政府双重干预对双销售渠道闭环供应链的影响

发布时间：2018-04-29 14:44

本文选题：闭环供应链 + 政府双重干预　；参考：《系统工程理论与实践》2017年10期

【摘要】：本文考虑政府再造品置换补贴和废旧品回收奖惩双重干预(简称政府双重干预),分别构建了无政府干预、再造品置换补贴干预、废旧品回收奖惩干预和政府双重干预下的双销售渠道闭环供应链模型.在政府干预内生化的基础上,探讨了政府双重干预对闭环供应链最优决策的影响并与单一政策的干预效果进行对比分析,并以社会福利最大化为目标分析了政府的最优干预参数.研究表明:政府双重干预下,新产品价格和需求量会降低,再造品价格和需求量会上升;政府双重干预时,两政策的干预效果会叠加,强化了单一政策干预的效果,进一步促进再造品的销售和废旧品的回收;通过设计合理的干预力度和干涉阈值,可提高制造商利润和消费者剩余并实现全社会福利的增加;制造商与零售商通过利润共享,可弥补政策干预下的零售商利润损失,保证闭环供应链的稳定性和实现闭环供应链成员的共赢.
[Abstract]:In this paper, we consider the dual intervention of government replacement subsidy for recycled goods and reward and punishment for recycling products (referred to as government dual intervention for short), and construct non-government intervention and subsidy intervention for recycling product replacement, respectively. Double-channel closed-loop supply chain model of waste recovery reward and punishment intervention and government intervention. On the basis of the internal biochemistry of government intervention, this paper probes into the influence of government dual intervention on the optimal decision of closed-loop supply chain and makes a comparative analysis with the intervention effect of single policy. The optimal intervention parameters of the government are analyzed with the aim of maximizing social welfare. The research shows that the price and demand of new products will decrease and the price and demand of recycled goods will increase under the dual intervention of the government, and the intervention effect of the two policies will be superimposed under the dual intervention of the government, which will strengthen the effect of the single policy intervention. To further promote the sale of recycled goods and the recovery of used and used products; to increase manufacturers' profits and consumer surpluses and achieve an increase in social welfare through the design of reasonable intervention and intervention thresholds; and to share profits between manufacturers and retailers through profit sharing, It can make up for the loss of retailer profit under policy intervention, ensure the stability of the closed-loop supply chain and realize the win-win situation of the members of the closed-loop supply chain.
【作者单位】：大连理工大学管理与经济学部;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金(14BGL063)~~
【分类号】：F274

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