信用保证的制度设计与交易成本研究

发布时间：2018-09-01 06:01

【摘要】：目前,世界各国普遍采用信用保证制度来解决中小企业融资困境的问题,特别是中小企业融资市场失灵的问题。过去多数的研究从微观角度,针对信用保证机构的营运特性、营运绩效或风险进行分析；宏观的角度则从政府产业或银行信贷政策等探讨,一些跨国的研究则以各国制度功能或特征表现作出说明和比较,虽然大部份的结论也说明政府介入的必要性及信保制度的特定效益,但也常出现正反两面的意见,对于信用保证制度为何或如何解决中小企业融资问题缺乏整体性的理论架构及分析工具。本文先以制度经济学的交易成本观点,针对中小企业融资问题的市场失灵现象,分别从信息不对称、垄断、外部性及公共财等角度进行完整深入的分析,从中归纳出与交易成本的关联性,并以“交易成本是制度运作的成本”为核心思想,从制度理论中探讨制度的定义及其中的构成要素并和相关的交易成本作为联结,形成一个制度要素与交易成本分析表,作为检视世界各国及美国、中国大陆和台湾等信用保证制度的分析框架。其次,透过制度变迁理论分析各种制度安排的背景因素,以了解其发展的时空背景和影响性。研究结果发现,在制度安排分析方面,以“法令明定交易对象”和“政府主导”是世界各国信保制度普遍的安排要素,前者有助于参与者降低市场交易成本；后者则有助于降低银行等金融机构的高度垄断性问题,同时也解决“信用保证”公共财供给不足的问题。此外,政府进行政策统合和资源分配将有效降低政治交易成本。至于其它的信保制度设计要素对于解决交易成本问题,因各国环境及政策不同,不易判断其优劣,这也说明了制度的设计需有整体性的思考。在个案研究中,美国和台湾的信保制度因针对小企业融资市场的交易成本问题有较多的制度安排,因此较能有效降低市场失灵问题,中国大陆的个案则显示制度安排不足。从制度变迁的观点来看,前两者的制度安排与经济危急的环境有关,而最后者则因从功能补足为思考出发点,故仅重视监管的安排。本文所发展的分析架构工具能协助快速检视现行信保制度的全貌,也可明确掌握该制度的缺失和各因素之间的关联性,以作为制度检讨或修正时综合考虑的依据。而透过制度变迁的分析,可以解释说明诱发各国信保制度的时空背景,以降低不当模拟的偏误。本文主要包括下列内容：对中小企业的融资问题进行理论及实务上的梳理,并归纳为四个交易成本的因素。针对制度理论的制度定义进行深刻的探讨,并和交易成本理论相结合。对于过去信保制度的诸多研究进行前述理论的分类及说明。发展出检视信保制度的工具框架。针对美国中国大陆及台湾三个信保制度个案进行检视,除详细说明其各自的特性也比较其间的差异。最后给出结论和建议。
[Abstract]:At present, credit guarantee system is widely used in the world to solve the financing dilemma of SMEs, especially the failure of SME financing market. In the past, most studies have analyzed the operating characteristics, operating performance or risks of credit guarantee agencies from a micro perspective, while from a macro perspective, they have been discussed from the perspective of government industry or bank credit policies. Some transnational studies illustrate and compare the functions or characteristics of national institutions. Although most of the conclusions also illustrate the necessity of government intervention and the specific benefits of the information and insurance system, there are often positive and negative views. There is a lack of comprehensive theoretical framework and analytical tools for how or how to solve the financing problems of SMEs in the credit guarantee system. Based on the view of transaction cost of institutional economics, this paper analyzes the market failure of SMEs' financing problems from the angles of information asymmetry, monopoly, externality and public finance respectively. This paper sums up the relationship between transaction cost and transaction cost, and takes "transaction cost is the cost of institutional operation" as the core idea, discusses the definition of institution and its constituent elements from institutional theory, and links it with relevant transaction cost. To form an analysis table of system elements and transaction costs, which can be used as an analytical framework to examine credit guarantee systems such as the United States, mainland China and Taiwan. Secondly, the background factors of various institutional arrangements are analyzed through institutional change theory to understand the space-time background and influence of their development. The research results show that in the analysis of institutional arrangements, "decree clearly defined trading object" and "government-led" are the common elements of arrangement in the world, the former helps participants to reduce transaction costs in the market. The latter will help reduce the high monopoly problem of financial institutions such as banks and solve the problem of "credit guarantee" shortage of public goods. In addition, government policy integration and resource allocation will effectively reduce the cost of political transactions. As for the other design elements of the system, it is difficult to judge the merits and demerits of different countries because of their different environments and policies, which also shows that the design of the system should be considered as a whole. In the case study, the United States and Taiwan have more institutional arrangements to deal with the transaction costs in the small business financing market, so they can effectively reduce the market failure, while the Chinese mainland cases show that the institutional arrangements are insufficient. From the point of view of institutional change, the institutional arrangements of the former two are related to the critical economic environment, while the latter only attaches importance to the arrangement of supervision because of the function complement as the starting point. The analytical framework tools developed in this paper can help to quickly examine the full picture of the current information and insurance system, and can also clearly grasp the deficiencies of the system and the correlation between the various factors, so as to serve as the basis for comprehensive consideration in the review or revision of the system. Through the analysis of institutional changes, it can be explained that the space-time background of the inducement of the trust and insurance system in various countries can be explained to reduce the bias of improper simulation. This paper mainly includes the following contents: the financing problem of small and medium-sized enterprises is analyzed theoretically and practically, and it is summarized into four factors of transaction cost. The institutional definition of institutional theory is deeply discussed and combined with transaction cost theory. For the past many studies of information and insurance system for the above-mentioned theoretical classification and explanation. To develop a framework for examining the information and insurance system. In this paper, three cases of China and Taiwan are examined, and the differences between them are compared in detail. Finally, the conclusions and recommendations are given.
【学位授予单位】：南开大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F830.5

【参考文献】