance system on the financial industry in China. Then, through the analysis of the panel data of 15 banks in China, the author verifies that the implicit deposit insurance system in our country really weakens the power of market restraint to a great extent. Then it expounds the internal environment and basic conditions of establishing explicit deposit insurance system in China, and then makes a comparative analysis of the reform and development trend of international deposit insurance system from the perspective of market constraints. Finally, according to the actual situation of our country and international experience, based on the perspective of market restriction, this paper designs the target orientation, organization form and fund source, insurance qualification, maximum claim limit and premium rate of deposit insurance system. The purpose is to provide theoretical support for the establishment of a deposit insurance system which is compatible with market constraints and deposit insurance incentives, and to promote the healthy and stable development of our financial industry.
【学位授予单位】：华东交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.2;F842.6
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