CSR行为管理中政府与核心企业的进化博弈模型分析

发布时间：2018-03-29 17:37

本文选题：企业社会责任　切入点：进化博弈　出处：《北京交通大学学报(社会科学版)》2013年03期

【摘要】：由于对企业是否履行CSR(Corporate Social Responsibility)行为进行监督需要可观的监督成本,且对政府来说,严格的监督还可能对短期内GDP政绩指标表现造成不利影响。因此,在缺乏媒体监督的社会环境中,政府和核心企业都有不采取措施监督供应链成员履行CSR的动机。针对这一现实问题,可运用进化博弈理论,在前人研究基础上引入GDP政绩和媒体监督的环境因素,构建政府和核心企业CSR监督的进化博弈模型,对彼此博弈策略的稳定性进行分析。研究表明:政府和核心企业对供应链成员的CSR行为是否进行监督一方面取决于监督成本、公众的CSR意识、GDP政绩指标权重以及社会媒体的监督力量等因素,另一方面也与博弈对手的策略选择的概率相关。
[Abstract]:Since monitoring the performance of CSR(Corporate Social response by enterprises requires considerable oversight costs and can adversely affect the performance of GDP performance indicators in the short term, it is also possible for the government to exercise strict supervision. In the social environment without media supervision, both government and core enterprises have the motive of not taking measures to supervise supply chain members to fulfill CSR. In view of this realistic problem, evolutionary game theory can be used. On the basis of previous studies, this paper introduces the environmental factors of GDP performance and media supervision, and constructs an evolutionary game model of CSR supervision between government and core enterprises. The stability of each other's game strategy is analyzed. The research shows that whether the government and the core enterprises supervise the CSR behavior of supply chain members depends on the supervision cost on the one hand. The CSR awareness of the public is related to the weight of CSR performance indicators and the supervisory power of social media, on the other hand, it is also related to the probability of the strategy choice of the game opponents.
【作者单位】：中国石油大学(华东)经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71172080)
【分类号】：F270;F224.32

【参考文献】