基于偏好和运营成本的定价决策与零售商回收渠道选择研究

发布时间：2018-02-02 13:32

本文关键词： 闭环供应链双渠道渠道偏好博弈定价回收渠道选择　出处：《天津工业大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在闭环供应链中,制造商开辟网络渠道后,消费者会对传统渠道与网络渠道产生不同的渠道偏好,同时两条渠道会分别产生不同的渠道运营成本,这些因素都会对供应链成员的定价产生影响。在我国,建筑机械需求的不断增大为更接近市场需求的零售商进行产品再制造提供可能,零售商再制造为闭环供应链提供了新的管理运营模式。因此本文研究基于渠道偏好和运营成本的双渠道闭环供应链定价决策问题和零售商再制造的闭环供应链回收渠道选择问题,运用博弈论建立决策模型。通过对模型的求解与分析,得出管理启示。第二章对文中应用到的闭环供应链、博弈论和回收渠道理论进行了介绍。第三章考虑零售商负责回收废旧产品、制造商开辟网络直销渠道的双渠道闭环供应链,基于消费者对传统渠道和网络渠道偏好不一致和渠道运营成本的不同,建立了制造商和零售商之间三种不同权力结构下的博弈定价决策模型。比较分析了模型的均衡解,得到了消费者渠道偏好度、渠道运营成本对最优定价策略和企业最大利润的影响。研究表明:最优直销价格随网络渠道偏好的增加而增加,而最优零售价格随之减小;网络渠道运营成本增加对制造商不利对零售商有利,而传统渠道运营成本增加对制造商和零售商都不利。第四章研究了零售商再制造的闭环供应链定价与废旧品的回收渠道选择问题。分别在三种不同回收模式(即零售商回收、第三方回收、零售商与第三方同时回收)下建立了零售商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,对定价与回收量决策给出相应的博弈均衡解,并对结果进行了比较分析。结果表明:双回收渠道总是比单回收渠道对零售商,消费者和整条供应链有利,但对制造商不利;当零售商回收价格与回收量转换率和第三方回收成本与回收量转换率增大时,制造商最大利润将会增加而零售商最大利润和供应链总利润均会减少。第五章对闭环供应链中制造商开辟网络渠道后博弈定价和零售商进行再制造的闭环供应链中回收渠道选择的研究结果进行了总结,并对相关的研究进行了展望。
[Abstract]:In the closed-loop supply chain, after the manufacturer opens the network channel, the consumer will produce different channel preference to the traditional channel and the network channel, at the same time, the two channels will produce different channel operation cost respectively. These factors will affect the pricing of supply chain members. In our country, the increasing demand for construction machinery provides the possibility for retailers who are closer to the market demand to remanufacture their products. Retailer remanufacturing provides a new management mode for closed-loop supply chain. Therefore, this paper studies the pricing decision problem of double-channel closed-loop supply chain based on channel preference and operating cost and the closed-loop supply chain return of retailer remanufacturing. The problem of channel selection. Game theory is used to establish decision-making model. Through solving and analyzing the model, the management enlightenment is obtained. Chapter two is about the closed-loop supply chain applied in this paper. Game theory and recycling channel theory are introduced. Chapter three considers that retailers are responsible for recycling used products and manufacturers open up a double-channel closed-loop supply chain. Based on the consumers of traditional channels and network channel preferences and channel operating costs are different. A game pricing decision model with three different power structures between manufacturer and retailer is established. The equilibrium solution of the model is compared and the consumer channel preference is obtained. The influence of channel operating cost on the optimal pricing strategy and the maximum profit of the enterprise. The research shows that the optimal direct selling price increases with the increase of network channel preference, while the optimal retail price decreases; The increase of operating cost of network channel is bad for manufacturer and good for retailer. In Chapter 4th, the closed-loop supply chain pricing and recycling channel selection of remanufacturing by retailers are studied respectively in three different recycling modes (1). Retailers recycle. The Stackelberg game model led by retailers is established under the condition of third party recovery (retailer and third party recovery), and the corresponding game equilibrium solution is given for pricing and payback decision. The results are compared and analyzed. The results show that the dual recovery channel is always beneficial to retailers, consumers and the whole supply chain, but not to manufacturers; When the conversion rate between the retailer's recovery price and the payback is increased, and the third party's recycling cost and the payback conversion rate increase. The maximum profit of the manufacturer will increase, while the maximum profit of the retailer and the total profit of the supply chain will decrease. Chapter 5th: the closed loop supply chain in which the manufacturer opens up a network channel and the retailer remanufactures the closed-loop supply chain. The results of the research on the selection of the recovery channel were summarized. The related research is prospected.
【学位授予单位】：天津工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F714.1;F713.32

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