政府绩效信息内部人控制行为的产生及对策研究

发布时间：2018-04-28 01:25

本文选题：政府 + 绩效信息　；参考：《湘潭大学》2016年硕士论文

【摘要】：政府绩效管理是当今世界各国推动政府改革的科学管理工具。党的十八届三中全会提出,要“严格绩效管理,突出责任落实”。保障政府在履行公共管理职能、提供公共服务过程中所产生、传递和发布的所有绩效信息的真实性和公信力,是提高政府管理绩效、推进政府管理体制创新的关键。但不可否认的是,在政府绩效管理实践中,尤其是在绩效信息供给过程中,绩效信息内部人控制行为频现。这严重影响着政府绩效管理的效率,一定程度上制约着政府治理体系和治理能力的现代化。在政府绩效信息供给过程中存在着多层次的委托代理关系。与此同时,委托代理理论也逐渐发展为现阶段学术界研究公共绩效治理的重要理论之一。而当前国内外对政府绩效信息内部人控制的研究鲜有关注,以委托代理理论为视角开展的相关研究更是凤毛麟角,这也是本文写作的源动力和目的之一。运用委托代理理论,剖析政府绩效信息内部人控制行为的产生,探索其规避路径,是增进政府绩效、提高公共管理质量、满足公众需求的现实需要。因此,本文以委托代理理论为视角,旨在运用经济学的工具,基于我国政府绩效管理实践和客观事实,重新审视政府绩效信息供给过程中的委托代理关系,不仅有利于剖析绩效信息内部人控制的深层次原因,还有利于为政府绩效管理科学发展提供有效的实现途径。本文主要对政府绩效信息、内部人控制行为和委托代理理论的相关概念进行了界定,详细阐述了政府绩效信息内部人控制行为中的委托代理关系,并以委托代理理论为视角,从表现、负面影响及成因等三个方面对我国政府绩效信息内部人控制行为进行了较为细致地分析,提出了规避政府绩效信息内部人控制行为的路径,确保委托人与代理人的利益目标趋于一致。在实现委托人与代理人共赢的同时,推进高绩效政府建设目标的顺利实现。
[Abstract]:The government performance management is a scientific management tool for various countries in the world to promote the reform of the government. In the third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, the party proposed to "strict performance management, to highlight the implementation of responsibility". To ensure the authenticity and credibility of all the performance information produced, transmitted and published in the process of public administration and public service. It is the key to improve the performance of government management and promote the innovation of government management system. But it is undeniable that in the practice of government performance management, especially in the process of performance information supply, the internal control behavior of the performance information is frequent. This seriously affects the efficiency of government performance management and restricts the government governance system and governance to a certain extent. In the process of government performance information supply, there are many levels of principal-agent relationship in the process of government performance information supply. At the same time, principal-agent theory has gradually developed into one of the important theories in the study of public performance governance at the present stage. At present, there is little concern about the internal and external research on the internal control of government performance information. It is also one of the most rare studies in the perspective of theory, which is also one of the motive forces and purposes of this article. By using the principal-agent theory, it analyzes the emergence of the human control behavior in the government performance information and explores its evasion path, which is the practical need to enhance the government performance, improve the quality of public management and meet the needs of the public. From the perspective of principal-agent theory, the purpose of this paper is to reexamine the principal-agent relationship in the process of government performance information supply, using the tools of economics and based on the performance management practice and objective facts of our government. It is not only beneficial to the analysis of the underlying causes of the internal control of the performance information, but also to the scientific development of the government performance management. This article mainly defines the related concepts of government performance information, insider control behavior and principal-agent theory, expounds the principal agent relationship in the internal control behavior of government performance information, and takes the principal-agent theory as the angle of view, from three aspects, from performance, negative impact and cause of cause to me. The internal control behavior of the government performance information is carefully analyzed, and the path to avoid the internal control behavior of the government performance information is put forward to ensure that the interests of the principal and the agent tend to be consistent. At the same time, the successful realization of the high performance government construction goal is carried out while the principal and agent are achieved.

【学位授予单位】：湘潭大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：D630

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